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Sabine von Schorlemer & Sylvia Maus∗
Reflections on Climate Change,  
Heritage and Peace
I Climate Change as a Threat to Peace
“Does Climate Change Kill People in Darfur?”1 – The question is striking, but 
the title of a 2011 journal article captures the quintessence of a vivid and topical 
debate over the impacts of man-made climate change on international peace and 
security. Influential voices such as the UN Secretary-General2 and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)3 have established a direct link be-
tween the armed conflict and climate change, notably for the conflict in Darfur.4 
A commentary of the International Institute for Strategic Studies partly attrib-
utes the Arab Spring to climate change.5 And the well-known Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change purports that “climate-related shocks have sparked 
violent conflict in the past”.6
∗ Prof. Dr. jur. habil. Dr. rer. pol. habil. Sabine von Schorlemer is chair holder of the 
UNESCO Chair in International Relations at the Faculty of Law at the Technische 
Universität Dresden. On 30 September 2009, she was appointed as Saxon State Min-
ister for Higher Education, Research and the Fine Arts.
 Sylvia Maus, LL.M. (Nottingham) is a PhD candidate and scientific co-ordinator at 
the UNESCO Chair in International Relations.
1 Lyal S Sunga, ‘Does Climate Change Kill People in Darfur?’ (2011) 2(1) Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 64. See also Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: 
A Short History of a Long War (Zed Books 2005).
2 Report of the Secretary-General on Climate Change and its Possible Security Implica-
tions, A/64/350 of 11 September 2009, especially paras. 68ff.
3 United Nations Environment Programme, Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental As-
sessment (Nairobi 2007).
4 See e.g. Gareth Evans, Conflict Potential in a World of Climate Change, Address by 
the President of the International Crisis Group, to Bucerius Summer School on Global 
Governance 2008, Berlin, 29 August 2008, www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/
speeches/2008/conflict-potential-in-a-world-climate-change.aspx accessed 1 June 2014.
5 Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, ‘Global Warming and the Arab Spring’ (2011) 
53(2) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 11.
6 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 
2006), Executive Summary, p. vii-viii.
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However, the patterns of correlation and causation are far from being firmly 
established and both critics and proponents of a conception of “climate change 
as conflict catalyst” are still wrestling with the problem.7 While the link between 
scarcity of natural resources and conflict has long been established,8 the claim 
that the “potential for the changing climate to induce conflict or exacerbate exist-
ing instability (…) is now recognized”9 should be approached with caution. Crit-
ics argue that even though “there is unquestionably a general causal connection 
(...), at least in the sense that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’”,10 it is difficult 
to establish a clear causal link between climate change and conflict.11 Indeed, 
in a long-term study ranging from 1990 to 2009, scholars examined climate-
conflict relationships using data from over 16.000 violent events in East Africa 
(Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and 
7 Idean Salehyan, ‘From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet’ (2008) 45(3) 
Journal of Peace Research 315. For a summary of the debate see also Sumudu Ata-
pattu, ‘Climate Change, Resource Scarcity, Migration and Conflict: Implications for 
International Peace and Security’ forthcoming in id. Human Rights Approaches to 
Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge, 2015) and, touching 
upon a variety of issues, Michael Brzoska, Martin Kalinowski, Volker Matthies and 
Berthold Meyer (eds) Klimawandel und Konflikte. Versicherheitlichung versus Präven-
tive Friedenspolitik? (Nomos 2012).
8 See most notably Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, ‘On the Threshold: Environmental 
Changes as a Cause of Acute Conflict’ (1991) 16(2) International Security 76 and 
id., ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’ (1994) 19:1 
International Security 5.
9 Michael Werz and Laura Conley, ‘Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict: Address-
ing Complex Crisis Scenarios in the 21st Century’ (Center for American Progress 
and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2013), www.boell.org/downloads/climate_migration_ 
execsumm.pdf accessed 1 June 2014, 5. See further also Salehyan (n 7) and Attapatu 
(n 7).
10 Gareth Evans, ‘Conflict Potential in a World of Climate Change’, Address by the President 
of the International Crisis Group, to Bucerius Summer School on Global Governance 
2008, Berlin, 29 August 2008, www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2008/
conflict-potential-in-a-world-climate-change.aspx accessed 1 June 2014.
11 For studies questioning a causal link between climate change and conflict see, e.g. Bu-
haug, Halvard ‘Climate not to blame for African civil wars’ (2010) PNAS Early Edi-
tion, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1005739107 accessed 1 June 2014; Tor A 
Benjaminsen, Koffi Alinon, Halvard Buhaug, Jill T Buseth ‘Does climate change drive 
landuse conflicts in the Sahel?’ (2012) 49 Journal of Peace Research 97; Erik, Gartzke 
‘Could climate change precipitate peace?’ (2012) 49(1) Journal of Peace Research 177; 
Hanne Fjelde and Nina von Uexkull ‘Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies, vulnerability 
and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2012) 31(7) Political Geography 444.
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Uganda)12 and concluded that climate factors have a “modest influence in terms 
of predictive power in a model with political, economic, and physical geographic 
predictors”.13 They continue that “our findings question the most simplistic 
climate–conflict narratives. The relationships between rainfall and temperature 
variability and violence are complex and warrant careful interpretation”.14
In 2007, the United Nations Security Council attended to the topic and held 
a high-level debate on climate change and international peace and security, ad-
dressing for the first time in this forum the potential impact of climate change 
on security.15 In a Statement by the President of the Security Council, the “Secur-
ity Council expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change 
may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace 
and security”.16 The 2009 Secretary-General Report Climate Change and its Pos-
sible Security Implications provides a noteworthy summary of issues relating to 
climate change and security and identifies five “channels through which climate 
change could affect security”:17
(a)  Vulnerability: climate change threatens food security and human health, and in-
creases human exposure to extreme events;
(b)  Development: if climate change results in slowing down or reversing the develop-
ment process, this will exacerbate vulnerability and could undermine the capacity 
of States to maintain stability;
(c)  Coping and security: migration, competition over natural resources and other 
coping responses of households and communities faced with climate-related 
threats could increase the risk of domestic conflict as well as have international 
repercussions;
12 John O’Loughlina, Frank DW Witmer, Andrew M Linke, Arlene Laing, Andrew 
Gettelman, and Jimy Dudhia, ‘Climate Variability and Conflict Risk in East Af-
rica, 1990–2009’ (2012) PNAS Early Edition, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas. 
1205130109 accessed 1 June 2014.
13 Ibid, 1.
14 Ibid, 2.
15 UN Security Council, 17 April 2007, SC/9000, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/
sc9000.doc.htm accessed 1 June 2014.
16 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 July 2011, 
S/PRST/2011/15. See also UN General Assembly Resolution 65/159 ‘Protection of Glo-
bal Climate for Present and Future Generations of Humankind’, 20 December 2010. For 
a summary of the activities within the UN, see Security Council Report, Monthly Fore-
cast, July 2011, 30 June 2011, www.securitycouncilreport.org accessed 1 June 2014, 14.
17 UN General Assembly ‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications’ Report 
of the Secretary-General, 11 September 2009, A/64/350.
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(d)  Statelessness: there are implications for rights, security, and sovereignty of the loss 
of statehood because of the disappearance of territory;
(e)  International conflict: there may be implications for international cooperation from 
climate change’s impact on shared or undemarcated international resources.18
Equally, emerging threats which merit the attention of the international com-
munity are highlighted,19 namely loss of territory, statelessness and increased 
numbers of displaced persons,20 stress on shared international water resources,21 
and disputes surrounding the opening of the Arctic region to resource exploit-
ation and trade.22
Overall, the report echoes the prevalent perception that conceives of climate 
change as a threat multiplier, “exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, 
weak institutions for resource management and conflict resolution, fault lines 
18 Ibid, 1.
19 Ibid. 
20 The issue of climate migrants or climate refugees has spurred considerable scholarly 
debate, see, for an early example, Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, Environmental 
Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena (The Climate Institute 2005). See 
further Vikram O Kolmannskog, Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate 
Change, Conflict and Forced Migration (Norwegian Refugee Council 2008); Rosemary 
Rayfuse and Emily Crawford, ‘Climate Change, Sovereignty and Statehood’ (2011) 
Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/59; Sumudu Atapattu, ‘Cli-
mate Change: Disappearing States, Migration and Challenges for International Law’ 
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy (forthcoming). For a cautious 
view on a new treaty regime see, for instance, Jane McAdam, ‘Swimming against the 
Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer’ (2011) 23(1) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 2. For comprehensive reference to further lit-
erature, see Atapattu (n 7), note 64.
21 For instance, Nils P Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, Håvard Hegre, Bethany Lacina & 
Taylor Owen, ‘Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries?’, 
(2006) 25(4) Political Geography 361; Ralf Ludwig, Roberto Roson, Christos Zogra-
fos and Giorgios Kallis, ‘Towards an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda on Climate 
Change, Water and Security in Southern Europe and Neighboring Countries’, (2011) 
14 Environmental Science & Policy 794.
22 E.g. Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Ingo Winkelmann and Katrin Tiroch (eds) Arctic Sci-
ence, International Law and Climate Change: Legal Aspects of Marine Science in the 
Arctic Ocean (Springer 2012); Robert Snyder, International Legal Regimes to Man-
age Indigenous Rights and Arctic Disputes from Climate Change (2011) 22 Color-
ado Journal of Int’l Environmental Law & Policy 1; Kathryn Isted, Sovereignty in the 
Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy Considerations 
(2009) 18(2) Journal of Transnat’l Law & Policy 343.
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and a history of mistrust between communities and nations, and inadequate ac-
cess to information or resources”.23
II Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity
In addition to these direct security implications, climate change is increasingly 
posing a threat to the protection of World Heritage. It affects cultural heritage 
(for example through temperature changes, soil erosion, flooding and storms) as 
well as natural heritage (e.g. through the melting of glaciers and habitat changes), 
posing a threat to biodiversity. Furthermore, climate change is likely to affect 
cultural diversity and socio-cultural interactions by forcing communities to 
change their work habits and ways of life, to compete for resources or to migrate 
elsewhere.24
The UNESCO mandate for the protection of cultural heritage and cultural di-
versity stems from four main conventions: First, the 1972 Convention concern-
ing the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,25 with 190 States 
Parties, which links together the concepts of nature conservation and the pres-
ervation of cultural properties. The Convention sets out the duties of States 
Parties in identifying potential sites and their role in protecting and preserving 
them and focuses on the tangible aspects of heritage. The second Convention 
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,26 adopted in 2001, with 
42 States Parties today, outlines how States Parties should preserve underwater 
cultural heritage and take appropriate cooperative action. The third instrument 
23 UN General Assembly ‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications’ Report 
of the Secretary-General, 11 September 2009, A/64/350, p. 1.
24 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, ‘Climate Change and World Heritage. Report on 
predicting and managing the impacts of climate change on World Heritage and Strat-
egy to assist States Parties to implement appropriate management responses’ World 
Heritage Reports No 22, May 2007, available at whc.unesco.org/documents/publi_
wh_papers_22_en.pdf. For Case Studies and general comments on the management 
of world heritage sites in the context of climate change see UNESCO World Heritage 
Centre (2007a) ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’, (June 2007, re-
issued May 2009), available at http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/activities/documents/
activity-43-9.pdf and the special issue on climate change of the quarterly journal 
“World Heritage No. 42” (June 2006).
25 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 
adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
26 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage; adopted 
2 November 2001, entered into force 2 January 2009, (2002) 41 ILM 37.
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is the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage27 
with currently 153 States Parties. This Convention highlights that cultural heri-
tage does not end at monuments and collections of objects, but also includes oral 
traditions, performing arts, and social practices, inherited from our ancestors. 
The fourth convention of importance is the 2005 Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,28 with 127 States Parties 
and the European Union, ensuring that artists, cultural professionals, practition-
ers and citizens worldwide can create, produce, disseminate and enjoy a broad 
range of cultural goods, services and activities, including their own.29 As a fifth 
relevant legal instrument, the Convention on the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of Armed Conflict from 1954,30 including its Second Protocol 
from 1999,31 could be added to the aforementioned list of UNESCO conventions, 
with regards to the special circumstances under international humanitarian law. 
While these conventions cover a range of topics, climate change is not particu-
larly mentioned in any of them. A reference to climatic factors can only be found 
in the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention32; first, as “factors affecting the property” in the Nomination Format 
for inscription on the World Heritage List (Annex 5, 4.b (ii)) and, second, as 
27 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Property; adopted 
 17 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006, 2368 UNTS 3.
28 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions; adopted 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007, 2440 UNTS 311.
29 Sabine von Schorlemer: Kulturpolitik im Völkerrecht verankert. Das neuen UNE-
SCOÜbereinkommen zum Schutz der kulturellen Vielfalt, (2005) 6 Zeitschrift Vere-
inte Nationen 217; Sabine von Schorlemer and Peter-Tobias Stoll (eds.), The UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
Explanatory Notes (Springer 2012).
30 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention; adopted 14 May 1954, entered 
into force 7 August 1956, 249 UNTS 240.
31 Second Protocol of 1999 to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; adopted 26 March 1999, entered into 
force 9 March 2004, 2253 UNTS 172.
32 The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Con-
vention are drafted and regularly updated by the World Heritage Committee. They 
contain precise criteria for the implementation of the Convention, including for the 
inscription of properties on the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in 
Danger, see whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines.
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“potential danger” leading to the inscription of properties on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger (Paragraphs 179b (vi)).
The impacts on climate change on cultural and natural heritage were put on 
the agenda of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee for the first time in 2005. 
The Committee concluded that “the impacts of climate change are affecting many 
and are likely to affect many more World Heritage properties, both natural and 
cultural in the years to come”.33 One year later, the group of experts consisting 
of representatives of the World Heritage Centre and of the advisory bodies,34 
submitted its report “Predicting and Managing the Effects of Climate Change 
on World Heritage” as well as the “Strategy to assist States Parties to implement 
appropriate management responses”.35 Both documents present a detailed analy-
sis of the threats faced by World Heritage sites and discuss potential preventive 
and corrective measures. Last but not least, the World Heritage Committee in 
2007 adopted the “Policy Document on the Impacts of Climate Change on World 
Heritage Properties”,36 identifying synergies between existing international legal 
instruments as well as legal questions concerning the role of the World Heritage 
Convention with respect to an appropriate reaction to climate change. As the Pol-
icy Document highlights, climate change poses a variety of questions, not least 
concerning the legal obligations of Members to the World Heritage Convention 
and institutional challenges with respect to climate change.37 Rather surprisingly, 
there seemingly was no follow-up on these documents,38 except for an amend-
ment of the Operational Guidelines,39 which now acknowledge the “threatening 
33 UNESCO-Document 29COM 7B.a, 2005, Nr. 5.
34 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), International Council on 
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), International Centre for the Study of the Preserva-
tion and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).
35 WHC-06/30.COM/7.1, 2006.
36 WHC-07/16.GA/10, 2007.
37 Ibid. For a discussion of the scope of legal obligations under the Convention with 
respect to climate change, see Sylvia Maus, ‘Hand in Hand Against Climate Change: 
Cultural Human Rights and the Protection of Cultural Heritage’, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs (forthcoming 2014).
38 As the latest issue of the World Heritage Series, UNESCO published a management 
tool intended at assisting site managers in their responses to climate change, however 
without further taking up broader issues of World Heritage and climate change, see 
Jim Perry and Chalie Falzon, ‘Climate Change Adaptation for Natural World Heritage 
Sites. A Practical Guide’ (2014) UNESCO World Heritage Series No 37.
39 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 32 COM 7A.32 (31 March 2009) 
WHC08/32.COM/24Rev para 5.
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impact of climatic (…) factors”40 as one of the threats having potentially deleteri-
ous effects on the inherent characteristics of a property. A more determined reac-
tion by UNESCO to climate change is wanting. For instance, no further activities 
such as further amendment of the Operational Guidelines to better account for 
the threats imposed by climate change or the adoption of an additional protocol 
on this topic have taken place to date.41 Similarly, existing tools, most notably the 
Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstand-
ing Universal Value,42 bear the potential of playing a crucial important role in 
protecting properties threatened by climate change.43 While bearing in mind its 
limited size, this potential has to date not received much attention. As an interna-
tional organisation, UNESCO also faces institutional challenges in the context of 
climate change that call for closer co-operation between the different Programme 
Sectors Education, Sciences, Culture and Communication and Information. Fur-
thermore, enhanced exchange between UNESCO and other relevant actors in 
the field such as States Parties to the UNESCO conventions, but also related UN 
bodies and agencies, other international organisations, and national stakeholders 
would be essential. Yet, instead of assuming a leading role,44 UNESCO and the 
World Heritage Centre willingly left the field to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by stating that the “UNFCCC is the 
UN instrument through which mitigation strategies at the global and States Par-
ties level is being addressed”.45
III Framework of Analysis
The present volume takes a fresh look at the issues and unanswered questions 
presented above and it intends to fill some of the gaps which have been identified. 
The contributions collected in this volume stem from an international conference 
40 Paragraph 179(b)(vi) of the Operational Guidelines. See also the contributions of 
Federico Lenzerini and of Alessandro Chechi in this volume.
41 See in detail the contribution of Alessandro Chechi in this volume.
42 Article 15 WHC.
43 See Federico Lenzerini, ‘Articles 15-16 World Heritage Fund’, in Francesco Francioni 
with Federico Lenzerini (eds.), The 1972 World Heritage Convention. A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2008), 269-288.
44 On the potential of UNESCO as a leading organisation, see Martin Gerner, Lead 
Agency: UNESCO’s Global Leadership and Co-ordination Role for the United Nations 
Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014), Dresden Papers on 
Law and Policy of the United Nations Vol 17 (Peter Lang 2013).
45 (n 35), para 18.
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entitled Climate Change as a Threat to Peace: Impacts on Cultural Heri tage and 
Cultural Diversity, hosted by the German Commission for  UNESCO and the 
UNESCO Chair in International Relations at the Technische Universität Dres-
den. It proceeded under the assumption that the impacts of climate change on 
cultural heritage and cultural diversity may challenge sustainable global peace. 
Accordingly, the above mentioned threats on climate change and conflict on the 
one hand, and protection of cultural property and climate change on the other 
one, were pulled together into one conceptual triangle. Maybe as the most inno-
vative feature, the nexus between cultural heritage and peace was expli citly taken 
account of. The UNESCO Chair in International Relations dedicates much of 
its research to the relationship between peace and cultural heritage and  cultural 
diversity. While the importance of the protection of cultural heritage in armed 
conflicts tends to become more and more recognized,46 the crucial role of cul-
tural policy as a reconciliatory, proactive element of building and  securing of 
sustainable peace47 has so far been largely underestimated. Linking this  nexus 
to the implications of climate change on both cultural property and peace is 
highly topical and thus almost a self-evident continuation of the research at the 
 UNESCO Chair in International Relations.
To be sure, the described triangular integration is a complex one, one that 
needs innovative thinking and innovative action. It is also one that has to be ac-
knowledged as an interdisciplinary issue bringing together natural sciences and 
46 E.g. Sabine von Schorlemer, ‘Cultural Heritage Law: Recent Developments in the 
Laws of War and Occupation’ in James AR Nafziger and Ann M Nicgorski, Cul-
tural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest, Colonization and Commerce ( Martinus 
 Nijhoff 2010) 137-158. Currently, the UNECO Chair in International Relations con-
ducts a research project on the “menace to cultural property in armed conflicts” in 
which the mechanisms for protecting cultural properties and cultural heritage in 
armed conflicts, with special emphasis on the provisions of the relevant conventions, 
are analysed. Furthermore, their application and effectiveness in the light of recent 
challenges illustrated by current examples of armed conflicts (amongst others Thai-
land und Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Congo, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Mali) are 
examined.
47 See, as an early recognition of this connection, Walter Hirche, Kulturelle Zusam-
menarbeit als dritte Dimension der deutschen Außenpolitik, in: Deutsche UNESCO-
Kommission (Hrsg.), Lernziel Weltoffenheit, Fünfzig Jahre deutsche Mitarbeit in der 
UNESCO (2001), p. 31, who regards cultural cooperation, especially in order to pro-
tect cultural heritage and diversity, by its very nature as a trust building task bearing, 
as a matter of principle, the potential for “endowing legal relationships with respect to 
peaceful cooperation” (translation by the authors).
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engineering with humanities and social sciences. The focus of the conference 
was on the legal and institutional challenges faced by national and international 
actors, and especially by UNESCO. However, as the present contributions show, 
it also alluded to broader issues of mitigation, adaptation and resilience.
The first part of the volume, Interdisciplinary Approaches of Linking Climate 
Change with Politics and Law of Cultural Heritage, starts off with shorter articles 
and comments from both academics and practitioners and intends to map the 
field and set the scene. In his contribution Man-made Climate Change: A major 
Challenge for World Heritage Conservation, Bernd von Droste zu Hülshoff, former 
Assistant Director General of UNESCO and Founding Director of the UNESCO 
World Heritage Centre, gives an overview about the impacts of climate change 
on natural and cultural heritage as well as on past, current and future activities of 
UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee in particular. As an opening of the 
debate, von Droste zu Hülshoff underlines the special obligation of rich countries 
to “commit to protecting our common global heritage” and calls for enforceable 
international obligations of “caring for the world climate” and “caring for our 
cultural and natural inheritance”.
Gunter Pleuger, long-time diplomat and Permanent German Representative 
at the UN in New York from 2002-2006, analyses the role of the UN Security 
Council in his article Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace – The 
Role of the UN Security Council. While acknowledging the capacity of the Secur-
ity Council to counter the lack of legal and enforceable obligations by taking 
binding decisions, and even “establishing itself as a new source of international 
law next to international customary and treaty law”, Pleuger does not see the is-
sue of climate change as a threat to peace to be placed on the Security Council 
agenda in the imminent.
With her contribution The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Climate Change – Introducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law, 
Franziska Knur article revisits the 2009 Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Report on the relationship of climate change and human rights 
and undertakes to develop the United Nations human rights-based approach to 
climate change into a more meaningful concept. She comes to the conclusion 
that a human rights-based approach can have significant impact on the inter-
national climate change discourse, not least by providing access to institutions 
for the concretization of State obligations and by the introduction of a vertical 
dimension, id est subjective rights, into international climate law.
The second part of the book illuminates in some details the manifold and 
sometimes severe Impacts of Climate Change on Cultural Heritage and on Cul-
tural Diversity. Michael Turner and Rachel Singer focus, from a perspective 
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of Urban Design and Architecture, on the role of Urban Resilience in Climate 
Change. Treating the concept of resilience as a “panacea to the negative impacts 
of change”, Turner and Singer propose new integrative conceptual tools to under-
stand Urban Resilience and stress the importance of heritage and cultural diver-
sity in the discussion in order to ensure sustainability between communities and 
preserving heritage for future generations.
Roger-Alexandre Lefèvre skilfully addresses the distinction between the Impact 
of Climate Change on Slow Degradation of Monuments in Contrast to Extreme 
Events. While the focus of attention in the realm of climate change often lies 
with extreme weather events such as extreme winds, storms, tornados; extreme 
precipitations, flooding, flash floods; heat waves, drought; pollution peaks, built 
cultural heritage will also experience slow events in strong correlation with air 
pollution (e.g. recession of façades in limestone or marble; soiling of stone sur-
face and of glass; chemical leaching of mediaeval stained glass; metal corrosion) 
or weak correlation with air pollution (salt crystallization in porous walls; freeze-
thaw damage in porous materials; submersion of monuments on littoral due to 
sea level rise; swelling-shrinkage of expansive clay minerals in soils; biomass 
accumulation on façades in unurban areas). In conclusion of his contribution, 
Lefèvre poses the question as to whether monuments will really be threatened by 
these slow climate change related events. Interestingly, he comes to the conclu-
sion that while monuments in Central and Southern Europe are not likely to be 
threatened by the slow evolution, monuments in Northern Europe will be threat-
ened. Therefore, Lefèvre calls for improvement basic research in order to better 
anticipating climate change impacts on cultural heritage.
With their contribution Impact of Global Change on World Heritage and on 
Environmental Resources: The Need for an Integrated Management Approach, Reza 
Ardakanian and Stephan Hülsmann consider heritage sites within their broader 
natural environment and the corresponding environmental resources. They focus 
on the need for an integrated approach for mitigating and/or adapting to the direct 
and indirect impacts of global climate change and argue that both protection and 
management of heritage sites must be approached by considering the environ-
mental resources within the respective region. Especially with regards to develop-
ing countries, Ardakanian and Hülsmann call for management strategies to be 
embedded in capacity development activities addressing all relevant stakeholders.
The contribution of Elisabeth Longworth The Culture of Prevention: Heritage 
and Resilience focuses on the important role cultural heritage plays in supporting 
sustainable development, disaster risk reduction and building community resili-
ence. Against this backdrop, Longworth calls for enhanced action to be taken in 
order to support efforts towards heritage-driven resilience, inter alia through the 
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integration of heritage in disaster risk reduction plans, policies and strategies at 
all levels as well as capacity-building programmes and awareness raising. Not-
ably, such enhanced action does not only include cooperation between different 
state institutions but also an inclusion of the private sector by harnessing public-
private partnerships.
The contributions of the next part entitled Lex Lata and De Lege Ferenda – 
Legal Challenges of Cultural Property Protection in the Context of Climate 
Change address the legal challenges of protecting cultural property in the face 
of climate change. In the focus of attention are amongst others the potential 
consequences of the failure of a State to protect cultural property in the con-
text of climate change as well as further breaches of international obligations. 
Existing legal rules are examined and legal voids identified which may call for 
amendments to prevailing treaty law or even the drafting of a new international 
legal instrument.
The relationship between cultural heritage protection and climate change is 
graphically presented in Guido Carducci’s contribution What Consideration is 
Given to Climate and to Climate Change in the UNESCO Cultural Heritage and 
Property Conventions? Notably, Carducci elaborates on the possibilities but also 
the limits of law and legal measures in this regard before giving an overview 
of UNESCO’s legal instruments protecting tangible and intangible heritage and 
how they treat (or rather do not treat) climate change.
Federico Lenzerini sheds light to some of these issues with his contribution 
Protecting the Tangible, Safeguarding the Intangible: A Same Conventional Model 
for Different Needs. While acknowledging the importance and the success of the 
1972 World Heritage Convention, Lenzerini is more reluctant with the replica-
tion of this model in other legal instruments, most notably in the 2003 Con-
vention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. With respect 
to climate change, Lenzerini explains that both Conventions “in principle pro-
vide the necessary tools to face the threats posed by climate change”. However, 
practice shows a lack of adequate attention to the issue within both legal in-
struments. While the WHC at least mentions climate change in its Operations 
Guidelines, the CSICH so far lacks such references in its Operational Directives. 
In conclusion, Lenzerini concedes that any changes to the current situation de-
pend on the political will of the respective states parties. However, it is warned 
that the “international community cannot further postpone setting up a global, 
targeted and efficient action having the purpose of fighting the detrimental ef-
fects produced by climate change on both tangible and intangible cultural heri-
tage. Maybe the time is still right to do that; the risk is that very soon it may be 
too late“.
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Subsequently, Alessandro Chechi analyses the The Cultural Dimension of Cli-
mate Change: Some Remarks on the Interface between Cultural Heritage and Cli-
mate Change Law. By examining the existing international legal framework, he 
investigates whether and to what extent cultural heritage law interacts with the 
international legal climate change regime and argues that the recognition of cul-
tural heritage concerns by climate change law is both desirable and necessary. 
Notably, while, in Chechi’s view, the WHC does contain a legally binding obliga-
tion for the States Parties to adopt GHG emissions limits “more compelling than 
those called for by the Kyoto Protocol”, he also draws attention to other mechan-
isms such as the Fund and the Operational Guidelines. Furthermore, existing 
shortcomings in the climate change regime must be addressed, bearing in mind 
that “procrastination is not an option”.
Birgitta Ringbeck concludes this section with her chapter on World Cultural 
Heritage Sites and Climate Change: Management Issues. By calling for a full inte-
gration of heritage concerns into risk strategies and programs, Ringbeck under-
lines the importance of management plans for World Heritage sites as “keytools 
in the effective stewardship of World Heritage sites under threat from climate 
change”. In addition, general mitigation policy is needed, such as the expansion 
of renewable energy, which has been promoted by German national and federal 
governments. In doing so, however, Ringbeck regrets that not enough attention is 
given to the potential of the use and reuse of moments and their appreciation as 
non-renewable resources.
As both a summary and outlook, Roland Bernecker’s Concluding Remarks re-
capitulate the main findings of the foregoing contributions. In bringing together 
the three elements of cultural heritage, climate change and peace, Bernecker once 
more underlines that culture is a “crucial, yet dramatically neglected dimen-
sion of sustainability”. Furthermore, he encourages scholars, practitioners and 
other stakeholders to broaden their views and rework familiar concepts such as 
preservation, safeguarding, change, and management. Especially the concept of 
resilience has emerged as crucial in this debate. As a resumé of the challenges 
we are facing today, Bernecker appositely concludes that “our inventiveness and 
our hunger for improvement not only compromise our future, but consume our 
past”. In order to prevent this from happening, a return to the universal values 
highlighted most notably by the World Heritage Convention, but also by her 
sister instruments, is “a necessary contribution to peace”.
The conference Climate Change as a Threat to Peace: Impacts on Cultural 
Heri tage and Cultural Diversity and thus also this volume could only be realised 
thanks to the generous financial contributions of the Association of Friends and 
Sponsors of the Technische Universität Dresden (Gesellschaft von Freunden und 
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Förderern der TU Dresden), the School of International Studies (Zentrum für 
Internationale Studien, ZIS) and the Regional Association Saxony, SaxonyAnhalt 
and Thuringia of the United Nations Association of Germany (Landesverband 
Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die 
Vereinten Nationen e.V., DGVN). The editor wishes to express deep gratitude to 
these organisations for their support. For their excellent work and commitment 
thanks are extended to the organising committee of the conference as well as the 
editorial team at the UNESCO Chair: Franziska Knur, Daphne Rodzinyak, Antje 
Urban and Martin Gerner. Very special thanks go to the German Commission 
for UNESCO, since without their crucial support in organising and funding the 
conference, the present volume would not have been possible.
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Bernd von Droste zu Hülshoff ∗
Man-made Climate Change: A Major Challenge 
for World Heritage Conservation
No issue is more international than global warming: all people on the planet 
share the same atmosphere. The world is currently engaged in a grand experi-
ment, studying what happens when you release carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere in greater and greater amounts. The scientific community is fairly sure of 
the result, a reality that is already occurring: glaciers and the polar ice cap will 
melt, ocean currents will change, and ocean levels will rise. Unlike other prob-
lems associated with globalization; however, global environmental problems 
affect developed and developing countries alike. Climate change will have an 
impact on social and cultural aspects, with communities changing the way they 
live, work, worship, and socialise in buildings, sites, and landscapes. Whole com-
munities may be forced to migrate and abandon their built heritage.
I Natural Heritage
Many World Heritage sites already exhibit serious effects due to global warming. 
In particular, some of the world’s most magnificent glaciers – the Jungfrau, Eiger, 
and Moench range in Switzerland and the magnificent glacier of Saint Elias in 
Alaska – that are on the World Heritage List. There is also alarming news about 
the disappearance of corral reefs and their bleaching – for instance at the Great 
Barrier Reef in Australia, the Moon Reef in Belize, and the Galapagos Islands. 
Lastly, terrestrial biodiversity, which is the foundation of many natural World 
Heritage sites, may also be affected through species shifting ranges, changes in 
the timing of biological cycles, migration of pests, and invasive species.
II Cultural Heritage
In addition to these environmental considerations, there is a growing concern, 
albeit rather late, over the implications of climate change on the historic built 
environment. Threats to urban areas and historic cities include direct impacts, 
such as more frequent and severe flooding due to extreme weather conditions 
∗ Former Assistant Director-General of UNESCO and Founding Director of the 
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre.
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or rising sea levels. Moreover, a high percentage of the urban population in low- 
income and middle-income countries live within the Low-Elevation Coastal 
Zone, the continuous area along the coast that is less than 10 metres above sea 
level. This creates a danger-zone for such communities.
Ancient buildings were designed for a specific local climate; a climate which is 
now changing. For instance, climate change is the root cause for desertification. 
Sand encroachment is increasingly affecting, for example, the famous Mosques 
of Timbuktu in Mali and the City of Chinguetti in Mauretania. Furthermore, in-
creasing sea levels threaten many coastal sites, as exemplified by the ever grow-
ing number of Acqua Alta (high water) days in the World Heritage City of Venice. 
As a final example, increasing soil temperature may degrade the conditions for 
the conservation of archaeological evidence. Many World Heritage cultural sites 
have already had to cope with climate change risks and impacts. Some climate 
change related processes that may have a negative impact on World Heritage 
sites include: soil moisture such as freeze-thaw cycles, a larger amplitude in tem-
perature and humidity changes, biological infestation of organic building ma-
terials, floods, coastal erosion and sea level rise, increased frequency of severe 
weather, and desertification.
Quantifying these risks and impacts, 72 per cent of State Parties surveyed 
reported climate change impacts on World Heritage. Furthermore, 125 sites 
in 59 different countries are allegedly affected.1 The fact that climate change 
poses a threat to the outstanding universal values of an increasing number of 
World Heritage sites has considerable implications for the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention.2
III World Heritage Convention and Committee
Since 2005, the World Heritage Committee has debated the climate change issue 
from the perspective of Cultural Heritage.3 The Committee addressed a broad 
range of basic questions: What is the real scope of the threat? What can the Com-
mittee do if changing climatic conditions threaten to destroy the very qualities 
for which sites were designated World Heritage?
1 UNESCO, ‘Climate Change and World Heritage’ World Heritage Reports 22 (1 May 
2007) 26.
2 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 
adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
3 UNESCO, ‘Threats to World Heritage Properties’ (9 September 2005) WHC05/29.
COM/22, World Heritage Committee Decision 29COM 7B.a.
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Most importantly, the World Heritage Committee adopted the “Strategy to 
assist States Parties to implement appropriate management responses”4 to assist 
State Parties in addressing these emerging threats. The main objective of this 
strategy was to review the main topics that should be considered when preparing 
to implement preventive and/or corrective management responses to deal with 
the adverse impacts of climate change. The Committee identified three actions 
to safeguard heritage from the effects of climate change:
1)  Preventive actions: monitoring, reporting and mitigation of climate change 
effects through environmentally sound choices and decisions at a range of 
levels (individual, community, institutional and corporate).
2)  Corrective actions: adaptation to the reality of climate change through global 
and regional strategies and local management plans.
3)  Sharing knowledge: including best practices, research, communication, public 
and political support, education and training, capacity building, networking, etc.
The World Heritage Committee climate change strategy also outlined that there 
are strong links between natural and Cultural Heritage, highlighting that the 
climate change issue could be used as an opportunity for the two parts of the 
Convention to be brought closer together. Therefore, whereas climate change 
impacts will differ for World Heritage of natural and cultural types, the pro-
posed strategy should address both types of properties jointly. The Committee 
also stressed that climate change is only one risk among a number of challenges 
facing World Heri tage sites. Therefore, this threat should be considered in the 
broader context of the conservation of these sites. In 2007, the General Assem-
bly of World Heritage States Parties adopted the “Policy Document on the Im-
pacts of Climate Change on World Heritage Properties”;5 which states, among 
 others, that impacts of climate change are already visible; these impacts are better 
studied in relation to natural sites than cultural places; research should focus on 
adaptation; and, the iconic value of World Heritage is used for communication 
and awareness raising. Furthermore, the policy document gave priority to three 
adaption strategies. There is a need for (1) research and vulnerability assess-
ments; (2) documentation, monitoring and cooperation; and (3) the strength-
ening of management and continuous maintenance. The policy document 
also states that in some cases, losses will be unavoidable. Nonetheless, ways to 
4 UNESCO, ‘Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate Management 
Responses’ (26 June 2006) WHC-06/30.COM/7.1.
5 UNESCO, ‘Policy Document on the Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage 
Properties’ (6 June 2008) WHC-07/16.GA/10.
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increase resilience include corridors between protected areas, preventive drain-
ing of glacial lakes, and maintaining and improving coastal dykes.
The World Heritage Committee also adopted principles guiding research, for-
mulating priorities for research, including priorities for Cultural Heritage.6 Over 
the past 35 years the UNESCO World Heritage List has, in a sense, evolved into 
close to 1000 observation posts around the world. These World Heritage sites, 
representative of our most outstanding Cultural and Natural Heritage, inevitably 
register the impact of changes that occur on our planet.
World Heritage sites are continually monitored and assessed. If a site happens 
to be flooded, the activity is observed, recorded, and the World Heritage Com-
mittee is duly informed in order to take appropriate action.
IV UNESCO Climate Initiatives
UNESCO’s climate related initiatives are conducted in close collaboration with 
relevant bodies already involved in climate change and heritage conservation 
issues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)7, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)8, the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD)9, the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere 
Programme (MAB)10 , the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands11, and the UNESCO 
conventions dealing with Cultural Heritage.12
In addition, the UNESCO World Heritage Centre has undertaken a number 
of activities relating to climate change issues. One of the most important is the 
6 The UNESCO World Heritage Centre issued a number of World Heritage and Cli-
mate Change Publications which can be consulted at whc.unesco.org/en/climate 
change accessed 25 September 2013.
7 Adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107 (2013: 
195 State Parties).
8 Created in 1988; see www.ipcc.ch accessed 25 September 2013.
9 Adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS 79 (2013: 
193 State Parties).
10 Created in 1971; see www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological 
sciences/man-and-biosphere-programme accessed 25 September 2013.
11 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habi-
tat; adopted 2 February 1971, entered into force on 21 December 1975, 996 UNTS 245 
(2013: 168 State Parties).
12 For an overview see UNESCO, ‘Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativ-
ity’ en.unesco.org/themes/protecting-our-heritage-and-fostering-creativity accessed 
25 September 2013.
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report “Case studies on climate change and World Heritage”.13 This report fea-
tures 26 sites, including the Tower of London, Kilimanjaro National Park, and 
the Great Barrier Reef. These case studies are representative of some of the dan-
gers faced by the nearly 1000 properties inscribed on the World Heritage List.
UNESCO also addresses the climate change issue in general. In 2009, the 
 UNESCO Director-General, Irina Bokova, launched the UNESCO Climate 
Change Initiative.14 It seeks to reinforce the scientific, mitigation, and adaptation 
capacities of countries and communities that are most vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change.
V Conclusion
Let me further underline that rich countries have a particular obligation to commit 
to protecting our common global Cultural Heritage. It is the poor countries that 
bear the greatest risks related to climate change: on the one hand for geographical 
reasons and on the other hand because they are less protected against destruc-
tion and diseases caused by climatic catastrophes. Furthermore, many of the poor 
have no insurance to pay for damage and remedies. Without the help of developed 
countries, they will not be able to conserve World Heritage as effectively, if at all.
We hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet in common, both 
with other members of the present generation and with other generations, past 
and future:
“At any given time, each generation is both custodian and trustee of the planet for future 
generations and a beneficiary of its fruits. This imposes obligations upon us to care for 
the planet, but also gives us certain rights to use it”.15
Planetary obligations such as caring for the world climate and caring for our cul-
tural and natural inheritance are based on the principles of equity between gen-
erations. These obligations become enforceable when they are made specific by 
international agreements, national and local laws, transformed into customary 
international law, or adopted as general principles of law. They must ultimately be 
defined and applied in the context of specific problems such as conserving World 
Heritage in a time of accelerated climate change. Let us assume this important task.
13 UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’ (UNESCO World 
Heritage Center 2007) whc.unesco.org/en/activities/473 accessed 25 September 2013.
14 www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/sc_climChange_initi 
ative_EN.pdf accessed 25 September 2013.
15 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common 
Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational Publishers 1989) 17.
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Gunter Pleuger∗
Climate Change as a Threat to International 
Peace – The Role of the UN Security Council
Climate Change has been recognized as a global challenge that needs action of 
the international community of states. The Kyoto-Protocol,1 the Millennium 
Declaration,2 treaties and international agreements, resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and regional efforts have been made to address 
the problem – but so far with no comprehensive and sustainable effect.
One of the main obstacles is the lack of legal and enforceable obligations of 
states, leaving the actual implementation of agreements to the sovereign decision 
of governments.
Final documents of conferences and international or regional arrangements 
are normally politically binding only to those states who have signed the docu-
ments, and these normally do not contain the threat of sanctions in case of 
noncompliance. Therefore, the implementation of climate goals varies between 
efforts and neglect.
Climate change as a global problem needs global solutions; and global solu-
tions need a global institution that takes the necessary decisions. The only global 
institution that we have is the United Nations. However, the resolutions of the 
General Assembly are not legally, but only politically, binding on those member 
states who have voted Yes. Those who have voted No, or abstained, have no pol-
itical obligation to implement the resolution adopted by the majority of member 
states in the General Assembly.
The only body of the United Nations that can make decisions legally bind-
ing on all member states is the Security Council. According to Article 25 UN 
Charter “(t)he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”.3
The unique decision making position of the Security Council is underlined by 
Article 12 UN Charter, preventing the General Assembly from making decisions 
on a subject once the Security Council is dealing with the matter.
∗ President of the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) and former German 
Ambassador to the United Nations.
1 Adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 148.
2 Adopted and entered into force 08 September 2000, A/RES/55/2.
3 Adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
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There are two possibilities of action for the Security Council: under Chapter 
6 of the Charter it can make recommendations for the pacific settlement of dis-
putes that endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. If that 
does not help, the Security Council can impose economic or political sanctions, 
and if necessary, authorize military action. However, Article 39 requires that the 
Security Council first determine the existence of a threat or breach of peace be-
fore taking action under Chapter 7. This gives the Security Council a legally 
binding decision making power, which is only ad hoc in the case of an actual 
threat to peace and security.
In the past decades, however, the Security Council has embarked on a new 
policy. It has taken up political and humanitarian issues such as “Children in 
Armed Conflicts”4 and has set general rules for actual problems, thereby creating 
new international law and establishing itself as a new source of international law 
next to international customary and treaty law.
The foundations for this development were laid by two resolutions: the anti-
terrorism resolution5 and the resolution against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass-destruction.6 Both resolutions contain strict rules to be obeyed by all mem-
ber states of the United Nations and include – where necessary – the obligation 
to change national legislation. The implementation of the rules set by these reso-
lutions is supervised by two subcommittees of the Security Council. Member 
states have to report to the Security Council which in the case of noncompliance 
of a member state, can either order assistance in the case of lack of capability or 
adopt sanctions in the case of lack of political willingness to implement Security 
Council resolutions.
This newly developed capacity of the Security Council to create international 
law will certainly be further developed and used in the future in order to cope 
with imminent and serious global problems. For the fight against terrorism or 
against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and similar threats, it would 
take too long to create the relevant customary or treaty law.
It would therefore be possible and potentially effective to make use of the 
powers of the Security Council to set new legal rules in order to cope with cli-
mate change. There are, however, a few obstacles.
4 UNSC Res 2068 (2012) UN Doc S/RES/2068; UNSC Res 1998 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1998; 
UNSC Res 1882 (2009) UN Doc S/RES/1882; see also UNGA ‘The Rights of the Child’ 
Res 51/77 (20 February 1997) UN Doc A/RES/51/77.
5 UNSC Res 1373 (2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373.
6 UNSC Res 1540 (2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540.
 Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace 35
First the issue of climate change as a threat to peace would have to be set on 
the Security Council agenda. Traditionally, the agenda of the Security Council is 
decided by consensus. As the setting of the agenda is a procedural matter, with 
no right of veto, the five permanent members have made sure that they cannot be 
outvoted. But, consensus gives every Security Council member a veto.
In a case of widely differing interests among the Security Council members, it 
can therefore prove difficult to find consensus.
In the Darfur conflict, for instance, two permanent Security Council members 
with special interests in Sudan prevented the inclusion of Darfur in the Security 
Council agenda, which in the end was achieved only by a trick of the Security 
Council presidency proposing as agenda item a “Report on the Situation of Hu-
man Rights in Africa” by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
This incident also reflects another obstacle: the fact that the five permanent 
members with their right of veto dominate the Security Council by their sta-
tus and often put their national interests above the interests of the international 
community.
The Security Council therefore, needs the reform that has been discussed for 
more than 20 years in order to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
its decisions.
At present it might be difficult to engage the Security Council in deliberation 
and action with regard to climate change as a threat to peace, but it is worth to 
try and seek a coalition in the United Nations to put this issue on the Security 
Council agenda. That could open new and creative ways, and effective rules, to 
resolve this global challenge.

Franziska Knur∗
The United Nations Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Climate Change – Introducing  
a Human Dimension to International  
Climate Law
Abstract The article revisits the 2009 Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights Report on the relationship of climate change and human rights 
and undertakes to develop the United Nations human rights-based approach to 
climate change into a more meaningful concept. Accepting the negative impact 
of global warming on the enjoyment of human rights States could be obliged 
to reduce green house gas emissions and provide substantial international as-
sistance to the States most affected by the consequences of global warming, 
not merely based on the international climate regime, but on the basis of 
international human rights law. Human rights also provide an accountability 
framework for damages related to climate change once the conceptual link of 
human rights law and global warming is accepted. Although approaches to en-
hance the concept remain fragmented, it is argued that a human rights-based 
approach can have a significant impact on the international climate change 
discourse: It provides access to institutions for the concretization of State 
obligations and introduces subjective rights and thus a vertical dimension to 
international climate law.
I Introduction
Appropriately addressing climate change is one of today’s major challenges to the 
international community since strategies to limit human-induced global warm-
ing as well as to adapt to the consequences of global climate change require inter-
national co-operation. Thus, the international climate regime presents itself as a 
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Centre for International Studies of the TU Dresden on 1 June 2013. I would like to thank 
Constanze Zahm for her valuable comments during her rejoinder at the symposium.
38 Franziska Knur
“highly specialized area of international law”.1 The 1992 United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2, complemented by the 1997 
Kyoto-Protocol3, acknowledges “that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse 
effects are a common concern of humankind” (1st preamble clause) and provides 
for a common international legal framework in order to stabilize “greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2  UNFCCC). In 
addition to these uniquely formulated treaty provisions, preexisting rules of 
international law – e.g. rules of international environmental or human rights 
law as well as secondary rules with regard to State responsibility – frame the 
legal context of international climate change regulation.4 The identification of 
pertinent international rules as well as the determination of the scope of their 
applicability in the climate change context requires a comprehensive interpret-
ation process governed by a variety of actors such as States, international organ-
izations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international jurisprudence 
and legal scholars.
This article elaborates on the undertaking of the United Nations, especially 
its Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in order to 
implement a human rights-based approach to climate change. The conceptional 
link of human rights and climate change goes back to an initiative of the Mal-
dives.5 In November 2007 a group of Small Island Developing States adopted 
the “Male Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change”6 
requesting the assessment of human rights implications of global warming. The 
Human Rights Council adopted this approach in 2008 and invited OHCHR to 
draft a study on the issue.7 Based on the written and oral submissions of States, 
international institutions, NGOs and scientific groups, the OHCHR’s “Report 
1 See e.g. Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling, ‘Climate Change and the 
Law’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and 
the Law (Springer 2012) 2.
2 Adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107.
3 Adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005, (1998) 37 ILM 22.
4 See e.g. Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, Mac Darrow and Lavanya Rajamani, Human 
Rights and Climate Change: A Review of the International Legal Dimensions (World 
Bank Publications 2011) 11–19.
5 On the role of the Maldives see John Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate 
Change at the United Nations’ (2009) 33 Harv Envt’l L Rev 477, 479–484.
6 (13–14 November 2007) www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf 
accessed 18 June 2013.
7 UNHRC Res 7/23 (28 March 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/78.
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on the relationship between climate change and human rights” was published in 
January 2009.8 It was presented before the Human Rights Council, which took 
note of the study in resolution 10/4 of 25 March 2009 and which decided to 
hold an interactive panel discussion on the relationship between climate change 
and human rights.9 At the debate held in June 2009 the Council concluded that 
it was “valuable to look at climate change-related effects from a human rights 
perspective”.10 It became, however, evident that there was substantial disagree-
ment between States on the question whether – and if, to what extent – interna-
tional human rights law contains State obligations in the context of addressing 
the causes and consequences of climate change. It remained unanswered how 
the normative construction of correlating rights and duties of international hu-
man rights law could be linked in a meaningful way to the international effort to 
manage climate change.
This article reopens the debate and discusses the advantage of the United Na-
tions human rights-based approach to climate change. First, the key findings 
of the OHCHR report will be revisited. With reference to three key questions, 
secondly it will be assessed how the human rights-based approach could further 
be developed into a more meaningful concept. Third, it will be suggested that 
the human rights-based approach uniquely contributes to the international dis-
course on climate change by introducing a human dimension to international 
climate law. On a practical as well as on a conceptual level, it will be argued that 
the acceptance of human rights as a cross-cutting issue within the context of 
global warming will – in the long run – be characteristic for the further develop-
ment of the international system.
II  The Report of the OHCHR on the Relationship  
between Climate Change and Human Rights
The OHCHR report discusses “how the observed and projected impacts of cli-
mate change have implications for the enjoyment of human rights and for the 
obligations of States under international human rights law”.11 However, it does 
8 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61.
9 UNHRC Res 10/4 (25 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/29.
10 UNHRC ‘Panel Discussion on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human 
Rights: Summary of Discussions’ (15 June 2009) www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ 
ClimateChange/SummaryPanelDiscussion.doc accessed 7 June 2013.
11 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 Summary.
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not provide a definite answer to the most obvious question, that is, whether 
 climate change in itself constitutes a human rights violation.12 The report states:
“While climate change has obvious implications for the enjoyment of human rights, it is 
less obvious whether, and to what extent, such effects can be qualified as human rights 
violations”.13
In answering this cardinal question, a twofold approach can be followed since in-
ternational human rights law has an entitling as well as an obligating dimension.14
1. The Entitling Dimension of Human Rights Law and Climate Change
First of all, the international system for the promotion and protection of hu-
man rights departs from the idea that all human beings are entitled to the rights 
and freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights15 and 
contained in international legal instruments such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)16 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).17
This entitling dimension of human rights law, with regard to climate change, 
is summarized by the OHCHR report under the heading “implications for the 
enjoyment of human rights”. It states that global warming will “potentially have 
implications for the full range of human rights” (Paragraph 20) and further men-
tions to that extent, explicitly, the right to life, right to adequate food, right to 
health and right to housing as well as the right to self-determination. Addition-
ally, it emphasizes that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by 
vulnerable groups such as women, children and indigenous peoples and that 
these groups are entitled to special protection in accordance with the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination (Paragraph 42).
12 Likewise Clemens Müller and Kristine Franzen, ‘Der Klimawandel und das Menschen-
rechtssystem der Vereinten Nationen’ (2010) 4 Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 7, 14.
13 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 Paragraph 70.
14 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz (2nd ed, Helbing-
Lichtenhahn 2008) 89.
15 Adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A (III).
16 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171.
17 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. See also 
the wording of the rights contained in the ICCPR, e.g. “Every human being has the 
inherent right to life” (Article 6), “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person” (Article 9 Paragraph 1).
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Overall, it is not controversial that climate change does and continues to affect 
the enjoyment of human rights.18 Thus, from the perspective of the ones entitled 
by human rights, it can be concluded that climate change and its consequences 
violate human rights.19
2.  The Obligating Dimension of Human Rights  
Law and Climate Change
A different question is whether climate change can be qualified as a human rights 
violation that is legally attributable to States as the primary duty-bearers under 
international human rights law. After all, a key feature of the international human 
rights system is the creation of State obligations.20 A State owes obedience to human 
rights provisions contained in international covenants and customary law towards 
the individual person, bilaterally towards another State and at all times to the whole 
international community (erga omnes/erga omnes partes).21 If States violate their 
human rights obligations, secondary norms of international law become applic-
able.22 Therefore, it stands to question whether contributing to climate change by 
emitting green house gases – and thus contributing to the harmful consequences 
of global warming – constitutes a violation of States human rights obligations.
The OHCHR identifies three obstacles to this argumentation: First, it would 
be “impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships linking histor-
ical greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a specific climate 
change-related effect, let alone with the range of direct and indirect implications 
for human rights”; second, global warming would often be only “one of several 
contributing factors to climate change-related effects”; and third, harmful con-
sequences of global warming would often be “projections about future impacts, 
whereas human rights violations are normally established after the harm has 
occurred” (Paragraph 70).
18 See the statements of State representatives contained in UNHRC, ‘Summary of Panel 
Discussion’ (n 10) Paragraphs 33–54.
19 For a ‘survey of illustrative examples’ see McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani 
(n 4) 11–19.
20 See again the wording of the international covenants such as “Each State Party under-
takes to respect and to ensure (…)” (Article 2 Paragraph 1 ICCPR); see also Kälin and 
Künzli (n 14) 90–94.
21 See Kälin and Künzli (n 14) 107–109.
22 However, see on human rights as self-contained regimes Eckart Klein, ‘Self- 
Contained Regime’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2008 online ed, accessed 6 July 2013) Paragraph 14.
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Before turning to a discussion of these arguments and the assessment of con-
ceptual approaches to further develop the relationship of human rights and cli-
mate change, it will be briefly revisited where the OHCHR sees the value added 
through a human rights-based approach to climate change: International human 
rights law provides States with normative guidance in protecting individuals and 
adopting climate change response measures (Paragraph 71). Discussing the rele-
vant human rights obligations of States, the report distinguishes between na-
tional and international human rights obligations.
a) National Level Obligations of States Dealing with Climate Change
The report emphasizes the national level obligations deriving from international 
human rights law. Foremost, States are obliged to protect their inhabitants from 
foreseeable threats related to climate change (Paragraph 74). Also, when adopt-
ing measures in response to climate change, States need to act in accordance 
with their domestic human rights obligations. Thus, mitigation measures shall 
take into account possible implications on the enjoyment of human rights. Like-
wise, adaptation measures need to be human rights-compliant and substantial 
procedural safeguards, such as the right to access to information and the right to 
participation in decision making processes, shall be ensured (Paragraphs 78–79).
b)  International Level Obligations of States in the Context  
of Climate Change
Additionally, the report derives some international level State obligations in the 
context of climate change from human rights law. Especially from an interna-
tional equity perspective, it is desirable not only to impose obligations to deal 
with the consequences of global warming in a human rights-compliant way on 
the countries most affected by climate change, but also to remind industrial-
ized countries of their responsibilities under international human rights law.23 
Of course, the discussion within the Human Rights Council on this issue proved 
difficult. Whereas developing countries and Small Island States did not want to 
be ‘left alone’, industrialized countries insisted on emphasizing on national level 
obligations.24
23 See the statements of State representatives on international assistance and cooper-
ation as well as on equity under the UNFCCC and human rights contained in 
UNHRC, ‘Summary of Panel Discussion’ (n 10) Paragraphs 68–92.
24 See on this divide Marc Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability in the 
Face of Climate Change’ (2010) 38 Ga J Int’l Comp L 543, 550; see as an example for 
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However, according to OHCHR there undoubtedly exists an obligation for 
international co-operation and assistance in international law that also applies 
to the context of climate change (Paragraphs 84–85). This international obliga-
tion might be derived from Article 1 Paragraph 3 United Nations Charter as well 
as from Article 2 ICESCR. Therefore, States are – also due to their knowledge 
on the human rights implications of global warming – obliged to work together 
and to “take steps through international assistance and co-operation, depending 
on the availability of resources, to facilitate fulfilment of human rights in other 
countries” (Paragraph 86).
3. Discussion
The report, although generally welcomed, has been the object of criticism.25 
While drawing a thorough picture of how climate change may affect the enjoy-
ment of human rights, its elaborations on State obligations fall rather short. 
Although it prominently features the fact that climate change mitigation and 
adaption strategies contain human rights violating potential, national as well 
as international State obligations should have been elaborated in more detail.26 
Additionally, the determination of extra-territorial State obligations should 
have been included.27 Thus, the report underlines the apprehension that hu-
man rights have become the “common currency of contemporary legal and pol-
itical discourse”;28 at the same time substantial room for further elaborations 
remains in order to turn the human rights-based approach into a  meaningful 
concept.
III  Three Conceptual Questions for the Further Development 
of the Human Rights-Based Approach
In order to investigate how the human rights-based approach to climate change 
might reach its full potential, three conceptual questions will be elaborated upon: 
the reluctance of industrialized States John von Doussa, Allison Corkey and Renée 
Chartres, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ (2007) 14 Austl Int’l L J 161, 174–176.
25 See e.g. Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability’ (n 24) 586; Knox, 
‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change’ (n 5) 496.
26 Ibid 478.
27 John Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 50 Va J Int‘l L 163, 200; 
Müller and Franzen (n 12) 17.
28 Dimitris Efthymiou, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights and Distributive Justice’ (2009) 
20 Finnish YBIL 111, 112.
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First, it will be asked whether a State duty to reduce green house gas emissions 
could be derived from human rights law. Second, it will be considered how States 
could be held responsible id est liable for the harmful consequences of human-
induced global warming on the grounds of human rights law. Third, the human 
rights-based duty to provide international assistance will be revisited.
1. Human Rights-Based Duty to Reduce Green House Gas Emissions
With the negative effects of hand-made climate change on the enjoyment of hu-
man rights in mind, one might ask whether States are obliged to reduce green 
house gas emissions on the basis of their human rights obligations.29 Since it has 
become evident that emissions contribute to a human-induced process of global 
warming, how are States allowed to do business as usual with regard to their na-
tional emission policies? From a human rights law perspective, can they openly 
accept the obvious impacts of their emissions on the enjoyment of human rights 
around the globe? At least under the ICESCR, States are obligated to promote 
human rights internationally.30 Every action that obviously hinders higher stand-
ards of living should thus be regarded irreconcilable with international human 
rights law. Therefore, a rule to abstain from policies that allow further contribu-
tion to global warming should be acknowledged. Of course, it is difficult to de-
rive detailed emission reduction goals from human rights provisions. This is not 
to be undertaken here; rather, attention is drawn to the fact that it is within the 
competences of human rights institutions to explore this issue. There is a variety 
of human rights institutions that can, and should, deal with the question of how 
States’ human rights obligations are linked to international climate law and their 
obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.31
29 Arguing strongly in favor of such a duty: Food First Information and Action Network 
Deutschland, ‘Menschenrechte im Klimawandel – Anforderungen an die deutsche und 
internationale Klimapolitik 2009’ www.fian-deutschland.de/online/index.php?option= 
com_remository&Itemid=160&func=startdown&id=16 5 accessed 7 June 2013.
30 According to Article 2 ICESCR States “undertake steps with a view to achieving the 
realization of the rights” in general. Thus, the provisions are at least to some extent 
extraterritorially applicable; see for an examination of the extraterritorial State obli-
gations of the ICCPR and the ICESCR with regard to climate change Knox, ‘Climate 
Change and Human Rights Law’ (n 27) 202–206.
31 See for the competences of the Human Rights Council UNGA Res 60/251 (3 April 
2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251 Paragraphs 2–6; for the evolutionary interpretation 
of the competences of the Human Rights Committee and the ICESCR Helen Keller 
and Leena Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and Their 
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On the one hand, the UN-charter-based human rights institutions should 
renew their commitment to investigating the topic of climate change and hu-
man rights. As has previously been shown, the debates on climate change and 
human rights at the Human Rights Council are highly controversial – here, 
the restrictions of political human rights bodies have become evident.32 How-
ever, (further) discussion within this forum keeps the issue on the international 
agenda.33 When States publicly argue that it is not their obligation from human 
rights law to reduce emissions, it gives NGOs and international civil society 
the chance to disagree in public.34 Again, the OHCHR may act as a think tank 
providing not only the members of the Human Rights Council with facts and 
figures but also suggesting further legal evaluations and insights. It might also 
be advisable to open a thematic procedure. By appointing a special rapporteur, 
an expert would further a “comparative and global understanding of the human 
rights problem”35 and suggest how single human rights obligations could extent 
to a duty to reduce emissions.36
On the other hand, all major international human rights conventions are 
equipped with monitoring institutions consisting of international experts.37 Each 
convention committee is competent to evaluate how climate change affects the 
enjoyment of the relevant convention rights, currently and in the near future. By 
establishing this link, it is to be elaborated to what extent the pertinent conven-
tions contain State obligations that might also affect national climate and emission 
policies. Here, a valuable tool “to give states guidance in nature and scope of other 
Legitimacy’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: 
Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 127.
32 See n 24.
33 See Nigel S Rodely, ‘UN Treaty Bodies and the Human Rights Council’ in Helen 
 Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 352.
34 See e.g. the report of the Food First Information and Action Network (n 29).
35 Rodely (n 33) 353.
36 See also the work of the thematic rapporteurs assigned by the Human Rights Council 
(and its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission) already conducted on climate 
change as reviewed in Müller and Franzen (n 12) 17–23.
37 Such as the Human Rights Committee (Article 28 ICCPR), Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC Res 1985/17 (28 May 1985) UN Doc 
E/RES/1985/17), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(Article 17 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women), Committee on the Rights of the Child (Article 43 Convention on the Rights 
of the Child) etc.
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obligations”38 are general comments that could address the relationship between 
pertinent human rights and the global threat of climate change. Although not for-
mally legally binding, general comments have a robust legal analytical function by 
defining the scope of convention rights.39 Furthermore, they often contain policy 
recommendations40 and thus might suggest to what extent States should cut emis-
sions and what measures are advisable to take in order to reverse the negative ef-
fects of national emission policies on the human rights situation around the globe.
2.  International Responsibility and Liability for Harmful Consequences 
of Human-Induced Global Warming on the Basis of International 
Human Rights Law
A second question derived from a human rights perspective on climate change is 
whether States could be held responsible, id est liable individually or collectively, 
for the harmful consequences of human-induced global warming. Generally, the 
issue of climate change litigation and compensation claims of individuals has 
not yet been fully explored.41 International law does not per se negate individ-
ual claims against States; the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts by the International Law Commission leave this question open 
(Article 33 Paragraph 2).42 However, individuals are not procedurally equipped 
with many opportunities besides seeking diplomatic protection.43 Also, the 
 UNFCCC remains more or less silent on the issue of responsibility for damage 
and compensation claims for injury.44
38 Rodely (n 33) 353.
39 See Keller and Grover (n 31) 129–133.
40 Of course the means and methods of domestic implementation of the covenant rights 
are to the discretion of the parties (Article 2 ICCPR); see on this Keller and Grover 
(n 31) 124–125.
41 See Timo Koivurova, ‘International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of 
Climate Change: Problems and Prospects’ (2007) 22 J Envt’l L & Litig 267, 278–282; 
see also Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’ (2008) 77 
NJIL 1, 2.
42 UN GAOR (53rd Session 2001) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1; on the few opportun-
ities for advancing climate change litigation in general international law see  Koivurova 
(n 40) 278–282.
43 Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties 
and State Responsibility (Nijhoff 2005) 242.
44 See Hannah Stallard, ‘Turning up the Heat on Tuvalu: An Assessment of Potential 
Compensation for Climate Change Damage in Accordance with States Responsibility 
under International Law’ (2009) 15 Canterbury L Rev 163, 178.
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Thus, in addition to domestic lawsuits,45 human rights law could provide an 
accountability framework for damages in relation to climate change.46 This was 
put to a test when, in 2005, representatives of US-American and Canadian Inuit 
petitioned to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to hold the 
United States responsible for the violation of human rights.47 It was argued that 
the US was responsible for human induced global warming since it is the world’s 
largest emitter of green house gases.48 Although acknowledging the human caus-
ation of climate change, the US-Government would not reduce emissions and 
denied participation in the Kyoto-Protocol. Since as a result of global warming 
the Inuit’s fundamental rights, e.g. to use and enjoy their traditional lands, to 
enjoy their personal property, to health and to life, were violated, the claimants 
requested a declaration that the US be internationally responsible for the viola-
tion of these rights; that it adopts measures to limit its greenhouse gas emissions 
and that it implements a plan to protect Inuit culture and resources.49
The petition was found to be inadmissible before the Commission.50 Accord-
ing to its decision, it was not possible to relate harmful emissions to one single 
State and to further calculate the national responsibility for climate change.51 
However, the case opened significant debate on the question whether States 
are responsible id est liable for infringements of human rights caused by cli-
mate change.52 Whereas the question of causation still remains unanswered, 
45 See Michael G Faure and André Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instru-
ment to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change’ (2007) 26 Stan Envt’l L J 123, 
147–150; further examples in McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani (n 4) 58.
46 See the Statement of Mauritius at the Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change 
(HRC 11th Session, 15 June 2009) as cited in Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and 
Accountability’ (n 24) 578.
47 Innuit Circumpolar Council, ‘Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Seeking Relief from the Violations Resulting from Global Climate Warming 
Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States’ (7 December 2005) www.inuitcircum 
polar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionSummary.pdf accessed 6 June 2013.
48 Ibid 6.
49 Ibid 4–8.
50 See Jessica Gordon, ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold Hearing 
after Rejecting Inuit Climate Change Petition’ (2007) 7 Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 55.
51 For further discussion of the case see Faure and Nollkaemper (n 45) 157.
52 See e.g. James D Ford, ‘Supporting Adaptation: A Priority for Action on Climate 
Change for Canadian Inuit’ (2008) 8 Sustainable Dev & Pol’y 25; Katherine King, 
‘Climate Change and the Inuit: A Melting of Actions into a Cloudy Mess’ (2009) 17 Se 
Envt’l L J 481.
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there is the idea to attribute climate change-related damage to a State based on 
its historical emissions or to the degree in which it fulfils its reduction targets 
contained in the Kyoto-Protocol.53 Some authors also introduce a whole system 
of reparations based on those targets.54 However, there is one important obs-
tacle: If the attribution of responsibility for damages is linked to the reduction 
targets that States willingly consent to, then there is considerably less incentive 
to commit to such obligations. Also, one could argue that there is not much 
value added from blaming, rather, the international community should focus 
on developing common approaches in order to manage future challenges of 
global warming.
With all these arguments in mind, human rights institutions nevertheless 
should elaborate on the principles for the international responsibility and liabil-
ity of States with regard to the effects that climate change has on the enjoyment 
of human rights.55 It is imperative to the human rights idea not only to speak of 
an entitlement to human rights but also to hold States responsible where they do 
not live up to their obligations. States should at least be evaluated with regard to 
how they meet protection obligations and adopt appropriate response measures. 
Thus, assessing individual liability claims for climate change-related damages, 
not the amount of emissions would be the appropriate yardstick but a State’s 
performance with regard to fulfilling its national level as well as its international 
level human rights obligations in the context of global warming.56 On a case to 
case basis, the extent of State responsibility has to be elaborated by the pertinent 
judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies.57 Although there are signifi-
cant procedural obstacles, filing suits and submitting petitions before interna-
tional and national bodies would initiate further exploration of the possibilities 
of international climate change litigation.58 As witnessed in the Inuit case, this 
53 See Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability’ (n 24) 571.
54 Maxine Burkett, ‘Climate Reparations’ (2009) 10 Melb J Int’l L 509, 521–529.
55 See e.g. for the concept of joint and several liability Faure and Nollkaemper (n 45) 165.
56 See Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (n 27) 209–210.
57 The relevance and impact of decisions of human rights institutions has also been 
recognized by the ICJ in Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of  Guinea 
v Democratic Republic of Congo) (Judgment of 30 November 2010) (2010) ICJ 
Rep 639, Paragraph 66.
58 For a critical discussion of the assumption, that human rights litigation may drive 
global green house gas policy see Eric A Posner, ‘Climate Change and International 
Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal’ (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1925.
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provides for international publicity. Further, it becomes an avenue for political 
pressure and a place for NGOs and civil society to present their points of view.59 
In addition to regional human rights bodies, especially bodies with an inter-
national scope seem to be the appropriate place for those kinds of procedures.60 
Complementing the individual complaint procedure before the Human Rights 
Committee, the recently established mechanism under the ICESCR will provide 
for valuable institutional resources since social and economic rights in particular 
are impaired by the consequences of global warming.61
3.  Human Rights-Based Duty to Provide International  
Assistance to Affected States
The third question is whether States have any further duties to provide inter-
national assistance on the basis of their human rights obligations. Especially, it 
stands to argue that industrialized countries have a substantial extra-territorial 
duty to assist the affected countries in the process of adapting to the conse-
quences of climate change. The duty to assist with adaptation (e.g. by means 
of technology transfer) is also contained in the UNFCCC (Article 4 lit c). In 
the past, however, it has proven difficult to bring these words to life.62 Human 
rights law could help concretize this obligation since it also contains the princi-
ple of international cooperation and mutual assistance.63 Article 2 Paragraph 1 
 ICESCR reads:
59 See Philippe Cullet, ‘Liability and Redress for Human-Induced Global Warming: 
Towards an International Regime’ (2007) 43 Stan J Int’l L 99; see also Faure and 
Nollkaemper (n 45) 179.
60 See Geir Ulfstein, ‘Individual Complaints’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
92–100.
61 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013, UN Doc A/63/435; 
see on the new mechanisms Rainer Grote, ‘The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights: Towards a More Effective Im-
plementation of Social Rights?’ in Holger P Hestermeyer et al (eds), Coexistence, Co-
operation and Solidarity, Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Vol I, Nijhoff 2012); on 
the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights see Urfan Khaliq and Robin 
Churchill, ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular Challenge?’ 
in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and 
Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 200–202.
62 See McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani (n 4) 61–62.
63 Ibid.
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Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
Thus, the ICESCR obligation to promote social, economic and cultural human 
rights is not restricted to the territory of a State party, but extends to interna-
tional assistance and co-operation. However, it is unclear what is contained in 
the human rights-based duty to co-operate; the nature of the concept and its le-
gal value is still debated.64 In terms of providing economic or technical assistance 
from one State to another, the duty to assist does not emerge until the sovereign 
State asks for it; even then it has to be realized step by step only.65 However, the 
duty of international co-operation and assistance could also contain a ‘stand-
ing’ State obligation to offer assistance to those States and peoples most affected 
by the consequences of global warming. Should not all States constantly take 
steps in order to guarantee non-discrimination in access to economic, social and 
cultural rights everywhere and to ensure the minimum essential levels of each 
right enshrined in the covenant?66 It should also be investigated to what extent 
national obligations of environmental law might be applicable internationally. 
Before legislating emission caps, States could be asked to do an impact assess-
ment not only focusing on national (and border) regions, but also take into ac-
count consequences on a global level.67
Accepting the human rights-based approach to climate change, it is again 
within the competence of human rights institutions to deal with these questions. 
They should firstly concretize the State obligation to provide assistance to af-
fected States and to co-operate internationally in reducing the effects of climate 
change on the enjoyment of human rights. Secondly, human rights institutions 
should monitor State compliance in this regard. During the State reporting pro-
cedure at the Human Rights Council as well as within the reporting systems of 
64 See Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability’ (n 24) 578–581.
65 See Margit Ammer, ‘Klimawandelinduzierte Umweltveränderungen als Ursache für 
freiwillige Binnenmigration: Ist Europa verpflichtet zu helfen?’ (2010) 4 Zeitschrift 
für Menschenrechte 48, 62–64.
66 These criteria were established by the CESCR for the concretization of the national 
obligations to promote the ICESCR rights of a progressive nature; see CESCR, ‘Op-
erational Statement’ (10 May 2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1; see also Khaliq and 
Churchill (n 61) 213.
67 In favour of this approach Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (n 27) 201.
 The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change 51
the human rights conventions, States should be invited to include information 
on how they fulfil their duty to provide international assistance to States most 
affected by the consequences of global warming.68
IV  The Contribution of the Human Rights-Based Approach  
to the International Discourse on Climate Change
These conceptual approaches to climate change derived from international 
human rights law remain incomplete and it is even unclear whether the three 
questions could at all be answered in a way that satisfies human rights lawyers. 
At least the OHCHR’s report on the relationship of climate change and human 
rights has not substantially changed the international discourse on how to man-
age the causes and consequences of global warming.69 It is thus not very promis-
ing for the individual to claim compensation through climate change litigation 
procedures on the grounds of international human rights law. There is no con-
sensus that human rights law explains the degree to which justice requires com-
pensation for green house gas emissions.70 Furthermore, States seemingly do not 
feel obliged to reduce emissions on the basis of their human rights obligations. 
Thus, it has to be concluded that at least in a formal sense contributing to climate 
change cannot be regarded a human rights violation.71
Is it therefore pointless to adopt a human rights-based approach to climate 
change – or does it even harm international human rights law by “cheapening the 
concept of rights”?72 It may be stated that the human rights-based approach con-
tributes to the international discourse on climate change in two significant ways: 
On a very practical level, conceptually linking climate change and human rights 
provides access to institutions. On a more theoretical level, the human rights-
based approach to climate change introduces a vertical level to international cli-
mate law and refocuses it on the needs and subjective rights of individuals.
68 On reporting procedures see Walter Kälin, ‘Examination of State Reports’ in Helen 
Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 37.
69 See Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change’ (n 5) 496; for some exemp-
tions see McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani (n 4) 55.
70 See Efthymiou (n 28) 120–124.
71 See Müller and Franzen (n 12) 24.
72 Kenneth Roth, ‘Is climate change a human rigts issue?’ bigthink.com/videos/re-is- 
climate-change-a-human-rights-issue-2 accessed 7 June 2013; a different approach: 
Edward Cameron, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change: Moving from an Intrinsic to 
an Instrumental Approach’ (2010) 38 Ga J Int’l Comp L 673.
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1. Access to Institutions
Firstly, treating climate change as a human rights-related problem provides ac-
cess to international institutions. Human rights bodies have proven to be forums 
of lively debates and expertise. This could be rewarding for the discussion of the 
human rights-related aspects of climate change as well.
The pertinent institutions of the international climate framework are mostly 
run by scientists and diplomats.73 There is not much place for elaborating on the 
impacts of global warming.74 The climate regime further does not establish a 
responsibility, id est liability framework, for individual claims against States for 
damages related to global warming and neither does it provide for institutions to 
which the individual may petition.75 By linking climate change to human rights, 
a multitude of institutions become available as platforms for discussion. The Hu-
man Rights Council and the convention committees then are the forums where 
States as well as international experts negotiate problems of climate change, ana-
lyse them from a human rights angle and elaborate on related legal and political 
aspects.
With general comments or during the individual complaints procedure, the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights might investigate the effects of global warming on single conven-
tion rights. During the reporting procedures they could include climate change 
aspects and ask to what extent States co-operate internationally in order to miti-
gate the effects of climate change in Developing and Small Island States. NGOs 
could complement the process by presenting their points of view.
Within the United Nations system, it is furthermore the Human Rights Coun-
cil’s task to monitor emerging problems such as climate change “in order to en-
sure that preventive approaches are implemented to head off gross human rights 
violations”.76 Here also State representatives have the opportunity to  illustrate 
73 See e.g. for the Kyoto-Protocol Meinhard Doelle, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in 
the Climate Change Regime’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling 
(eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer 2012) 166, 169.
74 “One of the key failings of climate change diplomacy over the past two decades is that 
the phenomenon has been viewed as a scientific projection,” Marc Limon, ‘Human 
Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action’ (2009) 33 Harv 
Envt’l L Rev 439, 451.
75 Koivurova (n 41) 278–282; but see on some participation rights Heike Walk, Par-
tizipative Governance: Beteiligungsformen und Beteiligungsrechte im Mehrebenensys-
tem der Klimapolitik (Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008) 153–170.
76 See Bertrand G Ramcharan, The UN Human Rights Council (Taylor and Francis 2011) 81.
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how they are affected by climate change, share experiences on common climate 
change-related human rights problems and present their mitigation and adapta-
tion strategies. During the Universal Periodic Review, for example, Vanuatu’s 
representatives already made reference to the implications climate change had 
on the country’s inhabitants.77 He illustrated that especially women and children 
suffer from the consequences of extreme weather events and how the Govern-
ment designs human rights-compliant response measures to adapt to climate 
change. Also, the State representative asked for international assistance in order 
to combat the consequences of climate change in his country.78
Thus, the charter-based as well as the treaty-based human rights institutions 
become a place where State efforts in combating climate change are put to a 
test from a human rights angle. One might argue that by ‘burdening’ human 
rights institutions with a climate change discussion the system is threatened by 
spreading itself too thin. This might actually be a realistic concern; however, it 
is rather an argument for allocating more resources to human rights institutions 
than against adopting a human rights-based approach to climate change. Link-
ing human rights and climate change provides the international discourse on 
global warming with the necessary forums that finally moves the individual and 
his/her rights to the centre of the discussion.
2. Introduction of Subjective Rights
This leads to the second contribution of the human rights-based approach to 
the international discourse on climate change: It might add a vertical dimen-
sion of State obligations and introduces the possibility of subjective rights to 
international climate law. The pertinent international rules on climate change 
derived from international environmental law as well as the UNFCCC, includ-
ing the Kyoto-Protocol, oblige States on a horizontal level.79 Thus, States have 
obligations, e.g. the reduction of emissions, primarily towards other State par-
ties. In contrast, human rights obligations function vertically; here an individual 
77 HRC, ‘Universal Periodic Review Highlights 12 May 2009 (morning, not an official 
record)’ www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Highlights12May2009AM.aspx 
accessed 11 July 2013; see for a review of the innovative mechanisms of the Human 
Rights Council Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Cri-
tique and Early Assessment (Taylor and Francis 2013) 254, 282.
78 HRC, ‘Universal Periodic Review Highlights 12 May 2009’ (n 77).
79 On the legal structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto-Protocoll as well as the con-
tained obligations see Verheyen (n 43) 44, 108.
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is entitled to a certain act or omission by a State.80 Thus, the human rights-based 
approach could add to international climate law a new direction of obligations.81 
It at least re-centres the discussion on human needs and introduces the possibil-
ity of individual claims.
At present it is rather difficult to derive such a vertical structure from the 
 UNFCCC.82 It stands to reason, from a classical inter-state treaty with a hori-
zontal structure, that subjective rights can also be derived and to what extent a 
human rights-oriented interpretation could assist with this endeavour. The gen-
eral possibility of the existence of subjective rights in international law was rec-
ognized by the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand-case.83 However, so 
far, there is not much consensus with regard to the identification of such rights.84 
It might be interesting to analyse Article 4 Paragraph 1 lit i in conjunction with 
Article 6 UNFCCC in this regard. By these provisions, State parties commit to 
promote education and training as well as public awareness on climate change 
and its effects and to encourage the widest possible participation in this process. 
Article 6 ensures public access to information on climate change and its conse-
quences as well as public participation in developing adequate responses. These 
provisions could constitute independent subjective rights of individuals. A treaty 
interpretation in this regard would add a normative direction to international 
State obligations, especially for those parties to the UNFCCC that have not rati-
fied the pertinent human rights conventions containing similar information and 
participation rights.85
80 See Kälin and Künzli (n 14) 90; Daniel Bodansky, ‘Climate Change and Human 
Rights: Unpacking the Issues’ (2010) 38 Ga J Int’l Comp L 511, 516; see however on 
some similarity of the two regimes Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Introduction’ in 
Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legiti-
macy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 2.
81 See Ammer (n 65) 59; likewise also Margaux J Hallt and David C Weiss, ‘Avoiding 
Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law’ (2012) 
37 YJIL 309, 344.
82 See on human rights under the UNFCCC Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and 
Accountability’ (n 24) 582–586.
83 ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v USA) (2001) ICJ Rep 466, Paragraph 77.
84 See Anne Peters, ‘Das subjektive internationale Recht’ (2011) 59 Jahrbuch des öffent-
lichen Rechts der Gegenwart 411, 439.
85 See on this group of rights in the climate change context Svitlana Kravchenko, 
‘Proced ural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat Climate Change’ (2010) 38 Ga J Int’l 
Comp L 613.
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Thus, human rights law could help “fill important gaps in the existing inter-
national climate change regime”.86 Accepting human rights law not as an isolated 
branch of international law, but as interacting with other fields of international 
law,87 might significantly influence special regimes such as climate law by re-
focusing some of its rules on the needs and interests of the individual. In the 
OHCHR’s view – although under the protest of industrialized States such as Can-
ada88 – human rights complement the UNFCCC by underlining that “the human 
person is the central subject of development and that international cooper ation 
is not merely a matter of the obligations of a State towards other States, but also 
of the obligations towards individuals”.89 To what extent this approach actually 
introduces subjective rights to the international climate regime is a matter of the 
further development of international law. Generally speaking, it comes down to 
the question of what role the individual is to play in the international system.90
V Conclusion
It might be concluded that the United Nations as well as the human rights in-
stitutions have not yet fully explored the advantages of a human rights-based 
approach to climate change. There so far is no satisfying answer to the question 
of how climate change can, in a meaningful way, be conceptually connected to 
the normative legal construction of correlating rights and duties of international 
human rights law.
I suggest that international climate law benefits from a human rights-based 
approach not only by gaining a ‘human face’ but also from the fact that the hu-
man rights framework is more legalistic than environmental treaties. By ap-
proaching climate change from a human rights perspective, the discussion 
moves from the political arena to the area of international law.91 For example, 
the reduction of green house gas emissions presents itself within human rights 
law as a question about what States shall do based on existing obligations; in 
86 Limon, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ (n 74) 455.
87 See e.g. Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Human Face of International Law: Inter-
actions between General International Law and Human Rights’ (2012) 32 HRLJ 1.
88 See the submission of Canada to the OHCHR Study cited in Limon, ‘Human Rights 
and Climate Change’ (n 74) 460 n 116.
89 (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 Paragraph 86.
90 See e.g. Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and 
Change in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010).
91 See Bodansky (n 80) 515.
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the international climate regime it is merely regarded as a question of political 
negotiations and voluntary reduction targets.92 Arguing that the political play-
ing field of mul tiple climate change management strategies would illegitimately 
be narrowed can hardly convince if one accepts the idea of universal, equal and 
inalienable human rights. How States use their margin of appreciation requires 
monitoring, and thus the relationship of human rights and climate change needs 
to be (re-) discovered by the pertinent human rights institutions.
In the end, adopting a human rights-based approach to climate change can be 
regarded as a manifestation of the increasing focus of international law on the 
individual. More and more areas of international law are exploited for individual 
interests, are made accessible for the private person or are complemented by sub-
jective rights.93 Acknowledging this overarching process of a “humanization of 
international law”94 the relationship of climate change and human rights requires 
further assessment. Ultimately, what then lies at the heart of the discussion of cli-
mate change as one of today’s major challenges to the international community is 
not only the State’s obligation but also the individual’s right.
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Impacts of Climate Change on Cultural 
Heritage and Cultural Diversity

Michael Turner & Rachel Singer∗
Urban Resilience in Climate Change
Abstract The term Urban Resilience re-emerged at the beginning of the 21st 
century as a counterterrorism policy. In recent years it has taken on new policy 
meanings and has broadened to formulate planning solutions that anticipate a 
wide range of potential disasters, natural and human, many of which are associ-
ated with climate change and extreme weather conditions. There are different 
methods and approaches on how to best meet the challenges, though mitigation 
and adaptation are both needed to cope with the predicted scenarios. A cross-
disciplinary approach and a re-examination of existing heritage policies in rela-
tion to Urban Resilience and climate change will allow more flexibility to cope 
with these contemporary and future threats. This paper, within the framework 
of the UNESCO Recommendation on Historic Urban Landscapes, proposes new 
integrative conceptual tools to understand Urban Resilience and stresses the im-
portance of heritage and cultural diversity in the discussion, thus ensuring sus-
tainability between communities and preserving heritage for future generations.
I What is Urban Resilience?
Resolving the aftermaths of sudden changes has been an agenda item from time 
immemorial. The ancients developed narratives where the elements of fire and 
water were evoked to explain disasters, and the floods of Gilgamesh and Noah 
and the fire and brimstone of Lot were just the tip of the iceberg. Aristotle in 
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ancient Greece categorizes disasters as the result of natural phenomena and not 
of supernatural interventions. However, more important is not the explanation 
of their occurrence but the social implications of recovery, and the capacities 
for moving ahead; in short, resilience. The concept of ‘resilience’ needs to be 
seen as a panacea to the negative impacts of change, whether gradual or sudden, 
whether man-made or though ‘natural disasters’, and as a proponent of the posi-
tive effects of growth.
Resilience combines the different periods of disaster cycles, including: miti-
gation, preparedness, response, recovery and adaptation.1 In the last decade the 
rhetoric of resilience and its underpinnings have slowly infused a variety of pol-
icymaking circles and a wide range of disciplinary areas,2 being more inclusive 
by relating to both the physical and social components of the city.3 Urban resil-
ience is a proactive approach that provides both a lens through which we can an-
alyse the different problems that cities face as well as providing a framework with 
space for solutions. Several phases in the evolution of urban resilience policies 
have been noted, initially reactive, expanding to take preventive actions and then 
followed by an attempt to incorporate aspects of resilience into daily routine, 
through the anticipation of shocks on multiple levels. The current approach sees 
the path to resilience as inclusive, incorporating the individual, institutions and 
neighbourhoods in order to achieve the broadest possible form of participation.4
Based on the three pillars of sustainability and extending from the physical 
infrastructures to include the socio-economic and environmental, the United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) broadened the definition 
of resilience as:
“[...] the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient man-
ner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures 
and functions”.5
1 Geoff O’Brien and Paul Read, ‘Future UK Emergency Management: New Wine, Old 
Skin?’ (2005) 14 Disaster Prevention and Management 353.
2 Jon Coaffee, ‘Rescaling and the Responsibilising of the Politics of Urban Resilience: 
From National Security to Local Place Making’ (2013) 33 Politics 240.
3 Jon Coaffee and Lee Bosher, ‘Integrating Counter-terrorist Resilience into Sustain-
ability’ (2008) 161 Proceedings of the ICE – Urban Design and Planning 75.
4 See Coaffee (n 2) 243, 246–248.
5 UNISDR, ‘Terminology: Resilience’ (The United Nation Office for Disaster Risk 
 Reduction, 30 August 2007) www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology accessed 
21 January 2014.
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As it is often not possible to prevent disasters, governments and NGOs are aiming 
to increase the resilience of communities and societies through a combination of 
research, policy and programme development as well as through management 
and education. Social resilience to disasters is associated with a number of char-
acteristics, including: resistance, recovery and creativity.
Resistance refers to the magnitude of disruption that can be absorbed by a 
community before undergoing significant changes. Recovery refers to the com-
munity’s ability to mend following a disaster and its return to function. The re-
covery can be measured as the time needed to rebound to levels similar to those 
before the disaster. Binding this together is social resilience as a function of mul-
tiple external factors as well, including environmental, political and economic. 
These forces also have a significant impact on the recovery, for instance strong 
economic forces can buoy a relatively quick recovery while a sluggish economic 
climate can hinder. Reaching the previous state of equilibrium post disaster is 
not the final stage but a point of reference in the process of continuing change. 
It is possible to learn from disasters and utilize these situations as opportun-
ities to springboard further preparedness and resilience for future events; this is 
the characteristic of creative communities. Even within communities that have 
a high level of resilience there are groups with fewer tools to cope with disas-
ters and tend to be disproportionately impacted; including women, children, 
the elderly and low-income groups.6 These particular characteristics of social 
behaviour need to be studied to achieve a more durable approach to disasters by 
inculcating day-to-day reactions to ‘everyday’ incidents.
What happens to cities after disasters? Disasters, strangely enough, need to be 
understood also as challenges and opportunities.7 This is where the city and its 
physical and social structures excel. Being an inherent part of urban resilience, it is a 
system that is able to absorb shocks, and the higher the level of resilience the greater 
the shock that that can be absorbed, and vice versa. In the outline of their book on 
the resilient city, Campanella and Vale describe the city as a phoenix, able to regen-
erate from the ashes of destruction; it is the exception to the rule that cities are lost.8
6 Brigit Maguire and Patrick Hagan, ‘Disasters and Communities: Understanding So-
cial Resilience’ (2007) 22 Australian Journal of Emergency Management 16.
7 Michael Turner, ‘Disaster preparedness and the aftermath: Risk Management as a 
component of conservation theories for Historic Urban Environments/Landscapes’, 
Presentation at the workshop on sustainable protection of Cultural Heritage in earth-
quake zones (Kyoto 30 August 2009, on file with author).
8 Lawrence J Vale and Thomas J Campanella, The Resilient City: How Modern Cities 
Recover from Disaster (Oxford University Press 2005).
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Contemporary research on climate change during the relatively short period 
of Anatomically Modern Human existence explores the link between climate 
disasters and the decline of urban culture in major cities, highlighted during the 
mediaeval period in Baghdad and Constantinople, which suffered from periods 
of extreme cold and drought. The effects of disasters on the populations in these 
cities and the resilience of the ruling administrations was the result of the inten-
sity of the calamity and the level of preparedness (or unpreparedness), specif-
ically how much food had been stored during periods of abundant yields.9 There 
are examples of coping mechanisms illustrating different levels of mitigation and 
adaptation dating back thousands of years. One might also conjure up the stra-
tegic policy of the biblical Joseph, chief advisor to Pharoah, as early documented 
evidence for risk preparedness. In anticipation of a seven year drought, Joseph 
proposed a massive plan to store food to feed the Egyptian populace.
II Measuring Urban Resilience
As the term resilience is still surrounded by a certain ambiguity regarding its 
precise meaning and application, there is a present hazard that it may morph into 
a type of fashionable slogan lacking applicable content10 or alternatively develop 
into manageable urban management strategies. The measurement of resilience 
could benefit from von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory and its applications 
to urban processes of change in the city. The decision-making systems of nat-
ural and biological organisms resilience identifying feed-back11 and feedforward 
processes (Figure 1) can be referred to in the analogies of the resilience of city as 
‘design by error’ and ‘zero error in design’.
In feedback processes adaptive systems are programmed to self regulate their 
responses to the surrounding environment. Information regarding various situ-
ations is channelled to points in the system that determines the appropriate re-
sponse.12 Resilience, in essence, is the development of feed-back processes in the 
9 Ronnie Ellenblum, The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate Change and 
the Decline of the East, 950–1072 (Camebridge University Press 2012) 5, 22, 88.
10 Adam Rose, ‘Economic Resilience to Natural and Man-made Disasters: Multidisciplin-
ary Origins and Contextual Dimensions’ (2007) 7 Environmental Hazards: Human 
and Social Dimensions 1.
11 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications 
(Braziller 1968) 42–44.
12 Dodd H Bogart, ‘Feedback, Feedforward, and Feedwithin: Strategic Information in 
Systems’ (1980) 25 Behavioral Science 238.
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face of uncertainty by defining points on the process as barriers of irreversibility 
(Figure 2). These barriers of limits will determine the scale of the activities and 
the costs needed for ‘undoing’ the actions. These uncertainties might be under-
stood within decision-making processes using feed-back urban processes and 
dynamic management as opposed to feed-forward actions based on a more static 
master-plan project approach. Scenario planning is currently replacing the psy-
chedelic Master Plan with zoning thus providing a link to the risk management 
of the city, in addition to providing for a culture of resilience and a live training 
facility for stakeholders.
Figure 1:  Diagram illustrating concepts of “Feedback” and “Feedforward”, based on von 
Bertalanffy, the upper diagram shows Control by Error - the feedback mechanism 
allowing the existence of an error if it is reversible, and the system to incorp-
orate adjustments. The lower diagram, Control by Design-shows the feedforward 
mechanism, a system that constantly strives to maintain a state of equilibrium; it 
allows zero error and is not adaptable to changes (Turner)
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Figure 2:  Diagram illustrating the concept of “Barriers of Irreversibility”, within a single 
stage there is room for error and feedback, however once the barrier has been 
passed entering the feed-forward range, it is not possible to reintroduce the  
feedback mechanism (Turner)
Not all errors can be tolerated, and due to the dynamic structure of the city, the 
boundaries of irreversibility must be recognised as ‘points of no return’. Actions 
and reactions must have limits and these might be defined as a reiterative process 
contained by a defined set of parameters, in which feedback can be applied to 
the process.
Within this planning process it is possible to identify a range of resilience that 
is bordered by limits on the one hand and design on the other (Figure 3).
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Figure 3:  Diagram on the left explains the links between the planning process, the design 
process and imposed limits using a pendulum analogy, the design and adapta-
tion oscillates between the plan and its limits, through different “zones” to find 
the correct balance – thus identifying the range of resilience. The diagram on the 
right differentiates between natural design processes, which feature an S curve 
remaining within limits and planned processes which will exceed them leading to 
growth beyond limits (Turner)
III  Increasing Urban Resilience as a Response  
to Climate Change
Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that climate 
change is a factor in the increasing trend of extreme weather events, ranging 
from floods and droughts to cyclones and extreme temperatures.13 While climate 
change is often perceived as a long term effect, not to be reckoned with during the 
politician’s fickle life span, a more immediate phenomenon seems to be the ap-
pearance of severe climatic activities occurring in a series of ‘short sharp shocks’. 
An example is an unusual desert flash storm that washed away conservation 
works at Masada, Israel, precipitating a need to nationally redefine the mortar 
components of the bonding limes for conservation. Similar flash storms have cre-
ated landslips and mudslides in areas of development with marginalised commu-
nities in Italy, Central and Latin America. At an urban scale, two drought seasons 
in the rural hinterland of Harar, Ethiopia has brought about a massive migration 
to the city with squatter neighbourhoods appearing on the urban fringe. This in 
turn has created new pressures and challenges for the resilience of the city.
13 IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (Oxford University Press 2012) 29.
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Climate change is an integral part of the Earth’s history. The debate on the 
speed and characteristics of these changes that might be attributed to human 
activities does not affect the necessity of identifying the two primary methods 
in use to combat the ensuing urban effects; that of mitigation and adaptation.
Mitigation is referred to as the lessening or limitation of the adverse im-
pacts of hazards and related disasters. The adverse impacts of hazards often 
cannot be fully prevented, though their scale or severity can be substantially 
lessened by various strategies and actions. Mitigation measures encompass 
engineering techniques and hazard-resistant construction as well as im-
proved environmental policies and public awareness.14 These measures pri-
marily focus on the long term and can have both international and local 
applications.15
Adaptation is “the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or ex-
ploits beneficial opportunities”.16 Adaptation is generally on a smaller scale, refer-
ring to the impacted system and often site specific.17 The applicable dimensions 
of resilient urban infrastructure are currently being examined and extended to 
the socioeconomic and environmental conditions, resulting in methodologies as 
Social Ecological System (SES).18
At present, efforts are aimed to create procedures that are applicable during 
both normal and disaster incidents, some cities are promoting campaigns to the 
general public which link disaster risk reduction with sustainable living. The 
goal of these campaigns is to change individual, household and community be-
haviours and raise the level of resilience.19
At the global level, UN Habitat has embarked on a mission to create City Re-
silience Profiles, one of the current key problems identified being that there is a 
lack of an integrative urban systems approach, and many of the models belong to 
specific sectors. The need for interdisciplinary action was articulated by Richard 
14 UNISDR, ‘Terminology: Mitigation’ (n 5).
15 Adriana Galderisi and Floriana F Ferrera, ‘Enhancing Urban Resilience in Face of 
Climate Change: A Methodological Approach’ (2012) 5 Journal of Land Use, Mobility 
and Environment 69.
16 UNISDR, ‘Terminology: Adaptation’ (n 5).
17 Galderisi and Ferrera (n 15).
18 James P Evans, ‘Resilience, Ecology and Adaption in the Experimental City’ (2011) 36 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 223.
19 UNISDR, ‘Making Cities Resilient’ (2012) www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/ 
accessed 23 January 2014.
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Haigh, the director of the Salford University Centre’s Disaster Mitigation and 
Reconstruction Programme:
“The complex nature of disasters has led to recognition that risk reduction through increased 
resilience will require a strategy that is inter-disciplinary. True interdisciplinarity only occurs 
where a number of separate disciplines surrender their own concepts and goals, and col-
lectively define themselves by reference to a common set of strategic concepts and goals”.20
In parallel, the UNISDR report on “Making Cities Resilient” discusses the import-
ance of international cooperation and knowledge sharing. The “City to City Shar-
ing Initiative” between Makati City, Quito and Kathmandu included an exchange 
of good practices in managing and reducing urban risk through improved land 
use planning, emergency management and increased public awareness. Preserva-
tion and rehabilitation strategies to ensure the protection of Cultural Heritage 
were also shared.21 Best cases of resilience occur when the formula for managing 
an emergency or disaster is paralleled in normal situations and day-to-day op-
erations. It is clear that international cooperation provides a wider perspective of 
the city and its context. Further, with relevant financial support cooperation can 
provide the resources for the mitigation of disasters on a global scale, but it is the 
best practice in the tools of adaptation where person-to-person cooperation can 
take place and that actions are really needed. This has been highlighted in the UN 
Habitat report and the case studies indicating the sharing of knowledge on man-
aging systems in a sustainable way. The seventh framework action on Designing 
Safer Urban Spaces (DESURBS) goes a long way in establishing a database and 
proposing methodologies and protocols that promote urban resilience.22
In planning urban forms it is vital to use resources to achieve multiple goals 
which factor in, as much as possible, both mitigation and adaptation. Buildings 
should integrate renewable power sources, such as solar energy, and factor in 
surrounding climatic conditions to enable a comfortable internal environment.23 
At the same time these buildings might form part of an architectural conserva-
tion area using existing sustainable historic buildings or benefit from policies of 
reuse and recycling of the urban fabric.
20 UN Habitat, ‘City Resilience Profiling Programme: Providing national and local 
governments with tools for measuring and increasing resilience to multi-hazard 
impacts including those associated with climate change’ (UN Habitat information 
brochure 2012) www.unhabitat.org accessed 23 January 2014, 2.
21 UNISDR, ‘Making Cities Resilient’ (n 19).
22 See DESURBS, ‘Project’ desurbs.eu/index.php/project accessed 23 January 2014.
23 Elisabeth M Hamin and Nicole Gurran, ‘Urban Form and Climate Change: Balancing 
Adaptation and Mitigation in the U.S. and Australia’ (2009) 33 Habitat International 242.
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To demonstrate the interlacing of urban components and attributes of the var-
ied actions for mitigation and adaptation, Ewing, Bartholomew, Winkelman, Wal-
ters & Chen formulated a mitigation policy goal of reducing car emissions through 
the measurement of Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT). They identify five Urban Ds:
•	 Density – higher persons, jobs and/or dwelling units per unit area
•	 Diversity – greater mix of land uses to include residential, employment, and 
retail/services in close proximity to each other
•	 Design – smaller block size or larger number of intersections per square mile, 
more sidewalk coverage, smaller building setbacks, smaller street width, more 
pedestrian crossings, more street trees
•	 Destination – more jobs or other attractions are reachable within a reasonable 
travel time, tends to be highest in urban cores
•	 Distance to Transit – shorter distance from home or work to the nearest rail 
station or bus stop24
While this might be perceived as very specific and particular, the parameters or 
attributes clearly have wider implications and can be applied usefully as attributes 
for other urban policies, such as crime prevention, risk preparedness, environmen-
tal hazards and socio-economic equity within a comprehensive resilience policy.
The following matrix examines the 5 Ds and their urban attributes in relation 
to potential disasters that have been linked with extreme weather incidents asso-
ciated with climate change – flooding, landslides, storms and extreme tempera-
tures. This matrix could be developed for other urban attributes and is important 
for the consideration of the integrative process.
Table 1: The 5 Ds and their urban attributes in relation to potential disasters
mitigation preparedness response recovery adaptation
Density 3 1 1 1 2
Diversity 1 3 2 3 3
Design 3 3 1 3 3
Destination 1 1 1 1 2
Distance to Transit 1 1 3 2 1
A scale with a rating between 1 (low correlation) and 3 (high correlation) was used to 
demonstrate the relationship between climate related disasters and urban components.  
The rating could be allocated by different stakeholders to achieve coordinated actions
24 See Reid Ewing et al, Growing Cooler: Evidence on Urban Development and Climate 
Change (Urban Land Institute 2008) 70–71.
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The matrix might be expanded to include other components of resilience, 
such as translating Distance to transit to the Distance to first aid and assistance. 
Another factor that has yet to be harnessed within the urban scene is the po-
tential of the smart city and the applications of ICT in the management of the 
city whereby bottle-necks and threats can be managed efficiently. This potential 
needs to be tapped and can possibly support both mitigation and adaptation.
Local actions for urban adaptation are the key to resilience and its integrative 
approach can respond to climate change, both incremental and extreme condi-
tions. The main sectors that were identified in relation to climate change include: 
energy, transportation, water management, natural hazards, waste management, 
planning and governance.25 Urban resilience will be most effective when these 
sectors are integrated with the 5 Ds for mitigation.
All this highlights the need for strengthening decision-making processes to 
include resilience, which could be effective through the expansion of the Envir-
onmental Impact Assessment process with specific references to Risk Manage-
ment rather than an independent stand-alone document. This should underscore 
the processes that develop feed-back and feed-forward recommendations and 
conclusions based on these assessments and their monitoring utilising tools as 
Results Based Management to evaluate the true added value.
IV Heritage as a Contributor to Urban Resilience
The open secret for urban resilience is in the mixed uses of the city, its cul-
tural diversity and sensitivities to environmental assessment. While the latest 
UNESCO recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape underscores the 
need for an integrative approach to planning, these ‘mainstream’ actions need to 
be expanded, as most urban development affected by climate change and other 
disasters are usually in areas that are environmentally unsustainable on ‘left-over 
urban spaces’26 that were cheap and readily available. Too often it is the under-
privileged that are affected by incidents in the city that involve urban disasters. 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is a prime example that links the needs for social 
equity with climate change, where the lowest socio-economic groups have been 
affected.
25 World Bank, ‘Cities and Climate Change: An Urgent Agenda’ (2010) 10 Urban Devel-
opment Series Knowledge Papers 6.
26 The term ‘space left over after planning’ (SLOAP) was coined by Prof Leslie Ginsburg 
of the Architectural Association in London during the 1960’s.
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The Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ), defined by McGranahan, Balk & 
Anderson is “the contiguous area along the coast that is less than 10 metres above 
sea level that covers 2 per cent of the world’s land area but contains 10 per cent 
of the world’s population and 13 per cent of the world’s urban population”.27 It is 
not surprising that small increases in sea levels can have devastating effects. The 
aqua alta of Venice, the Thames estuary, the sea towns of Zanzibar and Lamu in 
East Africa, the river settlements in Bangkok, Jakarta and Accra all share similar 
challenges, and notably the flooding of low lying areas as in Bangladesh. Sea 
walls, barriers and breakwaters have become immediate necessities, these solu-
tions, in many cases, are not sustainable in the long term and are not econom-
ically or environmentally viable. In addition, they often affect the city’s historic 
structures within the wider urban fabric. More balanced planning utilising open 
spaces can increase urban liveability on one hand and help cope with flooding 
on the other. Good environmental planning solutions are preferable to expensive 
man-made engineering options.
Both Cultural and Natural Heritage are increasingly affected by events that re-
sult from human and natural causes. Heritage sites provide a significant element 
of social cohesion and sustainable development and their erosion has extremely 
negative ramifications for society and its resilience. Human behaviour and deci-
sions developed in normal times can greatly increase the resilience of these sites, 
thus reducing the impact of potential disasters. Specific disasters are generally 
far more destructive than prolonged processes of deterioration. A short-lived 
disaster can swiftly and suddenly devastate an entire area, and therefore man-
aging disaster risks is an urgent issue:
“Heritage if well maintained can positively contribute to reducing disaster risks. This 
is true not only for natural heritage resources that guarantee the proper functioning of 
ecosystems and the beneficial effect of their goods and services, but also for cultural 
heritage properties that- as a result of traditional knowledge accumulated over centuries 
have proven to be resilient to disasters while providing shelter and psychological sup-
port to affected communities”.28
Where traditional knowledge systems exist it is vital to integrate them into the 
Disaster Risk Management.29 These wisdoms and memories of the city can 
27 Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk and Bridget Anderson, ‘The Rising Tide: As-
sessing the Risks of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coast-
al Zones’ (2007) 19 Environment and Urbanization 17.
28 UNESCO, ‘Managing Disaster Risks for World Heritage’ (2010) World Heritage 
Resource Manual whc.unesco.org/document/104522 accessed 23 January 2014, 3–4.
29 Ibid 40.
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provide information and awareness, enabling heritage to contribute to the de-
velopment of resilience parameters.30 A World Heritage workshop held in Acre, 
Israel in 2009 continued to expand on the 2008 results established at the Olympia 
meeting in the field of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), emphasising the pol-
icy document on the Impact of Climate Change on World Heritage Properties 
adopted by the General Assembly of the States Parties to the World Heritage 
Convention in 2007. The Acre Workshop further elucidated the link between 
events related to climate change and DRR.31
The annual UNESCO State of Conservation reports offer an indicator of the 
current threats to World Heritage properties. Of 1.007 (as of 201432) listed prop-
erties, 250 are registered World Heritage Cities within the framework of the Or-
ganization of World Heritage Cities (OWHC), and within the category of climate 
change and severe weather events, flooding is the greatest current challenge. The 
statistics of the World Heritage Centre show that climate and severe weather 
events are affecting 10 per cent of the properties and are interlinked to other 
factors mainly attributed to management (71 per cent) or building and develop-
ment (43 per cent).33
In the fields of conservation there has been much recognition of the import-
ance of cultural diversity – of place, people, time and narrative, notably with 
the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions.34 Since the 1990’s important texts have strived to integrate cul tural 
diversity into the conservation process, recognising urban conflicts on one hand 
and the needs for their resolution through co-existence or compromise, on the 
other. The Nara Document (1994)35 and subsequent Burra Charter (1999)36 
30 Rohit Jigyasu et al, ‘Heritage and Resilience’ 4th Session of the Global Platform for Dis-
aster Risk Reduction (2013) whc.unesco.org/document/122923 accessed 23 January 
2014, 30.
31 UNESCO, ‘Recommendations of the Second International Workshop on Disaster 
Risk Reduction to Cultural Heritage Acre (Israel)’ (14 November 2009) whc.unesco.
org/en/events/610 accessed 23 January 2014.
32 For dynamic reference see whc.unesco.org/en/list.
33 For dynamic reference see whc.unesco.org/en/activities/634/.
34 Adopted 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007, 2440 UNTS 311.
35 ICOMOS, ‘The Nara Document on Authenticity’ drafted at Nara Conference on 
Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention held at Nara, Japan, from 
1–6 November 1994 www.icomos.org/charters/nara-e.pdf accessed 23 January 2014.
36 ICOMOS Australia, ‘The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places 
of Cultural Significance 1999’ australia.icomos.org/publications/charters/accessed 
23 January 2014.
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together with the 2011 UNESCO Recommendation on Historic Urban Land-
scapes (HUL)37 all strengthen the importance of integrative processes in the 
evaluation of urban challenges and needs. The new HUL Recommendation 
states that the
“[...] approach goes beyond the preparations and readiness for disasters, but includes the 
day-to-day management of the city and the lives of the individuals, which make up its 
identity. Multi-layered spaces and multi-layered times are a key component in establish-
ing urban resilience”.38
Cultural diversity is an essential element in our society, the acceptance of ‘the 
other’, the enriching experiences of the society and more important their cultural 
expressions and manifestations in the urban fabric.
Urban resilience is achieved in many instances through the need to resolve 
conflicting dilemmas involving many socio-cultural groups. Therefore the reso-
lution of conflict, by compromise or coexistence, as outlined in the Code of the 
Burra Charter can be made relevant, assuming that:
(i)  the healthy management of cultural difference is the responsibility of soci-
ety as a whole;
(ii)  in a pluralist society, value differences exist and contain the potential for 
conflict; and
(iii)  ethical practice is necessary for the just and effective management of places 
of diverse cultural significance.
It is important to highlight that more often than not, it is the intra and not inter-
cultural conflicts that are critical and need resolution. These might be achieved 
through the management of the city that combines these three assumptions into 
a single policy. This concept is further highlighted in Article 13, which sets out 
the basic tenet that
“[...] co-existence of cultural values should be recognised, respected and encouraged, 
especially in cases where they conflict. For some places, conflicting cultural values may 
affect policy development and management decisions”.39
37 UNESCO, ‘Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape’ (10 November 2011) 
whc.unesco.org/en/activities/638 accessed 23 January 2014.
38 Ibid.
39 In this article the term ‘cultural values’ refers to those beliefs which are important to 
a cultural group, including but not limited to political, religious, spiritual and moral 
beliefs. This is broader than values associated with cultural significance.
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Diversity must also be harnessed as an important tool to build resilience, as 
monoculture has inherent weaknesses, showing much less resilience than a di-
verse system that has multiple resources to cope with and recover from crises.40 
Diversity in general and cultural diversity in particular is an important concept 
to develop in support of resilience in all its component parts of sustainability, 
physical, social, environmental and economic and are essential in combating the 
urban effects of climate change.
V Conclusion
The significance of climate change lies in its interactions with other aspects of 
change and stress and its impacts should be considered within such a multi-
cause context.41 At first sight it might seem strange to link climate change with 
cultural diversity, equity and sustainability, but the parameters and attributes of 
each when overlaid show a close inter-relationship, strengthening the need for a 
multi-disciplinary approach. This links social inequality to the effects of urban 
disasters from climate change, where poorer communities find themselves in 
areas of weak environmental conditions sensitive to disasters thus demanding a 
more comprehensive analysis for applying the test of resilience to the city.
Cultural mapping as applied in the UNESCO Recommendation on HUL 
could generate a more integrated awareness of knowledge and traditions not 
only by the local community but by the public at large, thus understanding the 
spirit of the populace and place. The mapping of environmental weaknesses will 
be critical in developing an urban resilience policy, absorbing historic wisdoms 
and traditional knowledge, wherever the experiences of, for instance, low-lying 
slope areas, orientation and geo-morphology are known.
Responding to change is the challenge of the cities where social migrations, 
economic revolution become day-to-day occurrences. The smart city of the digi-
tal age offers the potential to connect systems and manage disaster risks based on 
a growing body of knowledge, now manageable at a macro-scale. The innovative 
changes in life-styles due to this digital revolution can re-organise existing land 
use patterns and provide mixed uses for urban resilience. The way forward is to 
develop an integrative methodology whereby language should transcend profes-
sions and disciplines in the spirit of the General System Theory; for instance 
40 Carl Folke et al, ‘Resilience and Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive Capac-
ity in a World of Transformations’ (2002) 31 Journal of the Human Environment 438.
41 IPCC, ‘Climate Change and Water: Technical Paper VI’ (June 2008) www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
technical-papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf accessed 12 June 2013.
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ruptures refer equally to the language of geology and social history. The Envir-
onmental Impact Assessment is already a tool of this methodology and the 
sub-headings of risk assessment and disaster preparedness need to be woven 
seamlessly into the process.
There is a need to develop and strengthen local knowledge and history in 
the educational programmes to make it noticeable and attribute a high profile 
for its recognition in our daily life. Awareness has to be raised at all levels and 
the developments of what-if scenarios are critical in developing effective urban 
management. This is in itself an important exercise in as much that it encour-
ages people to have a dream and vision for life. Schools of architecture abound in 
visionary planning in the aftermath of disasters, business management faculties 
restructure our society, and children’s works on ‘drawing their neighbourhood or 
city’ can all be part of our preparedness and the challenges in the face of disas-
ters. This can be facilitated by the use of historic examples which in themselves 
are less threatening. The recognition of these disasters as events as defined in 
criterion (vi) of the Operational Guidelines to the World Heritage Convention 
should be encouraged, developing an urban culture through educational and 
awareness programmes contributing to social resilience.
Through the encouragement of dialogue, in the spirit of the UNESCO consti-
tution, we strive towards peace through mutual assistance and concern. This is 
the place to foster Cultural Heritage in the lives of the communities being all the 
more important in the new age of social transformations and urban migrations 
with the need to re-establish socio-geographic identities. It also highlights our 
responsibility as architects and designers towards cooperation in the managing 
of natural disasters in general and those ensuing from climate change in particu-
lar. It is the social contract42 that is critical in this management; it is the mutual 
responsibilities between communities whether national or local that can generate 
the acceptance of the other, and reduce conflict by determining the responsibili-
ties of the public, private and NGO sectors to manage the city at times of crisis.
The largest resource of a city is its built fabric and the historic buildings with 
an added lease of life can often provide conservation solutions using traditional 
technologies. This brings us back to the need for a comprehensive understand-
ing of preparedness and to ensure its integration into our daily lives as opposed 
to a separate component dealt with esoterically by experts. As to the accidents of 
42 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Henry Regnery Company 1954, trans-
lated by Willmoore Kendall) 2.
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life, we need to design in a more proactive way to ensure that a defensible space43 
encompasses all its facets, including those presented by climate change. In short, 
it should be nothing out of the ordinary.
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The Impact of Climate Change on Slow 
Degradation of Monuments in Contrast  
to Extreme Events
Abstract In the future, besides extreme events (extreme winds, storms, tor nados; 
extreme precipitations, flooding, flash floods; heat waves, drought; pollution 
peaks) the Built Cultural Heritage (Monuments) will experience slow events, ei-
ther in strong correlation with air pollution (recession of façades in limestone or 
marble; soiling of stone surface; soiling of glass; chemical leaching of mediaeval 
stained glass; metal corrosion) or in weak correlation with air pollution (salt 
crystallization in porous walls; freeze-thaw damage in porous materials; submer-
sion of monuments on littoral due to sea level rise; swelling-shrinkage of expan-
sive clay minerals in soils; biomass accumulation on façades in unurban areas).
To assess the impact of slow events, outputs of climate and pollution mo-
dels are introduced into Dose-Response Functions to allow the projection of the 
slow weathering of the Built Cultural Heritage on the long-term. In Central and 
Southern Europe, the conjunction of a slight increase of temperatures and of a 
local decrease of precipitations, with an important abatement of air pollution, 
leads to the conclusion that monuments will likely not be threatened by this 
slow evolution in the 21st century. On the contrary, in Northern Europe, the con-
junction of a slight increase of temperatures and an important increase of pre-
cipitations with an important abatement of air pollution leads to the conclusion 
that monuments will be more or less threatened by this slow evolution in the 
21st century. This article focuses on some of these slow events.
The goal of this paper is to project and assess the future impact of slow climatic 
phenomena on Built Cultural Heritage, namely Historical Monuments. This as-
sessment results from the introduction of outputs of climate and pollution mod-
els in Dose-Response Function which quantify the behaviour of materials placed 
in an environment characterized by climate and pollution parameters. At the 
end, a crucial question is posed: Will monuments be threatened by future slow 
events in the context of future climate and pollution changes?
∗ Professor emeritus Paris Est-Créteil University (France) and European University 
Centre for Cultural Heritage, Ravello (Italy).
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I  Damages to Built Cultural Heritage Caused  
by Climate and Pollution
When describing climate and pollution events causing damage to Built Cultural 
Heritage, it is fundamental to distinguish two types: extreme events and slow 
events.
Extreme events are short-lived, acute, intensive, recurrent, highly destroying 
and uncontrollable. They include extreme winds, storms, tornados, extreme pre-
cipitations, flooding, flash floods, heat waves, drought and pollution peaks. In 
the future, both their frequency and intensity are predicted to increase.1
Slow events are long-lived, progressive, permanent, less destroying and con-
trollable. Among them, one first category has a strong correlation with air pollu-
tion: recession of façades in limestone or marble, soiling of stone surface, soiling 
of modern glass (haze), chemical leaching of mediaeval stained glass, metal cor-
rosion and biomass accumulation in urban areas. A second category has a weak 
correlation with air pollution, but hardly depends on geographic location: salt 
crystallization in porous walls (stone, brick, plaster, frescoes, wall paintings etc), 
freeze-thaw damage in porous materials, submersion of monuments on littoral 
due to sea level rise, swelling-shrinkage of expansive clay minerals in soils (af-
fecting the stability of monuments foundations) and biomass accumulation in 
unurban areas.
In the context of climate change, an inventory of these phenomena and their 
effects – either extreme or slow – was published by the World Heritage Centre 
of UNESCO in 2007.2 However, this list was only descriptive and qualitative, 
mainly theoretical and at global scale.
Slow phenomena and their outdoor impacts on the materials of Built Heritage 
were quantified and mapped at the European continental scale in the “Noah’s 
Ark” European Project (2004–2007).3 Although these slow phenomena have not 
been mapped, they were quantified at a local scale in London for recession and 
1 IPCC, Fourth assessment report: climate change (Cambridge University Press 2007).
2 UNESCO, ‘Climate Change and World Heritage. Report on Predicting and Managing 
the Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage and Strategy to Assist States Par-
ties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses’ World Heritage Reports 22 
(1 May 2007).
3 Alessandra Bonazza et al, ‘Mapping the impact of climate change on surface recession 
of carbonate buildings in Europe’ (2009) 407 Science of the Total Environment 2039; 
Cristina Sabbioni, Peter Brimblecombe and May Cassar (eds), The Atlas of Climate 
Change Impact on European Cultural Heritage (Anthem Press 2010).
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soiling of stone;4 in Oviedo, Prague and Paris only for recession of stone;5 and in 
Paris for damage on glass and stained glass.6 Maps of the effects of climate and 
pollution on limestone at the scale of two different metropolises, Istanbul7 and 
Madrid,8 by means of the Dose-Response Functions, have been recently pub-
lished. However, the Istanbul study concerns only the current period while the 
one on Madrid gives projections until 2025.
Indoor effects on Built Cultural Heritage will be quantified and mapped at the 
European scale and at the scale of individual buildings in the frame of “Climate 
for Culture” European Project (2010–2014).9
The Council of Europe in Strasbourg pays attention to the impacts of climate 
change on materials of Built Cultural Heritage by producing reports10 and fund-
ing activities in this field at the European University Centre for Cultural Heri-
tage, Ravello (Italy): doctoral courses11 and international workshops.12
II  The Method for Predicting and Assessing the Slow  
Impacts of Climate Change on Built Cultural Heritage
This method consists of introducing the outputs of climate and pollution mo-
dels into the Dose-Response Functions (DRF). Climate models (e.g. English 
4 Peter Brimblecombe and Carlota M Grossi, ‘Millennium-long Recession of Limestone 
Façades in London’ (2008) 56 Environmental Geology 463; Peter Brimblecombe and 
Carlota M Grossi, ‘Millennium-long Damage to Building Materials in London’ (2009) 
407 Science of the Total Environment 1354.
5 Carlota M Grossi et al, ‘Predicting Twenty-first Century Recession of Architectural 
Limestone in European Cities’ (2008) 56 Environmental Geology 455.
6 Anda Ionescu et al, ‘Long-term Damage to Glass in Paris in a Changing Environment’ 
(2012) 431 Science of the Total Environment 151.
7 Ferhat Karaca, ‘Mapping the Corrosion Impact of Air Pollution on the Historical Pen-
insula of Istanbul’ (2013) 14 Journal of Cultural Heritage 129.
8 Daniel De la Fuente et al, ‘Mapping Air Pollution Effects on Atmospheric Degrada-
tion of Cultural Heritage’ (2013) 14 Journal of Cultural Heritage 138.
9 Johanna Leissner, ‘The Impact of Climate Change on Historic Buildings and Cultural 
Property’ (2011) 3 UNESCO Today 44; Constanze Fuhrmann and Johanna Leissner, 
‘Climate for Culture Project: First Results’ (2012) www.climateforculture.eu/index.php? 
inhalt=dissemination.publications accessed 24 January 2014.
10 Cristina Sabbioni et al, ‘Vulnerability of Cultural Heritage to Climate Change’ Report 
to Council of Europe (20 November 2008) AP/CAT (2008) 44.
11 Roger A Lefèvre and Cristina Sabbioni, ‘Vulnerability of Cultural Heritage to Climate 
Change’ (European Master-Doctorate Course, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2009).
12 Roger A Lefèvre and Cristina Sabbioni (eds), Cultural Heritage and Climate Change. 
Proceedings of the Ravello International Workshop 2009 (Bari: Edipuglia 2009).
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HADLEY, French ARPEGE-CLIMAT, European ENSEMBLES) propose: future 
temperature (T), air relative humidity (RH) and amount and acidity (H+) of rain. 
Pollution models (e.g. European GAINS) propose future concentrations of SO2, 
HNO3, O3 and particulate matter (PM).
The DRFs are equations allowing the projection of the behaviour of a mate-
rial in new environmental and climatic conditions, current or future, or even re-
constructing its past behaviour.13 The doses are the parameters influencing the 
response; in this case, they correspond to climatic (meteorological) and environ-
mental (pollution) factors. Their influence is different according to the exposure 
conditions: dry (sheltered from rain) or wet (unsheltered). The response is a meas-
urable modification of the material: corrosion, recession, soiling, leaching etc.
The general expression of a DRF is:
Response (damage) =  Dose dry (T, RH, [SO2], [HNO3], [O3], [PM], t…)
 + Dose wet (Rain, [H+], t…)
The DRFs are obtained either by exposure in atmospheric simulation chambers 
where the different doses are simulated, or, more frequently, by exposure cam-
paigns on real sites with various environmental and climatic parameters, which 
are measured around the experience. The exposure duration ‘t’ is accounted as a 
dose. Only the measured doses are taken into account, excluding all others, even 
if they should be included as possible causes of the response, but unknown at the 
time of the experience.
These functions present a crucial interest as they can be mapped in the same 
way as climatic and pollution factors.
III Recession of Façades in Limestone or Marble
When unsheltered, the parts of the façades in limestone or marble exposed to rain 
erode by dissolution of carbonates and their surface begins to recede. A damage 
function (DRF) was established by Lipfert14 after laboratory experiments on the 
dissolution of calcite (CaCO3), the main component of limestone and marble:
Recession µm y-1 = 18.8 Rain m y-1 + 0.016 [H
+] µmol l-1 Rain m y-1 
+ 0.18 (VdS cm s-1 [SO2] µg m-3 + VdN cm s-1 [HNO3] µg m-3)
13 Vladimir Kucera et al, ‘UN/ECE ICP materials dose-response functions for the mul-
tipollutant situation’ (2007) 7 Water Air and Soil Pollution Focus 249.
14 Frederick W Lipfert, ‘Atmospheric damage to calcareous stones: comparison and rec-
onciliation of recent experimental findings’ (1989) 23 Atmospheric Environment 415.
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If measurements of HNO3 are not available, Kucera
15 suggests the following con-
version formula:
[HNO3] µg m-3 = 516e-3400/(T+273) ([NO2] µg m-3 [O3] µg m-3 RH%)
0.5
The first factor of the Lipfert equation represents the action of clean rain (karst 
effect), the second the action of acid rain and the third the action of acid dry 
deposition (VdS and VdN being respectively the deposition velocity of SO2 and 
HNO3). Therefore this DRF underlines that the recession of façades in limestone 
or marble depends both on climate (clean rain) and pollution (wet/dry pollu-
tion: acid rain, SO2, HNO3).
This DRF, established by Lipfert, was applied to the reconstruction of the past 
and the projection of the future recession rates of porous Portland limestone, in 
London from 1100 to 210016 (Figure 1). The karst effect dominates the earliest 
period and continues, only with subtle changes, throughout. Pollution damage to 
stone increases rapidly in the late 1600s as the result of the dramatic increase of the 
use of high-sulphur coal. This use ultimately dropped at the end of 20th century.
Figure 1:  Recession rates of porous Portland limestone in London 1100–2100. The contri-
butions to recession rates of acid rain, dry deposition and karst effect are added  
to show the sum of the contributions (After Brimblecombe & Grossi, 2008).
15 Vladimir Kucera, ‘Model for multipollutant impact and assessment of threshold 
levels for Cultural Heritage’ (Swedish Corrosion Institute, Stockholm 2005) www. 
corrinstitute.se/multi-assess/web/page.aspx accessed 24 January 2014.
16 Brimblecombe and Grossi (n 4).
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Figure 1 indicates clearly that the recession rates of Portland limestone in London 
for the period beginning in 2000 are of 12-14 µm y-1. These rates are regularly, 
but slowly, increasing throughout the 21st century due to the increasing of the 
karst effect, a consequence of increasing temperature and atmospheric concen-
trations of CO2, although rainfall may decline.17
A second DRF is given by Tidblad et al.18 after field campaigns of exposure of 
samples of Portland limestone to various real current environments:
Recession µm = 2.7 [SO2]
0.48µg m-3 exp (-0.018T) ty




Measurements of the recession rates of Portland limestone were performed at 
the St Paul Cathedral in London for three decades (1980–2010).19 The results of 
these measurements were compared to the calculations based on the DRF for 
calcite by Lipfert20 and for the same limestone by Tidblad et al21 (Table 1):
Table 1:  Annual recession rates (in µm) measured and calculated by decades of Portland 
limestone at St Paul Cathedral in London22
Period Measures at  St Paul Cathedral
DRF Lipfert 
(1989)
DRF Tidblad et al. 
(2001)
1980–1990 49 14.72 8.54
1990–2000 38 11.78 5.18
2000–2010 35 12.64 3.74
There is an important difference between the results obtained from the two 
DRFs and between them and the results of measurements on the cathedral: 
Tidblad’s DRF underestimates Lipfert’s DRF (results are lower from the half to 
the third). All of these calculations are significantly lower than the in the field 
17 Bonazza et al (n 3).
18 Johan Tidblad et al, ‘UN ECE ICP Materials: Dose-response Functions on Dry and 
Wet Acid Deposition Effects over 8 Years of Exposure’ (2001) 130 Water, Air, Soil Pol-
lution 1457.
19 Rob Inkpen et al, ‘Modelling the Impact of Changing Pollution Levels on Limestone 
Erosion Rates in Central London, 1980–2010’ (2012) 61 Atmospheric Environment 
476; Rob Inkpen et al, ‘Thirty Years of Erosion and Declining Atmospheric Pollution 
at St Paul’s Cathedral, London’ (2012) 62 Atmospheric Environment 521.
20 Lipfert (n 14).
21 Tidblad et al (n 18).
22 Inkpen et al (n 19).
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measurements (from the tenth to the third). Nevertheless all of these results are 
in the same magnitude. Inkpen et al wrote:
“Researchers using dose-response functions are well aware that there are problems 
with their construction and use. Likewise, researchers who use Micro Erosion Meter 
or stone tablets to monitor erosion are well aware that this method is not without […] 
problems”.23
According to the results of the Noah’s Ark European Project, at European scale, 
the recession of façades in limestone or marble will remain constant in the near 
future (2013–2039) but, in the far future (2070–2099), although it will remain 
constant in Central Europe, it will hardly decrease in Southern Europe and it will 
increase in Northern Europe.
IV Soiling (Blackening) of Façades in Limestone or Marble
Contrary to the previous location, the parts of the façades in limestone or marble 
sheltered from rain accumulate particles (Particulate Matter, PM) not washed by 
rain after their dry deposition. An equation, having the value of DRF, links the 
reflectivity or lightness Rt after time t to the initial reflectance R0 (clean stone) 
and the concentration of fine particulate matter (PM10) (<10 µm) with a constant  
rate for blackening ks24:
Rt % = R0 % exp (-ks [PM10] µg m-3 t y)
This DRF assumes that soiling of façades in limestone or marble depends only 
on pollution (PM10).
Figure 2 shows the evolution over the last millennium of the blackening of 
a new sample of Portland limestone in London. As for recession (Figure 1), the 
blackening increased from the 1600s with a peak at the end of the 19th century 
and decreased in the 20th century. This decrease will continue throughout the 
21st century. The shaded area points out the contribution of busy streets where 
the PM10 is taken as 50 per cent higher than urban background and the particles 
a few per cent darker.
23 Inkpen et al (n 19).
24 Brimblecombe and Grossi (n 4).
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Figure 2:  Blackening rate (% y-1) as loss of reflectance of new sample of Portland limestone 
(80 % initial reflectance) exposed in London from 1100 to 2100. EC/µg m-3: 
Elemental Carbon concentration; % EC: percentage of Elemental Carbon with  
respect to PM10. The shaded area shows the increase of PM10 in busy streets  
(After Brimblecombe & Grossi 2009)
Although the quantification and the mapping of soiling of façades were not 
achieved in the Noah’s Ark Project, at the European scale, there is a good reason 
to do it. Indeed, soiling is a complementary phenomenon of recession (soiling in 
sheltered zones and recession in unsheltered zones of the same façade), the two 
phenomena can be quantified and mapped at the same European scale and their 
long-term evolution might be estimated as well.
V Soiling of Modern Si-Ca-Na Glass (Haze)
Modern Si-Ca-Na glass is used for windows and building façades as well as for 
double protective glazing of stained glass windows. Due to its chemical composi-
tion, this modern glass is highly durable. From the physical point of view, haze 
is mainly caused by particle deposition and the development of microcrystals, 
mainly sulphates (neocrystallisations), on the glass surface. Glass soiling can be 
accessed through an optical measurement: the haze, defined as the ratio between 
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 the diffuse transmitted light and the direct transmitted light, expressed in a per-
centage. The corresponding DRF is expressed as25:
Haze % = (0.2529 [SO2] µg m-3 + 0.108 [NO2] µg m-3 + 0.1437 [PM10] µg m-3). 
1 / (1+ (382 /tdays)1.86)
One can notice from the previous expression that Haze of modern glass seems 
to depend only on pollution (SO2, NO2, PM10), the climate parameters having no 
significant contribution.
Figure 3 shows the evolution from 1500 to 2100 of haze development, from 
the first year of exposure of a pristine sample of Si-Ca-Na glass in Paris. Compar-
ing Figures 1, 2 and 3, the picture emerging in London is broadly similar to Paris, 
however, the period of rapid damage to materials is longer and begins earlier in 
London. This difference reflects the much earlier adoption of coal as a fuel in 
London.26 A general abatement is projected in the 21st century.
Figure 3:  Estimated haze in % development during the first year of exposure in Paris of 
modern Si-Ca-Na glass using the DRF including (dotted line) and excluding 
(solid line) the effect of NO2 (After Ionescu et al 2012)
25 Tiziana Lombardo et al, ‘Dose–response Function for the Soiling of Silica–soda–lime 
Glass due to Dry Deposition’ (2010) 408 Science of the Total Environment 976.
26 Ionescu et al (n 6).
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Modern glass was not a material studied in the Noah’s Ark Project. For this rea-
son its soiling (haze) was not mapped and not considered on the long term at 
the European scale. Nevertheless, its development depending only on pollution 
parameters it is possible predicting its general abatement all over Europe during 
the 21st century.
VI Chemical Leaching of Mediaeval Si-Ca-K Stained Glass
In the goal of establishing a DRF for the weathering of mediaeval Si-Ca-K 
stained glass, less durable than Si-Ca-Na modern glass, Melcher & Schreiner27 
measured the leaching depth of the ions K+ and Ca2+ in mediaeval-like model 
glass specimens exposed to the environment of several sites sheltered from 
rain. The superficial leaching of K and Ca leads to the formation of a hydrated 
silica gel layer at the surface of stained glass, which plays a relatively protect-
ing role.
DRFs, as a result of regression calculations for the leaching depths of the two 
main alkali ions d(K) and d(Ca) in the glass, are given by the authors:
d(K)µm = - 0.64 + (0.03RH% + 0.04 [SO2] µg m-3)√t y 
– (0.05T°C + 2.03. 1/[NO2] µg m-3) t y
d(Ca)µm = - 0.79 + (0.03RH% + 0.03 [SO2] µg m-3)√t y 
– (0.04T°C + 1.91. 1/[NO2] µg m-3) t y
In conclusion, DRFs established for the Si-Ca-K glass reveal that leaching of 
mediaeval glass sheltered from rain depends both on pollution (SO2, NO2) and 
climate (RH, T) parameters.
An application of these two DRFs is illustrated in Figure 4: the trends in the 
depth to which the annual loss occurs for both K and Ca in stained glass shel-
tered from rain in Paris are seen to reflect changes in pollutant concentrations 
over time. The decrease observed in the late 20th century will not attain very low 
values in the 21st century due to climate factors (RH, T).
27 Michael Melcher and Manfred Schreiner, ‘Quantification of the influence of atmos-
pheric pollution on the weathering of low-durability potash-lime-silica glasses’ (2007) 
49 Pollution atmosphérique 13; Michael Melcher and Manfred Schreiner, ‘Impact of 
Climate Change on Medieval Stained Glass’ in Roger A Lefèvre and Cristina Sabbioni 
(eds), Cultural Heritage and Climate Change (Edipuglia 2010) 93–99.
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Figure 4:  The depth of damage in μm under the surface of a stained glass window with  
respect to leaching of potassium (dotted line) and calcium (solid line) over the 
first year of exposure in Paris sheltered from rain (After Ionescu et al 2012)
Si-Ca-K mediaeval-like model glass samples were exposed unsheltered from rain 
to the Parisian atmosphere on the Northern tower of the Saint Eustache Church, 
in the pedestrian quarter ‘Les Halles’ in the centre of Paris.28 The thickness of the 
leached layer is given by the author as a function of the duration of exposure in 
months (Table 2).
Table 2:  Thickness in µm of the superficial leached layer of Si-Ca-K glass exposed to rain 
in Paris unsheltered from rain resulting from measurements on Scanning Electron 
 Microscopy Images and Electron Probe Microanalysis (6 and 12 Month) (After 















Min. – – – 1.6 0.6 0.6
Mean 2.5 4.1 – 9.3 13.8 17.0
Max. – – 11 17.5 25.7 37.0
28 Lucile Gentaz, Simulation et modélisation de l’altération des verres de composition mé-
diévale dans l’atmosphère urbaine (Thèse de doctorat University Paris Est-Créteil 2011).
94 Roger-Alexandre Lefèvre
Other Si-Ca-K mediaeval-like glass model samples were exposed to rain at the 
Sainte Chapelle in Paris for 12 months during the European Project VIDRIO 
(2001-2004).29 The thickness of the leached layer was 0.6 µm, that is less than 
the thickness (4.1 µm) measured by Gentaz30 for the same duration exposed to 
rain, less than the results of the calculations performed for the same duration in 
Paris by Ionescu et al31 (Figure 4) by means of the two DRFs given by Melcher & 
Schreiner32 including the outputs of HADLEY and GAINS models (1 to 2 µm in 
average), but in sheltered situation. Although being quite different, these results 
are in the same range both for the sheltered and unsheltered situations or those 
resulting from calculations (DRFs and climate and pollution models).
Contrary to modern glass, mediaeval stained glass was studied in the Noah’s 
Ark Project33 on the basis of the DRFs established by Melcher & Schreiner.34 The 
conclusions were that a minor decrease in stained glass leaching all over Europe 
is predicted, but meaning that mediaeval glass will remain at risk in many areas.
The four diagrams (Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4) show clearly that in the 21st century, 
at least in London and Paris, the general decrease of two slow phenomena are 
linked exclusively to pollution: soiling of stone and haze of modern glass. They 
also show the different projected evolutions of two slow phenomena linked to 
both climate and pollution: erosion-recession of stone will slightly increase and 
leaching of mediaeval stained glass will slightly decrease.
VII Corrosion of Metals
For two metals, steel and zinc, the following DRFs were established35:
Corrsteel = 1.58 [SO2]0.52µg m-3 e 0.20 RH% + fsteel(T°C) + 0.102 DCl e 0.033RH% + 0.040T°C
Corrzinc = 0.011[SO2]0.44µg m-3 e 0.046 RH% + fzinc(T°C) + 0.0175 DCl e 0.008RH% + 0.085T°C
29 Adriana Bernardi et al, ‘Conservation of stained glass windows with protective glaz-
ing: Main results from the European VIDRIO research programme’ (2013) 14 Journal 
of Cultural Heritage 527.
30 Gentaz (n 28).
31 Ionescu et al (n 6).
32 Melcher and Schreiner (n 27).
33 Sabbioni et al (n 3).
34 Melcher and Schreiner (n 27).
35 Kucera et al (n 13); Johan Tidblad, ‘Atmospheric corrosion of metals in 2010–2039 
and 2070–2099’ (2012) 55 Atmospheric Environment 1.
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This assumes that corrosion of metals depends both on climate (RH, T) and pol-
lution (SO2, Chloride).
The expected evolution during the 21st century was mapped in the frame of
the European Noah’s Ark Project36 (Figure 5).
Figure 5:  Map of the expected corrosion risk for metals at the end of 21st century (2070– 
2099) issued by the European Noah’s Ark Project (After Sabbioni et al 2010)
The atmospheric corrosion of metals in inland areas is expected to increase in 
the Northern Europe (where the trend will be dominated by the effect of average 
annual temperature, as a maximum corrosion effect is observed at 10°C) and to 
decrease in Southern Europe. In European coastal areas affected by high chloride 
deposition, corrosion is expected to increase.37
VIII Biomass Accumulation in Unurban Areas
Organism growth on monuments is of particular interest, both as an agent of 
aesthetic change as well as its possible role in contributing to stone deterior ation 
or protecting against deterioration. Biomass production was correlated with 
 climate conditions, the main parameters defining bioclimate being precipitation 
36 Sabbioni et al (n 3); Tidblad (n 35).
37 Sabbioni et al (n 3).
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and temperature. Changes in these parameters affect organism activity and 
hence changes in the biomass.
The accumulation of biomass (Lichens, Algae, Mosses, Fungi etc) on façades 
in unurban areas is linked to rain and temperature, depending only on climate 
parameters38:




According to this DRF, rain has a positive effect while temperature has a negative 
effect. It has to be taken into consideration that in urban areas pollution has a 
negative effect on biomass growth.
Figure 6: Biomass accumulation projection for 2070–2099 (After Gómez-Bolea et al 2012)
The models on climate change predict an increase in temperature and precipita-
tion in Northern areas of Europe for the far future (2070–2099), which would 
lead to a higher accumulation of biomass. Contrary to the North, a significant 
reduction in precipitation is expected in Southern areas of Europe, associated 
with a lower biomass accumulation in such areas.39
38 Antonia Gómez-Bolea et al, ‘Mapping the Impact of Climate Change on Biomass 
Accu- mulation on Stone’ (2012) 13 Journal of Cultural Heritage 254.
39 Gómez-Bolea (n 38).
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IX  Will Monuments Really be Threatened by Slow Events 
Related to Future Climate Change and Future Pollution?
In Northern Europe, the conjunction of a slight increase of temperatures, an im-
portant increase of precipitations and an important abatement of air pollution 
leads to the conclusion that monuments will be more or less threatened by this 
slow evolution during the 21st century.
On the contrary, in Central and Southern Europe, the conjunction of an in-
crease of temperatures, a decrease of precipitations and an important abatement of 
air pollution lead to the conclusion that monuments are not likely to be threat-
ened by this slow evolution during the 21st century.
Nevertheless, climate change is obviously a reality demonstrated by observa-
tions, measurements and modelling. In addition, besides slow events, extreme 
events are serious threats for monuments. This is because they will likely be rein-
forced both by frequency and strength in the future.
The basic research in the field of Cultural Heritage is the scientific deter-
mination of the climate parameters that are most critical to heritage building’s 
materials, named Heritage climatology by Brimblecombe.40 There are a number 
of climate models and they all need to be tested and validated for the foreseen 
impact on Cultural Heritage. There are particular problems in applying exist-
ing models as the right spatial and temporal scales are required. Although the 
spatial resolution of models has improved in recent years, this is not always true 
of temporal scales as heritage research not only needs data on the long term, but 
often at annual or daily time intervals. It is essential to improve and test Dose-
Response Functions for a wide range of heritage materials for past, present and 
future climates in indoor and outdoor environments.41
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Reza Ardakanian & Stephan Hülsmann∗
Impact of Global Change on World Heritage 
and on Environmental Resources: The Need for 
an Integrated Management Approach
Abstract Natural Heritage sites are obviously closely related to and affected 
by environmental resources (mainly water and soil) of the area they are situ-
ated in. However, also Cultural Heritage sites are not only affected by e.g. wa-
ter (via precipitation, water level etc), but in most cases are part of a cultural 
landscape in which the surrounding nature and its environmental resources are 
a critical element. This notion certainly holds for Cultural Heritage in which 
water is an essential part. Further, any change in land use of heritage sites, be 
it climate related or man-made, may have a strong impact. Thus, virtually all 
Cultural Heritage Sites cannot be managed and maintained without consider-
ing their natural environment. Climate change directly affects both Natural and 
Cultural Heritage sites (e.g. changing temperature and precipitation patterns 
and changing, often increasing frequency of catastrophic events), but perhaps 
more importantly, it has an indirect effect via its impact on the environmental 
resources. In addition, climate change may increase the pressure on heritage 
sites by increasing human impact, since the people in the region may face a 
shortage of natural resources and/or increase in population density or move to 
urban areas. This means one has to consider impacts of global change rather 
than only climate.
Mitigating the direct and indirect impacts of global change on heritage sites 
and/or adapting to it requires an integrated approach. Protection and management 
of heritage sites must be considered in the context of managing environmental 
∗ Prof. Reza Ardakanian is founding director of the United Nations University Institute 
for Integrated Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources (UNU-FLORES), 
Dresden, Germany. Experiencing boards of various international programs or or-
ganizations, such like UNESCO-IHP, UNESCO-IHE, the International Hydropow-
er Association and UNU-EHS, he has served as director of the UN-Water Decade 
Programme on Capacity Development hosted by UNU since 2007 and as vice-rector 
ad interim of UNU in Europe.
 Dr. Stephan Hülsmann holds the position of academic officer of UNU-FLORES and 
specialist in Systems and Flux Analysis considering Global Change Assessment.
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resources in the region in a sustainable way. In addition, especially in develop-
ing countries, these management strategies need to be embedded in a suite of 
measures and activities in capacity development addressing all relevant stake-
holders. The mission of the United Nations University Institute for Integrated 
Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources (UNU-FLORES) is to address 
the urgent need for integrated and sustainable management strategies for envir-
onmental resources, focusing on water, soil and waste. Such an integrated ap-
proach to the management of inter-related resources may also be termed a nexus 
approach to the management of water, soil and waste. Implementing such strate-
gies, considering capacity development both at the individual and institutional 
level will be one means to manage and maintain World Heritage, be it natural or 
cultural.
I Heritage Sites and Their Environment
The UNESCO World Heritage Center currently lists 119 water-related proper-
ties (lakes) of outstanding universal value, among them 59 listed as Cultural 
Heritage, 51 as Natural Heritage and 8 as mixed sites.1 Natural heritage sites, 
often representing national parks and reserves, are protected mainly as areas 
of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance, as outstanding ex-
amples representing major stages of earth’s history, or significant ecological 
and biological processes in the evolution of ecosystems or based on their bio-
logical diversity. Usually, human impact and use of natural resources in these 
areas is prohibited or very restricted. For Natural Heritage sites it is clear and 
obvious that they are strongly related and interlinked with their natural en-
vironment. Any change in land-use, increasing usage or withdrawal of water, 
mostly associated with pollution would certainly directly affect the Natural 
Heritage site.
Is this close relation and dependency of Heritage sites on the natural environ-
ment and the surrounding environmental resources indeed so specific to Natural 
Heritage? In fact, we are making the case here that it applies also to Cultural Heri-
tage sites in a similar way. When talking about specific monuments and build-
ings, the relation is obviously not as close as to Natural Heritage sites, although 
they are still affected by environmental resources, e.g. by water via  precipitation 
(potentially polluted), groundwater level etc. However, the relation of Cultural 
Heritage sites to the surrounding environmental resources is in many (if not in 
1 As of November 2014; for dynamic reference please see whc.unesco.org/en/list insert-
ing lake as search criteria.
 Impact of Global Change on World Heritage & Environmental Resources 103
most) cases much closer and rather similar to Natural Heritage sites: Cultural 
Heritage sites are typically closely embedded into their natural environment with 
its natural resources; they are part of a landscape (if not the landscape itself is the 
Cultural Heritage). This means, also in the case of Cultural Heritage, any change 
in land-use, be it climate-related or man-made, or any change in the availability 
or quality of water resources, will have an impact.
Some arbitrarily chosen prominent examples to showcase the close inter-
relatedness with environmental resources are briefly described as follows 
(Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4); please note that all are explicitly classified as Cultural 
Heritage:
•	 West Lake Cultural Landscape of Hangzhou (China):2 This is considered an 
outstanding example of a cultural landscape where natural elements, farmed 
landscape and artificial elements manifest a perfect fusion;
•	 Angkor (Cambodia):3 This site includes a concentration of impressive monu-
ments, “closely linked to their geographic context”, including (artificial) water 
bodies, forests and cultivated land;
•	 Shushtar Historical Hydraulic System (Iran):4 Dating back to the 3rd century 
BCE “it is as rich in its diversity of civil engineering structures and its con-
structions as in the diversity of its uses (urban water supply, mills, irrigation, 
river transport, and defensive system)”. Its close relationship to water resourc-
es, but also to soil and land-use management, is obvious;
2 For a detailed description see UNESCO, ‘West Lake Cultural Landscape of Hangzhou’ 
whc.unesco.org/en/list/1334 last accessed 2 December 2013.
3 For a detailed description see UNESCO, ‘Angkor’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/668 last 
accessed 2 December 2013.
4 For a detailed description see UNESCO, ‘Shushtar Historical Hydraulic System’ whc.
unesco.org/en/list/1315 last accessed 2 December 2013.
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Figure 1:  Cultural Heritage sites showing their close relation to their natural environment 
and environmental resources: West Lake Cultural Landscape of Hangzhou (China); 
photo credits: shutterstock.
Figure 2:  Cultural Heritage sites showing their close relation to their natural environment 
and environmental resources: Angkor (Cambodia); photo credits: shutterstock.
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Figure 3:  Cultural Heritage sites showing their close relation to their natural environment 
and environmental resources: Shushtar Historical Hydraulic System (Iran); photo 
credits: shutterstock.
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Figure 4:  Cultural Heritage sites showing their close relation to their natural environment 
and environmental resources: Historic Centre of Vienna (Austria); photo credits: 
shutterstock.
•	 Historic Centre of Vienna (Austria):5 While the justification for inscription 
focuses on the architectural qualities, it is clear that the river Danube is an 
essential element within the city centre.
Looking beyond the official World Heritage list there are more examples where the 
sustainable use of water and soil resources has inspired people to create remarkable 
technical constructions and inventions, which typically do have a strong cultural 
dimension. One such example are so-called Qanats, historic hydraulic structures 
developed by the Iranian people, dating back to the 1st millennium BC. A Qanat is 
a series of well-like shafts, connecting gently sloping underground channels trans-
porting water over long distances to human settlements and irrigated land. This 
technology is widely used in arid and semi-arid areas. A category II UNESCO 
Centre was established in 2005 and is active in research, training and technology 
transfer related to Qanat technology and other historic hydraulic structures.6
5 For a detailed description see UNESCO, ‘Historic Centre of Vienna’ whc.unesco.org/
en/list/1033 last accessed 2 December 2013.
6 ICQHS, Official Homepage (International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic 
Structures) www.icqhs.org/English/Default.aspx accessed 2 December 2013.
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In conclusion: virtually all Cultural Heritage Sites (besides other technical 
and cultural monuments worth preserving) similarly to Natural Heritage sites 
rely on – and are closely related to – water and soil resources of their environ-
ment. This means they cannot be managed and maintained without considering 
their natural environment and its environmental resources, in particular water 
and soil.
II Impact of Global Change
Typical challenges for the ecosystems of Natural Heritage sites mostly refer to 
illegal human activities such as hunting, fishing, clearance of woods or any type 
of pollution. Climate change poses another challenge by changing temperature 
and precipitation patterns, increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophic 
events affecting water and soil resources and associated phenomena such as sea 
level rise, desertification etc. Climate change has direct and indirect effects on 
the flora and fauna of Natural Heritage sites and may cause species’ extinctions, 
shifts in species’ geographic distributions, increasing frequency of neobiota 
and alterations in ecosystem structure and function due to changes in species’ 
interactions.7
In addition, however, climate change may increase the pressure on Natural 
Heritage sites by increasing human impact, since the people in the region may 
face a shortage of natural resources due to climate-driven changes in water and 
food security, desertification, caused both by decreased rainfall and intensified 
land use, increased frequency and intensity of floods and droughts etc. Increas-
ing population densities and urbanization put additional pressure on environ-
mental resources and are intricately linked to climate change.
Overall, due to this close inter-linkage and concomitance of factors, one has 
to consider impact of global change, including climate, but also population 
growth, urbanization and demographic changes when looking at the challenges 
for integrated resources management.8
7 Céline Bellard et al, ‘Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of Biodiversity’ (2012) 
15 Ecology Letters 365.
8 UNEP, ‘Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources 
Management’ (UNEP 2012).
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Figure 5:  Impact of Global Change (various aspects) on World Heritage Sites (natural 
and cultural) and on Environmental Resources. Climate change affects World 
Heritage both directly and indirectly via environmental resources, which are also 
affected by other aspects of global change. An integrated management approach 
for World Heritage therefore needs to include measures targeting them directly, 
but also the management of environmental resources. It also includes capacity 
development and governance issues addressing the aspects of global change.
For Cultural Heritage sites, similar to natural ones, there will also be a direct 
impact of climate, via precipitation and temperature patterns, related both to 
extreme events9 and long-term changes in temperature and precipitation pat-
terns.10 Technical measures to preserve and protect buildings, monuments etc 
may be applied to mitigate these direct effects. As laid out in the previous section, 
Cultural Heritage sites in the majority of cases cannot be considered, maintained 
and managed without their natural environment, in particular with respect to 
water and land-use. Therefore, impacts of climate change on World Heritage 
sites (both cultural and natural, see above) will to a large extent be transferred 
via environmental resources (see upper part of Figure 2). These are, besides cli-
matic factors, strongly influenced by other aspects of global change, in particular 
population growth and urbanization.
9 See the contribution of Michael Turner & Rachel Singer on Urban Resilience in Cli-
mate Change.
10 See the contribution of Roger-Alexandre Lefèvre on The Impact of Climate Change on 
Slow Degradation of Monuments in Contrast to Extreme Events.
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III Managing Environmental Resources
Given the close relationship of World Heritage sites to their environment, man-
aging environmental resources, in particular water and soil, will be an important 
issue for maintenance, development and management of World Heritage. Look-
ing at common approaches to manage water and soil resources, a sectorial view 
on their management was and still is usually practised, typically also reflected in 
the respective bureaucracy and organisational structure of ministries (govern-
ance) as well as in education.
1. Water Management as an Example
In the case of water management, responsibilities are often distributed between 
various sectors: energy (hydropower, cooling water), agriculture (irrigation), 
health (drinking water supply), environment, fisheries, public works/transport 
(water ways and other infrastructure) etc. The fragmented and sectorial view 
often resulted in conflicting management strategies and overall poor manage-
ment results. As a response to this, the concept of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) was developed and has become widely accepted in recent 
years. It aims at considering water across all compartments and phases, taking 
into account the various uses and users and also the institutional framework, 
governance and capacity development.
IWRM was in particular promoted and emerged from the 1992 Earth Sum-
mit in Rio de Janeiro, which addressed development within an environmental 
framework and thus emphasized the global perspective of IWRM. Many research 
projects and case studies have since been conducted around the world and have 
provided some general lessons, but many challenges remain to the application of 
IWRM in practice.11 Not surprisingly, the implementation of the approach into 
water governance lags behind both in many developed countries, as well as in 
developing countries, although it has at least been initiated.12 By nature, IWRM 
involves and addresses to a certain extent waste (water) management in addition 
to soil and land use management as far as land use (e.g. in a river basin) affects 
water quantity and quality. However, IWRM looks at soil and waste only from a 
water perspective.
11 Roberto Lenton and Mike Muller (eds), Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Practice: Better Water Management for Development (Earthscan 2009).
12 UNEP (n 8).
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Conversely, soil and waste integrated management approaches have also been 
propagated. While they provide a wider view on the issues than a purely techni-
cal/engineering perspective (which has been common in earlier decades), they 
fail to provide a holistic approach. Neither IWRM nor the concepts of inte-
grated soil (fertility) management or integrated waste management capture and 
consider the full range of inter-connectivity and the feed-back loops between 
these resources, which would be needed to achieve sustainable management. 
Therefore, it is nowadays increasingly recognized that they should be developed 
further and merged to an integrated resources management approach, an ap-
proach explicitly considering the nexus of these resources.
2. The nexus approach to management of environmental resources
With specific reference to interlinked environmental resources, the term ‘nexus’ 
has already been used in the 1980s within the framework of the Food Energy 
Nexus Programme of UNU.13 However, it was only in – and after – the Bonn 
2011 Conference on “The Water, Energy and Food Security Nexus – Solutions 
for the Green Economy” that the concept and the term nexus itself gained wider 
recognition.14 This approach emphasizes the interdependence of water, energy 
and food security, taking synergies and trade-offs in the management of these 
nexus elements into account. Various case studies provide evidence that a nexus 
approach may facilitate integrated management and governance strategies, over-
all promoting sustainability and the transition to a Green Economy.
From a resources management perspective on the nexus of water, energy and 
food security, a nexus approach needs to be developed and implemented by in-
tegrating water resources management and soil and land-use management. Also 
to be considered and included in the nexus approach is waste management, es-
pecially concerning organic matter and the recycling of nutrients.15 The nexus 
of water, soil and waste results from various material flows and transitions, e.g. 
the soil transferring run-off and percolation into the blue water (surface and 
groundwater), and the latter by soil into the green water that plants use for their 
growth. The soil also contributes to the transformation of waste from crops, 
animals and trees into humus and plant nutrients and vice versa. Human use of 
13 Ignacy Sachs and Dana Silk, Food and Energy: Strategies for Sustainable Development 
(United Nations University Press 1990).
14 Holger Hoff, ‘Understanding the NEXUS’ Background Paper for the Bonn 2011 Con-
ference ‘The Water, Energy and Food Security Nexus’ (Stockholm Environment Insti-
tute 2011).
15 Rattan Lal, The Nexus of Soil, Water and Waste (UNU-FLORES 2013).
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water creates grey and black waters, which can be used through purification as a 
source of water and plant nutrients. Also, the application of sludge on soil is an 
important source of nutrients and organic matter. The contaminated water, grey 
and black, must be converted into blue and green by denaturing and filtration 
through soil. The goal is reuse and recycling of the waste following appropriate 
purification treatment. Thus, the nexus of water, soil and waste is essential for 
their sustainable management, for increasing water efficiency and soil produc-
tivity for food production and for adapting to climate change (see below).
The sustainable management strategies to be developed, advancing a nexus 
approach, have to be based on consistent and comprehensive systems and flux 
analysis approaches. Flux analysis, the quantification of material flows and the 
consistent tracing and follow up of the resource under question, throughout its 
migration (passage, flow, transport, transfer), through subsequent compart-
ments and phases is essential for closing cycles and a prerequisite for sustain-
able management. In case of the resource water, this approach would imply to 
close both the so-called small and large water cycles. The small one describes 
the sequence nature withdrawal, channel transport of water, treatment plant, 
distribution system, consumption/use, collection and transport of sewage and 
waste water, treatment, recycling and/or return to nature, and thus it is linked to 
the large water cycle (passage of water in the natural hydrosphere: atmosphere, 
biosphere, lithosphere, oceans and so forth). Besides closing cycles, the nexus 
approach requires linking cycles, in particular considering the linkage between 
water, soil and waste and the associated materials as briefly outlined above.
Obvious links arise from the fact that water is not only a resource, but also a 
transport medium and dissolver of minerals such as nutrients. Taking the case of 
phosphors, a limited resource and an essential element in all organisms and an 
important nutrient in agriculture, it clearly represents a broken biogeochemical 
cycle.16 While peak phosphorus is lying ahead, too much of this essential element 
is lost via erosion and run-off to rivers, lakes and ultimately the sea, causing 
eutrophication problems and making recycling unfeasible, at least with current 
technologies. Systems and flux analysis approaches, using modelling tools are re-
quired to quantify material flows and losses and to identify the gaps in the cycle. 
Respective models may also be used for scenario analysis to study the impacts of 
global change, considering for example climate change as well as urbanization, 
population growth and demographic changes.
16 James Elser and Elena Bennett, ‘Phosphorus Cycle: A Broken Biogeochemical Cycle’ 
(2011) 478 Nature 29.
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3. Adaptive Management
Environmental resources management always needed and needs to cope with 
uncertainties and changing boundary conditions, but the challenges are becom-
ing more pressing in times of concurrent global trends in terms of climate, popu-
lation growth, urbanization etc and correspondingly accelerating material flows. 
As an example, not only does climate change accelerate the large hydrological 
cycle, but also globalized markets accelerate the flow of virtual water around 
the world. This issue cannot be neglected in the context of water management 
and offers opportunities for adaption via economic incentives and regulations. 
Another driver of the water cycle is land-use change, e.g. deforestation affecting 
evapotranspiration patterns. Conversely, land-use management can be used as a 
tool for water management. Within a nexus approach, this could be combined 
with other aspects of climate-smart agriculture, which has been promoted in 
recent years.17 Changing land-use and agricultural practices may also enhance 
carbon sequestration as one aspect of climate change mitigation. Adaptation to 
climate change through a nexus approach may also be applied in urban areas, as 
exemplified in the blue green dream initiative.18
Coming back to World Heritage and their adaptive management in the context 
of their surrounding environment and its resources, a nexus approach to water, 
soil and waste management offers more opportunities for adaptive management 
than any sector-oriented management approach. This will, besides management 
measures targeted directly to World Heritage sites, address the indirect effect of 
global change via environmental resources (lower part of Figure 2).
A nexus perspective on environmental resources management not only needs 
to have a holistic view on the material flows and cycling of water, soil and waste, 
but also needs to be policy oriented. This was one of the main items worked 
out in the white book on Advancing a Nexus Approach to the Sustainable Man-
agement of Water, Soil and Waste.19 How to implement a nexus approach to 
environmental resources management, which institutional frameworks will be 
best suited and how they can be developed and improved are among the main 
questions to be addressed. Closely related to this issue is the need for capacity 
17 FAO, ‘Coping with a Changing Climate: Considerations for Adaptation and Mitiga-
tion in Agriculture’ (Rome 2009).
18 Blue Green Dream Project, Official Website bgd.org.uk/accessed 9 December 2013.
19 UNU-FLORES, ‘White Book – Advancing a Nexus Approach to the Sustainable 
Management of Water, Soil and Waste’ (UNU-FLORES 2014).
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development, taking a multi-level approach.20 To be able to implement a nexus 
approach, well-trained stakeholders at all levels and all sectors (academia, prac-
titioners, decision makers), which understand the concept, are required. This 
can be addressed by capacity development at the individual level, requiring tar-
get and region-specific study programmes as well as training programmes and 
courses addressing the nexus of water soil and waste. Successful implementa-
tion of management strategies requires also, however, an enabling environment, 
which is an issue in institutional capacity development.
4. UNU-FLORES: A Response to the Challenges
Since the Bonn 2011 Nexus Conference and partly in parallel to it, various ini-
tiatives and projects have been started to carry and develop the nexus concept 
further. One such initiative is the establishment of the United Nations University 
Institute for Integrated Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources (UNU-
FLORES) in Dresden, Germany. It was initiated and proposed jointly by UNU 
and its partner university TU Dresden. UNU-FLORES was officially inaugur ated 
in December 2012. Its mission is directly related to the nexus concept, namely 
“to contribute, through research, teaching, advanced training,  capacity develop-
ment and knowledge dissemination to the resolution of pressing challenges in 
the area of integrated management of environmental resources: soil, water and 
waste that are of concern to the United Nations and its member states particu-
larly in developing and emerging economies”.21 UNU-FLORES aims at acting 
at the forefront of initiatives promoting a nexus approach by serving within the 
UN system as a think tank that is internationally recognized as a major hub and 
intellectual focal point, promoting integrated management of environmental 
resources.
UNU-FLORES is unique in the sense that its academic functional structure 
is consistent with the water-soil-waste nexus (see Figure 3), which is, as out-
lined above, closely related to the water, energy and food security nexus pro-
moted by the Bonn 2011 conference. The organization of UNU-FLORES into 
20 Marco Leidel, Steffen Niemann and Nina Hagemann, ‘Capacity Development as a 
Key Factor for Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM): Improving Wa-
ter Management in the Western Bug River Basin, Ukraine’ (2012) 65 Environmental 
Earth Sciences 1415.
21 UNU, ‘Statute of the UNU Institute for Integrated Management of Material Fluxes 
and of Resources (UNU-FLORES)’ (United Nations University 2010) unu.edu 
accessed 19 March 2014.
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five academic units – three core scientific units dealing with the interconnected 
resources (Water Resources Management (WRM), Waste Management (WM) 
and Soil and Land use Management (SLM) supported by two cross cutting units 
(Systems and Flux Analysis considering global change assessment (SFA) and Ca-
pacity Development and Governance (CDG) – supports the think tank function 
of UNU.
Figure 6:  Academic functional structure of UNU-FLORES, reflecting the nexus approach to 
the management of water, soil and waste.
The work program of core scientific units to a large extent will be based on close 
cooperation with SFA to better understand the interactions between atmos-
phere, biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere and pedosphere. It is envisaged that 
the capacity development and governance unit will create demand for know-
ledge products (such as online courses), identify opportunities to field test new 
methodologies, facilitate cross-fertilization of ideas across regions based on in-
stitutional good practice and seek to create partnerships for education, research 
and training that support a think tank function.
UNU-FLORES will pursue its activities in close interaction with a network 
of partners. Besides collaborating with other UNU institutes working in related 
areas, it has established close relationships with UN organizations working in 
the respective areas, such as FAO, UNEP, UN-HABITAT and UNESCO-IHE. 
A major partner of UNU-FLORES is Dresden University of Technology (TU 
Dresden), in particular the faculty of environmental sciences, which has ample 
experience in closing cycles related to the management of water, soil and waste. 
Major joint activities related to advancing a nexus approach to the sustainable 
management of water, soil and waste include:
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•	 preparations for a joint PhD programme; its start is planned for October 
2014;
•	 the establishment of a regular international Nexus conference in Dresden; a 
kick-off workshop took place in November 2013, the major conceptual back-
ground had been drafted in a white book22 which was finalized in early 2014;
•	 various initiatives for research projects dealing with various aspects of the 
water-soil-waste nexus.
Another partnership is currently being established in Maputo, Mozambique. 
This initiative started concomitantly to the establishment of UNU-FLORES in 
Dresden and aims at creating a regional hub for environmental resources man-
agement in Southern Africa. Based in Maputo, closely cooperating with the 
Eduardo Mondlane University and the Ministry of Science and Technology of 
Mozambique, but also with a network for research and education spread all over 
Africa23, an operating unit of UNU-FLORES will take up activities in 2014.
Building on these and additional partnerships with international research or-
ganizations and universities as well as on direct contacts to governmental bodies 
in member states, UNU-FLORES is well positioned to fulfil its envisaged role as 
a think tank for integrated management of environmental resources – soil, water 
and waste – and to consolidate the scientific foundation of the nexus approach 
by filling critical knowledge gaps relating the nexus approach and its implemen-
tation. With its focus on policy-relevant research, considering capacity devel-
opment and governance, UNU-FLORES will be able to provide the adaptive 
management strategies as depicted in Figure 2 as one important component of an 
integrated management approach to World Heritage sites. Given its mission to 
act as a think tank for the UN system, UNU-FLORES is keen to cooperate with 
the UNESCO World Heritage Centre on implementing and adapting such inte-
grated management plans, including short, medium and long-term actions to 
protect and maintain World Heritage, as outlined in the Operational Guidelines 
for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.24 Such management 
systems of World Heritage, considering buffer zones, include a monitoring plan, 
22 UNU-FLORES (n 19).
23 Stephan Hülsmann and Reza Ardakanian, ‘Proceedings of the Regional Workshop 
on Establishment of a Network for Partnership of UNU-FLORES Based in Maputo, 
Mozambique’ (UNU-FLORES 2013).
24 UNESCO, ‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heri-
tage Convention’ (June 2013) WHC. 13/01 whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines accessed 
27 January 2014.
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capacity building activities and may allow the use of World Heritage properties 
in a sustainable way. This might best be achieved by developing a nexus approach 
to the management of water, soil and waste for the respective World Heritage 
sites and implementing it in the framework of the management system for these 
properties. The respective state parties, which are requested to submit the pe-
riodic reports on the status of World Heritage, should, via intergovernmental 
mechanisms, be involved in environmental resources management.
IV  Summary and Conclusion: Integrated Management  
of Environmental Resources as Means to Manage  
and Maintain World Heritage
Mitigating the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on World Heri-
tage (both natural and cultural) requires an integrated approach. Protection and 
management of World Heritage must be considered in the context of managing 
environmental resources in the region in a sustainable way. The most appropri-
ate approach to achieve this should be a nexus approach considering the close 
interrelations of environmental resources such as water, soil and waste. In ad-
dition, especially in developing countries, these management strategies need to 
be embedded in a suite of measures and activities in capacity development ad-
dressing all relevant stakeholders, thus considering both individual and institu-
tional capacity development. UNU-FLORES considers itself as a direct response 
of the UN system to address these issues and to advance a nexus approach to the 
sustainable management of water, soil and waste, acting as a think tank for the 
UN system and member states through policy-relevant research, education and 
capacity development. Implementing a nexus approach in the respective region 
or city will be one means and an important component to manage and maintain 
World Heritage, be it natural or cultural.
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The Culture of Prevention: Heritage  
and Resilience
Abstract Cultural heritage is an integral factor of sustainable development, 
climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and community resilience. 
Today, both tangible and intangible heritage are at risk due to development and 
socio-economic transformations, natural hazards, disasters, climate change, 
urbanization, unsustainable tourism, conflicts and political tensions. Laud-
able efforts are being made at the global, regional, national and local levels 
to protect cultural patrimony from these threats. However, more focused and 
strategic action must be taken by all concerned stakeholders; in a spirit of co-
operation, to ensure that heritage is protected and that its role in reducing the 
risks of disaster (including climate risk) and building resilience is recognized 
and promoted.
I Heritage at Risk
Cultural patrimony manifests in two ways: there is tangible heritage, such as 
monuments, museums, historic cities, archaeological sites and cultural land-
scapes; and there is intangible heritage or cultural expressions, such as trad-
itional knowledge, practices, skills and crafts.
Today, both tangible and intangible heritage are at risk due to a number of 
factors. Natural hazards and disasters (particularly, earthquakes, landslides and 
floods), climate change, urbanization, unsustainable tourism, conflicts and 
∗ The former director of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR). The presentation was made during the UNESCO Conference “Climate 
Change as a Threat to Peace: Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity”, 
31 May 2013, Dresden, Germany, draws largely from “Heritage and Resilience: Issues 
and Opportunities for Reducing Disaster Risks”, a paper produced for the UNISDR 
– convoked Fourth Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (19–
23 May 2013, Geneva, Switzerland), and the outcomes of the first round of consul-
tations related to the successor arrangement to the Hyogo Framework for Action: 
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (2005–2015), that 
were organized or participated in by the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR).
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political unrest have negatively impacted and contributed to losses of cultural 
patrimony. In recent years, more heritage has been lost due to natural hazards 
and disaster events than ever accounted for in the past.
II Building the Resilience of Nations
Cultural heritage plays an important role in supporting sustainable develop-
ment, disaster risk reduction and building community resilience,1 by:
•	 Providing a source of meaning and identity;
•	 Promoting a sense of belonging for individuals and communities;
•	 Serving as a means to organize communities and relationships;
•	 Promoting values and social cohesion through the cultivation of mutual re-
spect, a strong sense of collective purpose, and responsibility to maintain a 
common good;
•	 Contributing to spiritual and psychological well-being;
•	 Serving as a repository and rich source of traditional knowledge on disaster 
prevention, mitigation and recovery, as well as climate change adaptation;
•	 Rebuilding a sense of community after disasters; and
•	 Providing socio-economic benefits to the community, e.g. through tourism.
In recognition of the importance of Cultural Heritage in disaster risk reduction, 
the international agreement, entitled the Hyogo Framework of Action for Disaster 
Risk Reduction: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters 
(2005–2015) (HFA), identified the use of knowledge (particularly, traditional 
and indigenous knowledge), innovation and education to build a culture of safe-
ty and resilience as one of its priority actions. So significant is the role of heritage 
in community resilience and sustainable development, that the Rio+20 Confer-
ence (United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 2012) called for 
its conservation.
1 Resilience is the ability of a system to reduce, prevent, anticipate, absorb and adapt, or 
recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, includ-
ing through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential 
basic structures and functions, see the United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk 
Reduction for Resilience, 2013.
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Figure 1:  Hyogo Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction: Priorities for Action 
2005–2015.
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III Cooperation at Work
Laudable efforts have been and are still being made at the global, regional, na-
tional and local levels to protect cultural patrimony from threats. At the global 
level, international conventions (e.g. the World Heritage Convention, 19722), 
strategies (e.g. Strategy for Risk Reduction at World Heritage, 20073) and frame-
works for action (e.g. HFA) have been established; technical resources have also 
been published for stakeholders.
At the regional level, Regional Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction4 have 
been launched.
At the national level, disaster risk reduction plans and policies have been es-
tablished and National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction5 have also been 
launched.
At the local level, networks and partnerships between cities (including twin-
ning initiatives) have been established; conservation and cooperation plans are 
being pursued (see Figures 2 and 3, which illustrate the cases of Petra and Tim-
buktu); public-private partnerships and community engagement have been pro-
moted; and advocacy campaigns, such as the Making Cities Resilient: My City Is 
Getting Ready Campaign, have been launched.6
2 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 
adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
3 UNESCO, ‘Climate Change and World Heritage. Report on Predicting and Managing 
the Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage and Strategy to Assist States Par-
ties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses’ World Heritage Reports 22 
(1 May 2007).
4 Regional platforms are multi-stakeholder forums organized by UNISDR and host 
governments that reflect the commitment of countries to improve coordination and 
implementation of disaster risk reduction activities while linking to international and 
national efforts, see UNISDR website, www.unisdr.org, accessed 20 March 2014.
5 National Platforms are nationally owned and led multi-stakeholder forums or com-
mittees working on disaster risk reduction. They reflect the commitment of its gov-
ernment to implement national and local disaster risk reduction activities while 
linking up to international efforts, see UNISDR website, www.unisdr.org, accessed 
20 March 2014.
6 UNISDR, ‘Making Cities Resilient’ , www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/, 
accessed 20 March 2014.
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Figure 2: Petra: Conservation and cooperation in action
Figure 3: Timbuktu: Conservation and cooperation in action
IV Heritage-driven Resilience
All concerned stakeholders, in a spirit of cooperation, must take more focused 
and strategic action to ensure that heritage is protected and that its role in dis-
aster risk reduction and climate change adaptation is recognized and promoted. 
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Action must be taken to support efforts towards heritage-driven resilience, in 
particular through the:
•	 Integration of heritage in disaster risk reduction plans, policies and strategies 
at all levels;
•	 Development of awareness and capacity-building programmes, e.g. by es-
tablishing linkages between the Making Cities Resilient Campaign and the 
World Heritage Cities;
•	 Harnessing of public-private partnerships; and
•	 Strengthening of existing partnerships and networks7 in order to set the agen-
da and provide normative guidance, ensure coordinated action and link tech-
nical expertise with the needs.
Two major opportunities currently exist for developing a global culture of pre-
vention. One is the international debate on the post-2015 international develop-
ment agenda; the other is the consultation and drafting process for the successor 
arrangement to the Hyogo Framework for Action for Disaster Risk Reduction (cul-
minating in the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, 
in 2015). Governments and citizens alike should capitalize on these opportun-
ities and make decisions to protect their heritage while ensuring that nations as 
well as present and future generations are resilient to disasters.
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What Consideration is Given to Climate and 
to Climate Change in the UNESCO Cultural 
Heritage and Property Conventions?
I  A Preliminary Clarification: Climate per se, the Protection  
of Cultural Property and Heritage versus Climate Change
Before entering into the rather recent debate on climate change, which is a rapid, 
and in part unexpected, increase in the worldwide temperature, it is methodo-
logically appropriate to make a few remarks as to climate per se and the protec-
tion of cultural property and heritage law.
Going beyond any misleading appearance of a monolithic composition of 
property and heritage, cultural property – and even more if it is combined with 
Cultural Heritage – includes a huge variety of types and categories of mova-
bles and immovables. Each of them is made of materials that are more or less 
climate-sensitive and that deserve to be considered individually; conserved and 
protected in different ways. There is no one-fits-all solution and the Cultural 
Heritage or property material is, from a climate perspective, as relevant as the 
heritage or the property itself. For instance, humidity and rain can affect and 
heavily damage wood (as in structures, doors, frames), textiles (as in carpets) 
and untreated paper (as in maps and drawings), although it does not affect 
equally stone in a sculpture. Each category of material that composes cultural 
property and heritage is to be considered individually. Each has its own degree 
of sensitiveness to climate and of fragility to climate-related events, such as hu-
midity, rain, draught, etc.
Climate per se naturally changes over seasons. However, the so-called glo-
bal climate change is something different. It is a new, much greater in scale and 
faster in growth, phenomenon than the ordinary change of climate over sea-
sons. Reasons for such global climate change vary and include human activities, 
such as industrial development and the burning of fossil fuels like coal and oil. 
∗ Former Chief, Legal and Treaty Section (International Standards), UNESCO, Law 
Professor (Maître de Conférences, Univ. Paris Est; Visiting Professor Univ. of Miami 
and of Rome (Luiss)); Ph.D.s Univ. Paris II and Rome I; Diploma Hague Academy of 
International Law; Attorney; Chartered Arbitrator; FCIArb (gcarducci@noos.fr).
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These change the natural greenhouse emissions which keep heat radiating from 
Earth from leaving the atmosphere. The result is an increase in temperature with 
various consequences, from loss of sea ice and accelerated sea level rise to long 
draughts and stronger typhoons.
II  Climate Change and the Legal Protection of Cultural 
Property and Heritage
1. Law versus Climate Change
Cultural property and heritage are affected by global climate change as is any-
thing else on earth which is composed of the same material with the same degree 
of fragility for the type of climate change concerned, such as increasing rain falls, 
rising sea level, etc. The fact that in many countries Cultural Heritage and prop-
erty is often protected by legislation does not, per se, exclude the climate change 
threats. First, with regard to immovable Cultural Heritage, the law cannot re-
move it from its situs and protect it fully from the impact of nature. Second, with 
regard to movable cultural property, the law can organize a removal of the prop-
erty from its situs and its gathering in museums, which does protect from most, 
not all, impacts of nature. However, museums can hardly protect from flooding 
or other serious effects of climate change. For instance, some museums in the 
Czech Republic had to face unexpected floods. Again, the specificity and resist-
ance of each material does matter. For example, book collections are naturally 
more affected by floods than marble columns or statues. Further, they require 
cleaning and drying in addition to being disinfected if dangerous bacteria were 
in the flood water. Preparedness to deal with emergency situations is a must for 
most museums, foundations and collections. Standards have increased over the 
years and today such measures include floods and any other emergency situa-
tion, whether or not they are climate change-related.
But climate change can do more than flooding a territory, including museums 
and collections. From a legal perspective, it could go as far as cancelling a terri-
tory which is one of the constitutive elements of a State. A flat and small island 
could be submerged in a few years or decades; its territory disappears, becoming 
an underwater surface. At law, a State generally does not exist without a territory. 
Also, international law is based on States with their territories, population and 
governments. Without such elements a State no longer exists at law. If a popu-
lation leaves, the State disappears. Any cultural property still on the territory 
would self-evidently no longer be legally protected by national legislation nor 
by international law as the latter no longer regards the territory as part of a State 
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bound by its rules. The State might appear again; nevertheless, if the sea level 
would decrease, allowing a territory to be re-established with its population and 
government.
All forms of international legal protection of cultural property and heritage 
require a State that is bound by either a UNESCO Convention (or other similar 
conventions) that it has ratified or its own national legislation or is invited by a 
UNESCO declaration or recommendation to take action and ensure protection 
of the heritage on its territory. When one takes a closer look at protection this 
term is open-ended. It hides a variety of forms and effects, from measures of legal 
protection to those that also include material protection. Unsurprisingly, they 
entail a variety of thresholds in protection. With regard to those threats that cli-
mate change generally generates, the relevant forms of legal protection are limit-
ed to those legal measures that also include material protection. Declaring some 
heritage inalienable, for instance, does not protect it from climate change or from 
the ordinary and less aggressive and unpredictable annual climate change.
At the very least, climate change makes the protection of cultural property 
and heritage more needed and more expensive. An increasingly larger number of 
objects are affected by an increase of temperature and/or of humidity, and their 
conservation requires more museums to be built and/or, in the existing museums, 
more suitable equipment in terms of air conditioners, temperature stabilizers and 
dehumidifiers. Such costs are unproblematic for the national authorities of some 
countries, while problematic for other countries. Costs increase dramatically and 
prevention becomes more problematic when the risk is flooding, typhoons, and 
destruction of buildings where the museum or the collection is located.
2. Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention
Intangible Cultural Heritage is the most precarious form of heritage because it 
cannot rely per se on a tangible body, be it movable or immovable, that nat-
urally lasts over time, at least some time. The UNESCO 2003 Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage has currently reached the 
remarkable number of 161 States Parties.1 The terminology of intangible Cultural 
Heritage is still problematic in the countries where for many centuries the term 
of the tangible Cultural Heritage – be it movable or immovable – has been ap-
plied in a monopolistic manner both de facto and de jure. The terminology of in-
tangible Cultural Heritage is unproblematic and rooted in substance, stemming 
from an anthropological approach to culture of a community.
1  Adopted 17 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006, 2368 UNTS 3.
132 Guido Carducci
The international community gathered at UNESCO had to face these chal-
lenges, and many others, that the intangible dimension of culture raises, espe-
cially for the purposes of creating an international normative instrument. At the 
end of the negotiations, the result achieved reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention,
1.  the “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces 
associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, trans-
mitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and 
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their 
history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting 
respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Con-
vention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is 
compatible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with 
the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, 
and of sustainable development.
2.  The “intangible cultural heritage”, as defined in paragraph 1 above, is manifested 
inter alia in the following domains:
(a)  oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the intangible 
cultural heritage;
(b) performing arts;
(c) social practices, rituals and festive events;
(d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe;
(e) traditional craftsmanship.2
These practices, representations, expressions, knowledge and skills that commu-
nities and groups and at times individuals, recognize as part of their intangible 
Cultural Heritage can be easily put in danger by climate change. For instance, 
higher temperatures and longer periods of drought can rarefy and even extin-
guish some types of plants that were used in traditional knowledge and know 
how, either as medicine or as raw material.
For instance, in its Decision 7.COM 8.3 the Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage3, the Committee first took 
note of the following, an information which provides the reader some context:
“Noken is a knotted net or woven bag handmade from wood fibre or leaves by com-
munities in Papua and West Papua Provinces of Indonesia. Men and women use it 
for carrying plantation produce, catch from the sea or lake, firewood, babies or small 
2 Article 2.
3 Established under Article 5 of the Convention.
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animals as well as for shopping and for storing things in the home. Noken may also be 
worn, often for traditional festivities, or given as peace offerings. The method of making 
Noken varies between communities, but in general, branches, stems or bark of certain 
small trees or shrubs are cut, heated over a fire and soaked in water. The remaining 
wood fibre is dried then spun to make a strong thread or string, which is sometimes 
coloured using natural dyes. This string is knotted by hand to make net bags of various 
patterns and sizes. The process requires great manual skill, care and artistic sense, and 
takes several months to master. The number of people making and using Noken is di-
minishing, however. Factors threatening its survival include lack of awareness, weaken-
ing of traditional transmission, decreasing numbers of craftspeople, competition from 
factory-made bags, problems in easily and quickly obtaining traditional raw materials, 
and shifts in the cultural values of Noken”.4
Among these factors threatening survival, “competition from factory-made bags, 
problems in easily and quickly obtaining traditional raw materials” are likely to 
be the result of global warming, probably jointly with other causes. The making 
of Noken often relies on branches, stems or barks of some kind of small trees 
that are heated over a fire and then soaked in water. Such small trees grow under 
certain conditions.
The Committee has decided to inscribe Noken, a multifunctional knotted or 
woven bag which is a handcraft of the people of Papua, on the List of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding,5 and one of the considera-
tions is:
“The traditional know-how related to the Noken is in need of urgent safeguarding 
because of risks of a gap in transmission to younger generations, competition from 
4 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage Decision 7.COM 8.3 (3–7 December 2012) ITH/12/7.COM/Decisions, 
Paragraph 1.
5 Article 17 – List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding:
 1.  With a view to taking appropriate safeguarding measures, the Committee shall es-
tablish, keep up to date and publish a List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need 
of Urgent Safeguarding, and shall inscribe such heritage on the List at the request 
of the State Party concerned.
 2.  The Committee shall draw up and submit to the General Assembly for approval 
the criteria for the establishment, updating and publication of this List.
 3.  In cases of extreme urgency – the objective criteria of which shall be approved by 
the General Assembly upon the proposal of the Committee – the Committee may 
inscribe an item of the heritage concerned on the List mentioned in paragraph 1, 
in consultation with the State Party concerned.
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modern and imported products, and the scarcity of traditional materials that are being 
replaced by synthetic materials”.6
Besides this Committee’s decision, in order to facilitate the safeguarding of the 
intangible Cultural Heritage, the Convention has established an Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage Fund7 and a system of international cooperation and assistance.8
The forms of such assistance may include: (a) studies concerning various 
aspects of safeguarding; (b) the provision of experts and practitioners; (c) the 
training of all necessary staff; (d) the elaboration of standard-setting and other 
measures; (e) the creation and operation of infrastructures; (f) the supply of 
equipment and know-how; (g) other forms of financial and technical assistance, 
including, where appropriate, the granting of low-interest loans and donations.9
While such forms of assistance can satisfy a variety of scenarios and different 
kinds of threats to the intangible Cultural Heritage, several of these forms can ef-
fectively contribute to reducing the threats that climate change generates for the 
safeguarding of the intangible Cultural Heritage.
a) Conventions on Tangible Heritage
Tangible Cultural Heritage or property is the traditional subject matter of 
UNESCO standard-setting instruments. Among other instruments, these 
include:
•	 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Paris, 
2 November 2001)10
•	 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (Paris, 16 November 1972)11
•	 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, 14 November 
1970)12
6 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cul-





10 Entered into force 2 January 2009, (2002) 41 ILM 37.
11 Entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
12 Entered in force 24 April 1972, 823 UNTS 231.
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•	 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention (The Hague, 
14 May 1954)13 and its First Protocol (The Hague, 14 May 1954) and Second 
Protocol (The Hague, 26 March 1999)14
The size of this article clearly does not allow a detailed analysis of these conven-
tions. Generally, climate per se is not a variable in the protection of heritage that 
is expressly considered and taken into account by these conventions.
b) World Cultural and Natural Heritage
An important exception is provided by the famous Convention concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. With 190 States Parties 
this Convention has the privilege to stand out as a nearly universally applic-
able convention. Under this Convention, each State Party submits to the World 
Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of the Cultural and 
Natural Heritage of their State which has outstanding universal value.
In addition, the Committee has the duty to establish, keep up to date and 
publish, whenever circumstances shall so require, a List of World Heritage in 
Danger, id est a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the 
conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance 
has been requested by a State Party. This List of World Heritage in Danger may 
include only such property forming part of the Cultural and Natural Heritage as 
is threatened by serious and specific dangers which include, inter alia, “threat of 
disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration (…), destruction caused by 
changes in the use or ownership of the land; major alterations due to unknown 
causes; abandonment for any reason whatsoever; (…) calamities and cataclysms; 
serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, 
floods, and tidal waves”.15
It is rather remarkable that this Convention, adopted in 1972 – at a time 
where climate change was generally not considered per se, but simply as part 
of the broader and general climate annual change – expressly includes weather-
related phenomena that would probably be associated with climate change today. 
However, these causes were codified in 1972. Above all, these provisions do not 
necessarily provide evidence of what one defines as climate change today. In fact, 
it has rather been intended as a matter of principles. It has become clear that 
13 Enterd into force 7 August 1956, 249 UNTS 240.
14 Entered into force 9 March 2004, (1999) 38 ILM 769.
15 Article 11 (4).
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States most affected by one or more causes of climate change and comprising of 
world Cultural and Natural Heritage sites on their territories are most likely to 
endorse the insertion of those principles by the Committee on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger.
This article deals only with climate and climate change in the protection 
of Cultural Heritage and property, which is a dimension that is generally not 
considered per se. It is generally dealt with as a limited part, not particularly 
thoroughly examined, of the much broader debate on Managing Disaster Risks, 
primarily for the World Heritage sites.16
c) Underwater Cultural Heritage
Seas are directly affected by climate change in various ways. For instance, their 
bio system varies naturally with an increase of temperature. Their level rises as a 
result of greater ice melt. Stronger winds and typhoons make exceptional waves 
and tsunamis more frequent.
However, the situation on the seabed is, in part, affected differently by climate 
change than the situation at sea level is. This remark is not irrelevant when one 
focuses on the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heri-
tage (Paris, 2 November 2001). This Convention is focused on underwater Cul-
tural Heritage, not generally on the law of the sea. What such heritage includes is 
made clear by the Convention:
(a)  “Underwater cultural heritage” means all traces of human existence having a cul-
tural, historical or archaeological character which have been partially or totally 
under water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years such as:
 (i)  sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, together with 
their archaeological and natural context;
 (ii)  vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other con-
tents, together with their archaeological and natural context; and
 (iii) objects of prehistoric character.
(b)  Pipelines and cables placed on the seabed shall not be considered as underwater 
cultural heritage.
(c)  Installations other than pipelines and cables, placed on the seabed and still in 
use, shall not be considered as underwater cultural heritage.17
16 For instance, see UNESCO, ‘Managing Disaster Risks for World Heritage’ (2010) 
World Heritage Resource Manual whc.unesco.org/document/104522 accessed 
23 January 2014.
17 Article 1.
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Importantly, any thought that whatever is on the seabed is under threat and 
needs to be removed is defeated by the clear principle that inspires the whole 
Convention: “(t)he preservation in situ of underwater Cultural Heritage shall 
be considered as the first option before allowing or engaging in any activities 
directed at this heritage”.18 Self-evidently, this is not to say that preservation in 
situ excludes any alternative that the preservation of the underwater Cultural 
Heritage requires under the Convention and in its important Annex.
3. Why is Climate Change Generally not Taken into Account?
With the exception of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, generally Conven-
tions on the protection of Cultural Heritage and property do not expressly take 
into consideration the climate factor or the more aggressive climate change in 
today’s terminology. Why is not an easy question, but deserves to be asked. Fol-
low below some possible explanations.
1. Ordinary annual weather change and climate change vary significantly from 
country to country. Conventions set out rules that address generally any 
country regardless of its location on the globe and its degree of exposure to 
such changes.
2. Such variation in annual weather change can be taken into account by each 
country when it implements nationally the convention and its protection 
obligations.
3. Behind the term of Cultural Heritage and property, a variety of materials exist 
and each is more or less sensitive to climate (see above) and, more recently 
to climate change; inversely, the conventions set out rules that address gener-
ally all the categories of heritage and property that fall under their scope of 
application.
4. Some conventions, especially the less recent ones, have been negotiated at 
a time when climate change was not yet identified as a matter both distinct 
from and more unpredictable than, ordinary annual weather change.
III The Way Forward
It follows that the absence of a clear and explicit mechanism with regard to cli-
mate change in the UNESCO conventions at the time they were negotiated, as 
well as in other conventions on the protection of Cultural Heritage and property 
18 Article 2 (5).
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negotiated in the same period of time, can be easily explained. Reasonably, this 
is not a real gap and does not deserve an objective and substantiated criticism. A 
lot can be done by States Parties to such conventions in implementing them in 
order to protect Cultural Heritage and property on their territories from the ef-
fects of climate change. This is in spite of the absence of such a clear and explicit 
mechanism in the conventions.
In addition, States Parties do not only adhere to such conventions by imple-
menting them accordingly. It is their commitment towards implementation that 
may already be considered binding given that these efforts serve as intentional 
part of a State Party’s obligation to perform in good faith. Climate change, need-
less to say, may affect different parts of a national territory more than others. 
However, once a State Party adopts a treaty in force it becomes binding upon it 
and its entire territory.19
For future treaty-making undertakings, if and when the international com-
munity of States decides that the protection of cultural property and heritage 
needs to expressly include climate change in international treaties, then the trea-
ties will be drafted differently and openly insert this variable into their mechan-
isms and provisions.
Until then, in addition to the proper implementation of treaty obligations by 
each State Party, the international community of States may still take action, if it 
so wishes, by inserting this new variable, climate change, and by dealing with it 
properly in the Guidelines that States Parties to conventions may establish and 
that already exist with regard to the Convention concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage and the Convention for the Safeguarding 
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. An alternative option or viable path for the 
international community of States would be to negotiate ex novo another con-
vention in order to include climate change in the protection of Cultural Heritage 
and property. Regarded realistically this approach appears rather questionable 
in terms of needs and benefits as well as imponderabilitiy and other constraints.
That option would involve new intergovernmental negotiations and is neces-
sarily time-consuming. It would be faster and more flexible to embed provisions 
on climate change in the Guidelines as if they were existent or anticipated already 
in advance for a particular convention or at least for a common declaration of 
understanding among States Parties towards a prospective convention. Again, 
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331, Articles 26 and 29.
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both options are not necessary if States Parties already include climate change in 
their protection of cultural property and heritage.
There is no doubt that climate change is internationally a serious matter. Be-
ing so, it is common sense for States to protect cultural property and heritage 
in particular, from the new and most devastating threats that climate change 
represents. These threats add significantly and in unprecedented terms to those 
related to the ordinary annual climate changes and effect of climate on the nat-
ural decay of elements. Ensuring proper mitigation measures for each category 
of heritage and property, in view of its material and resistance appears more 
promising and effective for the sake of expedient protection than engaging in 
a new negotiation for a new convention and waiting for its adoption and entry 
into force. First, by proper implementation by States Parties, of treaty obliga-
tions and of their national existing legislation if adequate from this perspective; 




Protecting the Tangible, Safeguarding the 
Intangible: A Same Conventional Model for 
Different Needs
Abstract The model of the World Heritage Convention, adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference in 1972, has emerged as one of the most successful ever es-
tablished by an international convention aimed at protecting a common good, 
id est human rights, Cultural Heritage or environment. At present, the World 
Heritage Convention has been ratified by 191 states and 1.007 properties are 
inscribed on the World Heritage List,1 the keystone around which the system 
established by the Convention is centred.
In light of the huge success which has characterized the World Heritage Con-
vention, UNESCO has replicated its model in other legal instruments aimed at 
safeguarding Cultural Heritage in different contexts and/or of different kinds 
than the World Heritage Convention itself. This has happened, in particular, 
with respect to the scheme of enhanced protection established by the Second 
Protocol of 1999 to the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict as well as to the 2003 Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.
As far as the issue of climate change is concerned, both the World Heritage 
Convention and the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage, through providing for general obligations for states parties to take the 
necessary measures to ensure protection/safeguarding of the heritage they re-
spectively concern, as well as through establishing systems of international co-
operation to this end, in principle provide the necessary tools to face the threats 
posed by climate change on tangible and intangible Cultural Heritage. In prac-
tical terms, however, no adequate attention is devoted by both conventions to 
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1 As of November 2014; for dynamic reference see whc.unesco.org/en/list.
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the threats of climate change. Nevertheless, in this respect the World Heritage 
Convention is certainly better equipped than the Convention for the Safeguard-
ing of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. In any event, the concrete preservation 
of Cultural Heritage against the above threats ultimately depends on the willing-
ness and capacity of states parties to the respective conventions to take effective 
and efficient measures in order to properly address the specific problems faced 
by each manifestation of Cultural Heritage as a consequence of climate change.
I Introduction
The model of the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter WHC), adopted by 
the UNESCO General Conference in 1972,2 has emerged as one of the most 
successful ever established by an international convention aimed at protecting 
a common good, id est human rights, Cultural Heritage or environment. At pres-
ent, the WHC has been ratified by 191 states3 and 1.007 properties are inscribed 
on the World Heritage List (WHL),4 the keystone around which the system es-
tablished by the Convention revolves.
The scope of the WHC is limited to part of the world’s immovable cul tural 
property of tangible character and natural sites, namely to those properties 
which are “of outstanding interest” and therefore “need to be preserved as part of 
the World Heritage of mankind as a whole”.5 Consequently, adopting a list-based 
system reflected the logical structure according to which a convention pursuing 
such a goal should be organized. Although the WHC is organized according to 
a multi-structured regulation, pursuing the goal of coordinating national6 and 
international7 protection, only the latter is significantly operationalized in the 
context of the practical implementation of the Convention. In addition, despite 
the fact that – within the framework of the system of international protection – a 
specific provision is included stressing that all properties of outstanding univer-
sal value, and not only those inscribed on the WHL, should be the object of the 
2 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 
adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
3 See UNESCO, ‘Legal Instruments’ www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13055& 
language=E accessed 24 November 2014.
4 As of November 2014; for dynamic reference confer UNESCO, ‘World Heritage List’ 
whc.unesco.org/en/list/accessed 24 November 2014.
5 See WHC, Preamble sixth recital.
6 See Articles 4–5.
7 See Articles 6 ff.
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general measures of protection contemplated by the WHC,8 such a provision is 
in practice disregarded, attention being exclusively devoted to listed properties.9 
In fact, the listing system represents the aspect making the fortune of the WHC. 
States parties are eager to inscribe as more national properties as possible on the 
WHL, due to the huge international visibility a property attains after being listed; 
as a result of a transitive property, the more the number of national properties 
inscribed on the List, the greater the degree of international visibility achieved by 
the state. Also, the willingness to retain such a visibility usually persuades states 
parties to adopt adequate measures of preservation for the properties concerned, 
although recently exceptions have occurred leading the World Heritage Com-
mittee to delist properties in two cases,10 giving rise to a potentially dangerous 
trend for the effectiveness of the WHC. This trend, however, at least for the mo-
ment, does not challenge the assumption of the WHC as one of the most success-
ful conventional models ever in the panorama of international law.
II The Right Model for the Wrong Convention
In light of the huge success which has characterized the WHC, UNESCO has 
replicated its model in other legal instruments aimed at safeguarding Cultural 
Heritage in different contexts and/or of different kinds than the WHC itself. This 
has happened, in particular, with respect to the scheme of enhanced protection 
established by the Second Protocol of 1999 to the Hague Convention of 1954 for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict11 as well as 
to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(CSICH).12
The CSICH achieved extensive international support immediately after its 
adoption. At the moment of this writing, it has been ratified by 161 countries.13 
8 See Article 12.
9 See Federico Lenzerini, ‘Article 12. Protection of Properties Not Inscribed on the 
World Heritage List’ in Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini (eds), The World 
Heritage Convention. A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008) 201. On the 
functioning of the lists established by Article 11 WHC see Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Arti-
cles 8–11. World Heritage Committee and World Heritage List’ ibid 147; Gionata P 
 Buzzini and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Article 11. List of World Heritage in Danger’ ibid 175.
10 See notes 24 and 25 below and corresponding text.
11 Adopted 26 March 1999, entered into force 9 March 2004, 2253 UNTS 172.
12 Adopted 17 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006, 2368 UNTS 3.
13 See UNESCO, ‘Legal Instruments’ www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?language= 
E&KO=17116 accessed 24 November 2014.
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282 elements of intangible Cultural Heritage have been inscribed so far on 
the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (es-
tablished by Article 16 CSICH), 38 on the List of Intangible Cultural Heri-
tage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding (provided for by Article 17 CSICH), and 
12 programmes, projects and activities have been inscribed on the Register of 
Best Safeguarding Practices.14 In symbolic terms, the adoption of the CSICH 
determined an epochal step in the context of the process of development of 
international law on Cultural Heritage; in fact, it epitomized the completion of 
the evolution of UNESCO standard-setting toward embracing a holistic con-
cept of Cultural Heritage, including not only the material aspects of culture 
but also the intangible ones.15 The CSICH, therefore, was quite appealing for 
non-Western countries, in the context of which the understanding of culture is 
generally conceived, at least for a large percentage, in its intangible aspects. In 
fact, since the beginning of its negotiating process, the CSICH was particularly 
promoted and supported by African, Asian and Latin American countries.16 
Another factor determining the huge success achieved by the CSICH is rep-
resented by the circumstance that virtually no real state obligations – in the 
technical sense of the term – are included in its text. The duties of states parties 
are in fact expressed in quite soft terms and the Convention looks like a sort 
of manifesto proclaiming the right of states – to be recognized and blessed by 
the international community – to appropriately safeguard their own intangi-
ble Cultural Heritage. Last but not least, a third reason of the success of the 
CSICH is represented by the perspective that states may use the Convention 
as a tool for promoting their international visibility, to an equivalent extent of 
what happens with the WHC; the fact of replicating the model of the latter, 
based on the listing system, actually makes such a perspective very concrete 
and appealing.
14 See UNESCO, ‘Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage and Register of Best Safeguard-
ing Practices’ www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00559 accessed 24 
November 2014.
15 Generally on intangible Cultural Heritage and the CSICH see, inter alia, Federico 
Lenzerini, ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage: The Living Culture of Peoples’ (2011) 22 Eur 
J Intl L 101; Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013).
16 The very term ‘intangible Cultural Heritage’ is considered to correspond to a ‘loose 
Eng- lish translation’ of the Japanese expression mukei bunkazai; see Richard Kurin, 
‘Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage: Key Factors in Implementing the 2003 
Convention’ (2007) 2 International Journal of Intangible Heritage 9, 10.
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The CSICH, however, has (or should have) the purpose of safeguarding the 
common good of intangible Cultural Heritage to the benefit of the international 
community, rather than a state interest. In this respect, the fact of structuring the 
operational part of the CSICH according to the model of the WHC appears to be 
inadequate to ensure appropriate safeguarding for the specificities of intangible Cul-
tural Heritage. The present writer underlined this aspect at the second meeting of 
experts, preceding the negotiations leading to the adoption of the CSIHC, taking 
place in Rio de Janeiro in January 2002. He emphasized that ‘the schema of the 1972 
World Heritage Convention might not be the suitable model for Intangible Cultural 
Heritage … a legal approach should perhaps avoid the establishment of a List based 
on selective criteria of importance. The latter might give rise to arbitrary discrim-
ination among cultures’.17 The ‘anti-lists’ position was shared by the majority of in-
dependent experts, but since the beginning, the intention within UNESCO was to 
replicate the model of the WHC. This approach easily took the lead at the diplomat-
ic negotiations18 because it was shared by the most influential state delegations. In 
fact, it was never seriously challenged, not even when the Norwegian delegate raised 
the fact that the listing system is not appropriate for intangible Cultural Heritage.19
In objective terms, however, the fact remains that the model in point is not the 
best one – to say the least – in view of appropriately safeguarding intangible Cul-
tural Heritage in light of its specificities and its cultural and spiritual significance, 
particularly for the communities specifically affected. Indeed, listing intangible 
Cultural Heritage betrays the inherent value of such a heritage as mirroring the 
cultural identity of its creators and bearers. In factual terms, the very circum-
stance of listing inherently presupposes the taxonomy of different manifestations 
of the heritage concerned; this unavoidably leads to an instinctive perception that 
the listed examples are particularly valuable and in some way more important 
than similar manifestations of intangible heritage not included in the same lists. 
In other words, the establishment of a hierarchy among the different examples of 
Cultural Heritage ultimately leads to a (mis)understanding – especially among 
the general public – that certain examples of intangible Cultural Heritage are 
17 See UNESCO International Meeting of Experts, ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage: Pri-
ority Domains for an International Convention’ Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (22–24 Janu-
ary 2002) Final Report www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/00074-EN.pdf accessed 
23 September 2013, 8.
18 The present writer was a member of the Italian delegation throughout the whole 
length of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the CSICH.
19 See Janet Blake, Commentary on the UNESCO 2003 Convention on the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (Institute of Art & Law 2006) 79.
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better than others. While this approach can be appropriate – at least partially – 
for monumental heritage, it is totally improper for immaterial heritage, exactly 
for the reason that its main significance rests not on its exterior qualities, but 
rather on the cultural value it has for its creators and bearers. In fact, the main 
objective of the CSICH, as specified by its Article 1, is ‘to ensure respect for the 
intangible Cultural Heritage of the communities, groups and individuals con-
cerned’; this means that the rationale of the safeguarding of the heritage in point 
is (rectius: should be) grounded on the perception of its significance as an elem-
ent of the cultural identity of such communities, groups and individuals. Fur-
thermore, one should consider that the action for the safeguarding of intangible 
Cultural Heri tage pursues the goal of preserving the inherent value of the said 
heritage as a vehicle for the protection of cultural diversity. In this respect, it is 
evident that whatever value judgment based on external perceptions determined 
by its different elements is in principle incompatible with the value of diversity. 
The ultimate danger of the approach in point is represented by the possibility that 
listing intangible Cultural Heritage may implicitly lead to provoke an instinctive 
classification of the different communities which create such a heritage, deter-
mining an unconscious perception in the public that the communities whose 
intangible Cultural Heritage is listed are more valuable than others.
Against the reasoning just developed one could object that the Representa-
tive List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity is contemplated only 
‘(i)n order to ensure better visibility of the intangible Cultural Heritage and 
awareness of its significance, and to encourage dialogue which respects cultural 
diversity’; therefore, it would not imply any classification among the different el-
ements of intangible Cultural Heritage based on their quality or value. However, 
even though this can be true in theory, in practice it is unlikely that the existence 
of a list will not be perceived by the public as creating a value-based classifi-
cation among the existing examples of intangible Cultural Heritage, especially 
among those of a similar kind (e.g. examples of music or theatre representations, 
which are apparently very similar to each other but, in reality, may be profound-
ly different on account of the fact that they are part of the cultural identity of 
different communities). The experience of the WHC clearly shows that this con-
clusion is hardly rebuttable; in fact, although (as previously noted) it includes a 
 provision – Article 1220 – establishing that the protection accorded by the Con-
vention must not be limited to listed properties, in practice such a provision has 
remained virtually unapplied and attention has been devoted only to properties 
20 See note 8 above and corresponding text.
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inscribed on the WHL. Furthermore, it can hardly be asserted that the Repre-
sentative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity – around which 
the safeguarding of the intangible Cultural Heritage at the international level is 
centred – may represent a legal guarantee for the heritage concerned; it rather 
appears as a tool for states to obtain visibility for the intangible heritage located 
in their own territory.
III  The Common Structure of the WHC and the CSICH  
and the Threats of Climate Change
It is a fact that the two conventions under debate have many things in common. 
This holds true not only with respect to their equivalent structure and content, 
but also for the philosophical rationale inspiring them. Indeed, most probably, 
the reason why they are almost identical in terms of structure and content is 
exactly due to their equivalent rationale. While I do not want to question the fact 
that the initiators of the movement leading to the adoption of the WHC were 
moved by the noble intention of safeguarding the common good of Cultural 
Heritage in the general interest of humanity, at the same time one may easily im-
agine that since the first rounds of negotiations state representatives perceived 
its enormous potentialities in terms of raising states’ international visibility and 
increasing their attractiveness under different perspectives. The same percep-
tion certainly persuaded most countries in the world to support the adoption 
of the CSICH and to extensively ratify it.21 The result is two conventions which 
–   although having the huge merit of establishing very successful and efficient 
legal frameworks for the protection/safeguarding of, respectively, tangible/im-
movable and intangible Cultural Heritage – pay a huge tribute to the tradition-
al idea of state sovereignty. They in fact put in the hands of states parties the 
competence/power to determine which elements of heritage are to be protected/
safeguarded and the extent to which protection/safeguarding is actually to be 
accorded. The text and recent practice of the WHC make it crystal clear. As for 
the former, it is enough to note that no property may be inscribed on the WHL 
without an explicit request in this respect by the territorial government,22 as well 
as that international assistance may be activated by the World Heritage Com-
mittee only upon request of the state concerned.23 With respect to the latter, one 
21 See above, text corresponding to note 13.
22 See Article 11(3), stating that ‘(t)he inclusion of a property in the World Heritage List 
requires the consent of the State concerned’.
23 See Articles 13(1) and 19.
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may consider the cases of the two properties recently delisted from the WHL, 
namely the Oman’s Arabian Oryx Sanctuary24 and the German Dresden Elbe 
Valley.25 The first was delisted in 2007 following a decision of the state party to 
reduce the area of the property by 90 per cent in order to carry out hydrocarbon 
prospection in the area. The Dresden Elbe Valley was delisted in 2009 due to the 
building of a four-lane bridge in the heart of the landscape. In both cases, the 
decision of the World Heritage Committee was in line with the principles of the 
WHC, for the reason that the properties concerned had lost their ‘outstanding 
universal value’ on account of the modifications occurred with respect to their 
integrity; in fact, according to Article 1 of the Convention, protection is only 
granted to cultural properties having such a value (the same is established by 
Article 2 with respect to natural properties). The point to be emphasized, how-
ever, is that these cases show that, when a state party decides not to comply with 
its obligations pursuant to the WHC, no appropriate manner exists to prevent 
or react against such behaviour. In fact, it is paradoxical that the only available 
remedy is to de list the property, because, if the rationale of the Convention is to 
protect cultural (and natural) properties in the general interest of humanity, then 
delisting produces the effect of creating a prejudice not for the territorial state, 
but rather for humanity as a whole. It is, therefore, a sort of double injury for hu-
manity, the first being determined by the damage to the integrity of the property 
determined by the territorial state, the second by the deprivation of significant 
international protection for it following its delisting. It is even more paradoxical 
that in the practice the two cases just described have not been treated by other 
states parties as violations of the obligations established by the WHC, but ra-
ther as unfortunate adversities suffered by the territorial states concerned; this is 
epitomized by the words of the Chair of the World Heritage Committee – María 
Jesús San Segundo, Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Spain to UNESCO 
– following delisting of the Dresden Elbe Valley in 2009: ‘(e)very time we fail to 
preserve a site, we share the pain of the State Party’.26 Such an approach discloses 
a perception according to which, when a state party has other (usually econom-
ic) interests to pursue, Cultural Heritage may be legitimately sacrificed, and that 
state obtains even the solidarity of its consociates. This gives a very clear idea of 
24 See UNESCO, ‘Arabian Oryx Sanctuary’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/654 accessed 5 October 
2013.
25 See UNESCO, ‘Dresden Elbe Valley’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/1156 accessed 5 October 
2013.
26 See UNESCO, ‘Dresden is deleted from UNESCO’s World Heritage List’ whc.unesco. 
org/en/news/522 accessed 5 October 2013.
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the manner states conceive their duty to ensure appropriate protection for Cul-
tural and Natural Heritage in the interest of humanity… As previously noted, the 
CSICH imitates the approach and the model of the WHC. For both conventions, 
state sovereignty is therefore the driving force governing their functioning, in a 
manner which is evidently at odds with the nature of common good of Cultural 
Heritage of both tangible and intangible character.
In practical terms, the approach just described implies that the two conven-
tions are much more concerned in developing the strategies states may adopt 
to maximize the potentialities of Cultural Heritage under the perspective of na-
tional interests, rather than in properly facing the threats which may jeopardize 
the integrity and preservation of the heritage concerned to the benefit of future 
generations. Among the other issues to which such reasoning applies, climate 
change is undoubtedly included.
Climate change may determine a huge detrimental impact with respect to 
both tangible and intangible heritage. As regards to the former, the effects of 
climate change on World Heritage properties – especially mountains, glaciers 
and sea areas – over the past years are visible to everyone. For example, Mount 
 Kilimanjaro, in Tanzania,27 has been surrounded by large quantities of ice for 
some 10,000 years, but in the last decades the amount of ice has drastically de-
creased, of more than 85 per cent between 1912 and 2011; ice melting on the top 
of the mountain is at present a constant and seemingly inexorable process, to the 
point that it is expected to become ice free soon, predictions ranging from 2020 
to 2060.28 Also, in 2004 several properties inscribed on the WHL were affected 
by the earthquake and tsunami hitting South Asia; cultural properties include 
the Old Town of Galle and its Fortifications in Sri Lanka29 as well as Group of 
Monuments Mahabalipuram30 and the Sun Temple of Konârak31 in India; also 
27 See UNESCO, ‘Kilimanjaro National Park’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/403 accessed 
5 October 2013.
28 See Damien Gayle, ‘Kilimanjaro’s glaciers shrink and crack as scientists warn Afri-
ca’s highest mountain may soon be ice free’ Mail Online (13 November 2010) www. 
dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2232195/Kilimanjaros-glaciers-shrink-crack- 
scientists-warn-Africas-highest-mountain-soon-ice-free.html accessed 5 October 
2013.
29 See UNESCO, ‘Old Town of Galle and its Fortifications’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/451 
accessed 5 October 2013.
30 See UNESCO, ‘Group of Monuments at Mahabalipuram’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/249 
accessed 5 October 2013.
31 See UNESCO, ‘Sun Temple, Konârak’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/246 accessed 5 October 
2013.
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natural sites were damaged, including the Ujung Kulon National Park32 and 
the Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra,33 both in Indonesia. Another ex-
ample is offered by the Everglades National Park,34 in the United States, which 
in 2010 was inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, upon request 
of the American government, because of serious and continuing degradation 
of its aquatic ecosystem. The Park had been first inscribed on the same list in 
1993, due to damage caused by Hurricane Andrew and a marked deterioration 
in water flows and quality resulting from agricultural and urban development. 
 Although it had been removed from the List in 2007, its degradation has con-
tinued, especially in the form of drastic reduction of water inflows and incre-
ment of pollution, leading to a loss of marine habitat and decline in marine 
species.35 Overall, according to a study of the World Heritage Centre – which is 
quite outdated at the moment of this writing, as it was carried out in 2005 – 125 
properties inscribed on the WHL, located in 59 states parties, were affected at 
the time by climate change, including inter alia coastal marine sites, glaciers, 
mountainous sites and terrestrial biodiversity sites.36 The climate threats jeop-
ardizing cultural properties were identified in hurricane, storms, lightening, sea 
level rise, erosion, flooding, rainfall increase, drought, desertification and rise in 
temperature.37 As for the impacts observed for natural properties, they were the 
following: glacial  retreat and glacier melting, sea level rise, loss of biodiversity, 
species migration and tree-line shift, rainfall pattern changes and occurrence 
of droughts, fre quency of wildfires, coral bleaching, coastal erosion, sea water 
 temperature and sa linity change, as well as hurricane, storms and cyclones.38
32 See UNESCO, ‘Ujung Kulon National Park’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/608 accessed 
5 October 2013.
33 See UNESCO, ‘Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/1167 
accessed 5 October 2013.
34 See UNESCO, ‘Everglades National Park’ whc.unesco.org/en/list/76 accessed 5 Octo-
ber 2013.
35 For other examples of world heritage properties actually or potentially affected by 
climate change see World Heritage Committee, ‘Issues Related to the State of Conser-
vation of World Heritage Properties: The Impacts of Climate Change on World Heri-
tage Properties’ (Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, 8–16 July 2006) (26 June 2006) 
WHC- 06/30.COM/7.1, 29–33. See also, in general, UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 
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Within the WHC framework, climate change is only mentioned in the Op-
erational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention 
(Operational Guidelines),39 inside the Format for the nomination of properties 
for inscription on the WHL;40 in particular, at the voice ‘environmental pres-
sures’, in the context of which the major sources of environmental degradation 
affecting the property proposed for inscription are to be listed and summarized, 
climate change is identified as a possible example of such pressures.41 Also, 
among the ‘selected global conventions and programmes relating to the pro-
tection of Cultural and Natural Heritage’, the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change42 is included. However, also in the Convention’s 
text – even though the term climate change is not explicitly mentioned – it is 
dedicated implicit attention. In fact, at Article 11(4), in describing the reasons 
for which a property already included in the WHL may be inscribed on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger, certain typical effects of climate change are men-
tioned, id est calamities and cataclysms, landslides, changes in water level, floods 
and tidal waves. When a World Heritage property is threatened by one of these 
(or other climate-change-related) phenomena, it is possible to submit a request 
for international assistance to the World Heritage Committee;43 the latter may 
accordingly decide the forms of assistance to be granted to prevent and/or com-
bat the actual or potential effects determined by climate change over the prop-
erty concerned.
Probably the options offered by the WHC system are still far from laying 
down a satisfactory set of rules capable of properly addressing the potential 
threats of climate change on World Heritage properties. However, it is self-
evident that in this respect the WHC is certainly better equipped than the 
CSICH. This is due to at least two reasons. First of all, a very practical one: 
the heritage object of protection under the WHC is usually much more vis-
ible than intangible heritage; therefore, it is much easier to identify, monitor 
and visualize the effects of climate change – and possibly to keep them under 
39 The version of the Operational Guidelines updated in 2013 is available at whc.unesco.org/
en/guidelines/accessed 5 October 2013.
40 Ibid Annex 5, 102–113.
41 Ibid 109.
42 Adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107.
43 See Articles 19–26 WHC. On international assistance see Anne Lemaistre and Fede-
rico Lenzerini, ‘Articles 19–26. International Assistance’ in Francesco Francioni and 
Federico Lenzerini (eds), The World Heritage Convention. A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 305.
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control – on the former than on the latter. Sometimes intangible Cultural Heri-
tage is simply invisible; consequently, it just disappears (this happens in the 
world on a daily basis), and sometimes nobody realizes that, if not the com-
munities specifically concerned. Secondly, in reproducing the model of the 
WHC, the CSICH has established a system which, although characterized by 
equivalent provisions, is much less effective than the WHC in terms of poten-
tial action against the effects of climate change; this is due to the different na-
ture – under many perspectives – of the two categories of heritage concerned. 
In fact, while tangible heritage has a material structure on which the necessary 
measures may be directly put into concrete operation – id est measures ad-
dressing the property as such (e.g. restoration, application of layers of protect-
ive materials, reinforcement of the structure of a building, cleaning, etc) – this 
obviously does not apply to intangible heritage, for its ethereal character. When 
an element of intangible Cultural Heritage is threatened by climate change, 
clearly the right remedy cannot be that of modifying the nature and character-
ization of the element concerned; this would in most cases prejudice its very 
cultural significance for its creators and bearers. Therefore, the only acceptable 
option is to act on the root causes of climate change with specific respect to 
the heritage concerned. It is obvious that this is particularly difficult, because 
intangible Cultural Heritage is by its very nature a living heritage, and, since 
climate change usually forces people to modify their living conditions, habits 
and traditions, it consequently forces an artificial (nonspontaneous) change 
in the intangible heritage as well, leading it to lose its distinctive cultural sig-
nificance, if not to disappear. For example, when a community is forced to 
leave its ancestral lands for climate-change-related reasons (one may think, 
for instance, about the so-called environmental refugees, id est those who are 
forced to leave an island where they lived which is being submerged due to the 
increment of the sea level), all elements of intangible Cultural Heritage linked 
to that specific land will inevitably disappear. Even without any need to refer 
to such extreme situations, climate change may force communities and even 
individuals to change their habits so as to adapt them to the new climatic real-
ity, with a consequent loss of intangible Cultural Heritage. Alternatively, it may 
lead to changes in environmental conditions which are essential for an element 
of intangible Cultural Heritage to properly fulfil its cultural role as well as to be 
appropriately preserved and transmitted to future generations. If one takes a 
look at the two lists established by the CSICH, she/he may easily pick elements 
of intangible Cultural Heritage which are potentially or actually threatened by 
climate change. For example, the official Web page of the Yaokwa, the Enawene 
Nawe people’s ritual for the maintenance of social and cosmic order (included 
 Protecting the Tangible, Safeguarding the Intangible 153
in the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding), in 
Brazil, describes such a ritual as follows:
“(t)he Enawene Nawe people … perform the Yaokwa ritual every year during the 
drought period to honour the Yakairiti spirits, thereby ensuring cosmic and social order 
for the different clans. The ritual links local biodiversity to a complex, symbolic cosmol-
ogy that connects the different but inseparable domains of society, culture and nature. 
It is integrated into their everyday activities over the course of seven months during 
which the clans alternate responsibilities: one group embarks on fishing expeditions 
throughout the area while another prepares offerings of rock salt, fish and ritual food 
for the spirits, and performs music and dance. The ritual combines knowledge of agri-
culture, food processing, handicrafts (costumes, tools and musical instruments) and the 
construction of houses and fishing dams. Yaokwa and the local biodiversity it celebrates 
represent an extremely delicate and fragile ecosystem whose continuity depends directly 
on its conservation. However, both are now seriously threatened by deforestation and 
invasive practices, including intensive mining and logging, extensive livestock activity, 
water pollution, degradation of headwaters, unregulated processes of urban settlement, 
construction of roads, waterways and dams, drainage and diversion of rivers, burning of 
forests and illegal fishing and trade in wildlife”.44
While most of the causes threatening the integrity of the practice in point are 
man-made (although degradation of headwaters and accidental burning of for-
ests may be effects of climate change), it is based on a fragile ecosystem which 
may be easily disrupted by climate change. Similar considerations may be de-
veloped with respect to the Traditions and practices associated with the Kayas 
in the sacred forests of the Mijikenda, in Kenya, oral traditions and performing 
arts related to sacred forests, involving the use of natural resources regulated by 
traditional knowledge and practices, which have contributed to the conservation 
of local biodiversity.45 Another example of interest for the present study is offered 
by the Sanké mon, collective fishing rite of the Sanké, in Mali, which was inscribed 
on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in 
2009 because it is endangered by a number of factors, including degradation of 
the Sanké lake due to poor rainfall,46 one of the typical effects of climate change.
44 See UNESCO, ‘Yaokwa, the Enawene Nawe people’s ritual for the maintenance of social 
and cosmic order’ www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&USL= 
00521 accessed 5 October 2013.
45 See UNESCO, ‘Traditions and practices associated with the Kayas in the sacred forests 
of the Mijikenda’ www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&USL= 
00313 accessed 5 October 2013.
46 See UNESCO, ‘Sanké mon, collective fishing rite of the Sanké’ www.unesco.org/culture/ 
ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&USL=00289 accessed 5 October 2013.
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The two lists established by the CSICH, however, inescapably offer a very 
limited picture of the infinite variety of the intangible Cultural Heritage of the 
world. Many examples of the heritage in point threatened by climate change may 
therefore be found outside them. It suffices to think about all ice-related trad-
itional practices; for instance, ice-melting in the Arctic is progressively forcing 
the native Inuit to change their traditional way of life, implying a huge and ir-
replaceable loss of intangible Cultural Heritage.47
Threats to intangible Cultural Heritage determined by climate change are to-
day a daily reality all over the world, and the CSICH does not include any provi-
sion dealing with the problem in point. Also, unlike the Operational Guidelines 
of the WHC, no mention of climate change is included in the Operational Di-
rectives for the implementation of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Heritage (Operational Directives).48 Certainly the Convention does 
not prevent the possibility of taking action in view of safeguarding intangible 
Cultural Heritage against the effects of climate change. This may be done, first 
of all, through inscribing an element of such a heritage on the List of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, allowing the element con-
cerned to have privileged access to international assistance pursuant to Article 
20(a) CSICH. Also, according to Article 11(a) states parties have the duty to ‘take 
the necessary measures to ensure the safeguarding of the intangible Cul tural 
Heritage present in (their) territory’, which may well include measures having 
the purpose of opposing the effects of climate change. Furthermore, the scien-
tific, technical and artistic studies, as well as research methodologies, to be fos-
tered with a view of effectively safeguarding the intangible Cultural Heritage, in 
particular the intangible Cultural Heritage in danger, pursuant to Article 13(c), 
may concern action against climate change. Last but not least, action against 
climate change may be promoted through putting into practice the general duty 
of international cooperation contemplated by Article 19,49 by virtue of which 
states parties ‘undertake to cooperate at the bilateral, subregional, regional and 
international levels’ in the general interest of humanity.50 These, however, are 
47 See Ed Struzik, ‘As Arctic Melts, Inuit Face Tensions with Outside World’ environ-
ment360 (1 October 2012), e360.yale.edu/feature/as_arctic_melts_inuit_face_ 
tensions_with_outside_world/2577/accessed 5 October 2013.
48 www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00026 accessed 5 October 2013.
49 Including, inter alia, ‘the exchange of information and experience, joint initiatives, 
and the establishment of a mechanism of assistance to States Parties in their efforts to 
safe-guard the intangible Cultural Heritage’; see Article 19(1).
50 See Article 19(2).
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very generic provisions, and their translation into effective measures aimed at 
addressing the effects of climate change with respect to intangible Cultural Heri-
tage ultimately rests in the hands of states. In other words, for those effects to 
be properly faced and neutralized, a particularly structured and specific action 
would be necessary, which is not contemplated by the CSICH, but ultimately 
depends on the willingness and capacity of states parties to voluntarily take 
measures in view of properly addressing the specific problems faced by each ele-
ment of intangible Cultural Heritage as a consequence of climate change, within 
the broad scope of the freedom left to them by the Convention in safeguarding 
their national heritage. After all, as is well known, the correct functioning of the 
CSICH as a whole depends on the willingness of states parties to make it work; 
in this respect it suffices to think that (like the WHC) for international assistance 
to be activated, a request from the territorial state concerned is necessary,51 even 
with respect to elements inscribed on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in 
Need of Urgent Safeguarding.
In theoretical terms, the interaction between the safeguarding of intangible 
Cultural Heritage – as determined by the CSICH – and climate change might 
also be seen under a totally different perspective than the one examined so far. In 
particular, the hypothesis could be considered that a given element of intangible 
Cultural Heritage might favour the process of climate change. Should this hap-
pen, that particular element would be excluded from the scope of application of 
the Convention. This is due to the circumstance that, according to its Article 2, 
‘(f)or the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to 
such intangible Cultural Heritage as is compatible with existing international 
human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect 
among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development’.52 
In fact, in the event that one element of intangible Cultural Heritage might pro-
duce the effect of favouring climate change, it would clearly be incompatible with 
the requirements of sustainable development. It is very unlikely, however, that a 
situation of this kind may actually happen in practice, id est that an element of 
intangible Cultural Heritage may be in itself a force contributing to the progres-
sion of climate change.
51 See Article 23 CSICH.
52 Emphasis added.
156 Federico Lenzerini
IV  Perspectives in View of Improving Action against  
Cultural-Heritage-Related Threats Produced  
by Climate Change
It is a fact that the model of the WHC and the CSICH is not the best possible 
one in terms of protecting/safeguarding Cultural Heritage. This holds true in 
particular with respect to the CSICH, since – as seen in the previous section – 
the WHC system is certainly better equipped than the latter, both in terms of 
substantive provisions included along its text as well as in structural terms, id est 
for the fact that immovable tangible properties offer more chances to organize 
targeted action against climate change than intangible heritage. This said, to be 
successful one must work within the reality existing in the real world, finding 
the right balance between idealism and realism in order to effectively determine 
posi tive changes. The current text and structure of the CSICH are carved in stone, 
and there is no reasonable prospect to change them. At the same time, however, 
since the Operational Directives are subject to regular revision and may always 
be modified, they offer a formidable chance to update the global system of the 
Convention in order to make it more responsive to the need of preventing and 
combating the effects of climate change on intangible Cultural Heritage. In fact, 
the Operational Guidelines are an integral part of the CSICH, and the inclusion 
in their text of specific provisions addressing the issue of climate change would 
fill the gap left open by the Convention’s text in not appropriately dealing with 
such an issue.
Also, since tangible and intangible heritage often represent two indissoluble 
components of the same complex cultural reality,53 promotion of contextual 
management of the WHC and the CSICH – including in the field of the fight 
against climate change – might result particularly appropriate and effective.
At the same time, one should not forget that alternative avenues do exist, 
which, besides the CSICH, establish the conditions for a legal safeguarding of 
intangible Cultural Heritage. This happens especially with respect to human 
rights law, the said heritage being an essential part of the cultural identity of 
communities and individuals. As I have stated in other writings of mine, the 
recent developments of international law in the field of cultural rights make it 
reasonable to hold that at present the most effective legal safeguard available for 
intangible Cultural Heritage is outside the system of the CSICH, in light of the 
53 See, in this respect, the third recital of the CSICH Preamble, emphasizing the ‘deep- 
seated interdependence between the intangible Cultural Heritage and the tangible 
cultural and natural heritage.’
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deep interaction between the heritage in point and international human rights.54 
Of course, once a human right exists establishing an international obligation 
(whereas indirectly) to ensure proper safeguarding of intangible Cultural Heri-
tage of individuals and communities, as part of their cultural identity, such an 
obligation includes safeguarding the said heritage against the threats of climate 
change. This argument may be combined – in the form of a mutually-reinforcing 
relation – with the one concerning the human right to a safe environment, af-
firmed in contemporary international practice;55 indeed, the latter right also pre-
supposes a right to be protected against the effects of climate change (although 
it may be hard to be translated into practice), extended to all essential elements 
of the life and environment of human beings, including elements of intangible 
Cultural Heritage.
One final point: in examining the relation between intangible Cultural Heri-
tage and climate change, it is important to emphasize that it may be seen not only 
under the perspective of the detrimental effects that the latter may determine 
on the former. On the contrary, it is also opportune to consider that intangible 
Cultural Heritage may in some cases help in preventing climate change. Many 
elements of the heritage in point are in fact related to the sustainable use of 
natural resources, offering lessons which might be used in order to develop a 
more sustainable model of life, through replacing with long-established uses of 
traditional communities certain modern habits which contribute to favour cli-
mate change.56
54 See Lenzerini (n 15) 118.
55 See e.g. the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (among others, López 
Ostra v. Spain App no 16798/90 (ECHR, 9 December 1994); Guerra and Others v. Italy 
App no 14967/89 (ECHR, 19 February 1998)) and of the African Commission on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (in particular, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center 
and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication no 155/96 
(2001) African Human Rights Law Reports 60).
56 See, for example, Benjamin A Gyampoh et al, ‘Using traditional knowledge to cope 
with climate change in rural Ghana’ FAO Corporate Document Repository (2001) 
www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0670e/i0670e14.htm accessed 6 October 2013. The authors, 
among other things, note that “(t)raditional knowledge – the wisdom, knowledge and 
practices of indigenous people gained over time through experience and orally passed 
on from generation to generation – has over the years played a significant part in 
solving problems, including problems related to climate change and variability. Indi-
genous people that live close to natural resources often observe the activities around 
them and are the first to identify and adapt to any changes. The appearance of cer-
tain birds, mating of certain animals and flowering of certain plants are all important 
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V Conclusion
A recent report dealing with the effects of climate change on the life of the Inuit 
people of Canada notes that their ‘millennia-old traditions are already being al-
tered because of the warming Arctic, and (they) face the possibility of having to 
completely reinvent what it means to be Inuit’.57 This is an example of a reality, 
by virtue of which humanity is experiencing an irreplaceable loss of heritage, 
knowledge and traditions, which ultimately results in a harmful impoverishment 
of the Cultural Heritage of humankind as a whole. In fact, intangible Cultural 
Heritage is an essential component of cultural diversity, which, in turn, is a ‘com-
mon heritage of humanity’, as it ‘is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of 
the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of 
exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for human-
kind as biodiversity is for nature’.58 Similar observations may be developed with 
respect to World Heritage, which, as emphasized by the sixth recital of the WHC 
Preamble, ‘need(s) to be preserved as part of the World Heritage of mankind 
as a whole’. The international community cannot further postpone setting up a 
global, targeted and efficient action having the purpose of fighting the detrimen-
tal effects produced by climate change on both tangible and intangible Cultural 
Heritage. Maybe the time is still right to do that; the risk is that very soon it may 
be too late.
signals of changes in time and seasons that are well understood in traditional know-
ledge systems. Indigenous people have used biodiversity as a buffer against variation, 
change and catastrophe; in the face of plague, if one crop fails, another will survive 
[…]. In coping with risk due to excessive or low rainfall, drought and crop failure, 
some traditional people grow many different crops and varieties with different suscep-
tibility to drought and floods and supplement these by hunting, fishing and gathering 
wild food plants. The diversity of crops and food resources is often matched by a 
similar diversity in location of fields, as a safety measure to ensure that in the face of 
extreme weather some fields will survive to produce harvestable crops”.
57 See Unikkaaqatigiit, ‘Putting the Human Face on Climate Change – Perspec-
tives from the Inuit in Canada’ (2005) www.itk.ca/publication/canadian-inuit- 
perspectives-climate-change-unikkaaqatigiit accessed 6 October 2013, 11.
58 See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Resolution adopted on the 
report of Commission IV at the 20th plenary meeting (2 November 2001) Records of 
the General Conference 31st Session Paris, 15 October to 3 November 2001 Volume 1 
Resolutions, Article 1.
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Alessandro Chechi∗
The Cultural Dimension of Climate Change: 
Some Remarks on the Interface between 
Cultural Heritage and Climate Change Law
Abstract Climate change is one of the major environmental challenges of the 
twenty-first century whose aggravating effects impact biodiversity, landscapes, 
the life of peoples and Cultural Heritage. This chapter analyses the different ways 
climate change threatens Cultural Heritage and examines the existing interna-
tional legal framework. The aim is to investigate whether, and to what extent, 
Cultural Heritage law interacts with the international instruments that address 
the degradation of global climate conditions. The main argument is that these 
legal regimes are inadequate to protect cultural and environmental resources. 
Rather than advocating normative or structural reforms, this chapter offers a 
plea for a new attitude on the part of States, one that aims at sustainable models 
of economic growth for the sake of the protection of Cultural Heritage of great 
value to all of humankind.
I Introduction
Climate change is one of the most urgent challenges to humankind and to the 
sustainability of the world’s environment. Despite the uncertainties associated 
with scenarios and models, it is certain that climate change entails a number of 
threats: increasing temperatures; change of the frequency, intensity and distribu-
tion of extreme events such as droughts, precipitations, floods and tropical cyc-
lones; rising sea level; and increased marine acidification due to rise of carbon 
dioxide levels in the atmosphere and dissolved in the oceans. There is also no 
scientific doubt that human activities contribute significantly to climate change.1 
∗ Researcher, Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva; PhD in Law, European University 
Institute (Florence).
1 Solar radiation that reaches Earth warms the surface, which then re-radiates heat 
back into the atmosphere. Since the atmosphere presents a barrier to both incoming 
and outgoing radiations, the atmosphere retains a greater proportion of heat radi-
ated from Earth. Human activities perturb this natural filtering (greenhouse) effect 
by adding greenhouse gases (GHG), such as carbon dioxide and methane, which are 
the products of fossil fuel combustion resulting from transport-related emissions and 
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This linkage was uncovered in 2007 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which asserted that “there is very high confidence that the glo-
bal average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming”.2 
However, already the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) established that climate change can be “attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmos-
phere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over com-
parable time periods”.3
Besides climatic events, human-induced climate change results in global, 
long-term and accelerating social and economic changes, which threaten hu-
man well-being. Further, it has the potential to threaten international peace and 
security, the stability of nation States4 and the enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights. Indeed, climate change will undermine – and is already  undermining 
–  the realization of a broad range of individual rights, including the right to 
health, to life, to food, to water, to shelter, to property, and the rights associated 
with culture.5
While many scholarly works have examined the connection between climate 
change and internationally protected human rights, this chapter will look at 
the cultural dimension of climate change. In other words, this chapter will fo-
cus on the interface between Cultural Heritage law and climate change regula-
tion, addressing the following questions: is Cultural Heritage protection from 
climate change threats envisaged by international law? Where does international 
energy production in power plants. The heat-trapping property of these gases leads 
to an overall warming of the planet and to the ensuing climate change phenomenon. 
John C Mutter and Kye Mesa Barnard, ‘Climate Change, Evolution of Disasters and 
Inequality’, in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (CUP 
2010) 272, 275–277.
2 IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change (CUP 2007) 37. The IPCC is the 
leading international scientific body for the assessment of climate change. It was es-
tablished by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorolog-
ical Organization in 1988 to provide scientific assessments of climate change and its 
potential environmental and socio-economic impacts, see IPCC, ‘Organization’ www.
ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UZJEsUq5-Yk accessed 24 January 2014.
3 Adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107, Article 1.
4 Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V Scott, ‘Mapping the Impact of Climate Change on 
International Law’, in Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V Scott (eds), International Law 
in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 3.
5 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Introduction: Human Rights and Climate Change’, in 
Humphreys (n 1) 1.
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Cultural Heritage law coincide with or confront obligations under the climate 
change regime? Where must climate change policies resist with Cultural Heri tage 
law imperatives? Are climate change regime and Cultural Heritage law mutually 
supportive? This study will thus permit to examine the content and the links 
between the legal regimes designed by States and international organizations to 
reduce the vulnerability of Cultural Heritage and the global climate. These re-
sources have emerged as global public goods,6 id est values that are fundamental 
for the international community as a whole and that transcend the interests of 
individual States.
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment constitutes the 
first body of norms and principles governing the collective action of States and 
other international actors with the goal of safeguarding the essential elements 
of the environment as a global public good, including climate and the biosphere. 
Subsequently, Resolution 43/53 of the General Assembly underlined that “cer-
tain human activities could change global climate patterns, threatening present 
and future generations”; that “emerging evidence indicates” that the effects of 
global warming “could be disastrous for mankind if timely steps are not taken 
at all levels”; and that climate change is a “common concern of humankind”.7 
Likewise, the UNFCCC acknowledged that “change in the Earth’s climate and 
its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind”.8 The idea of Cultural 
Heritage as a ‘public good’ can be traced back to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, according to which
“damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the 
cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture 
of the world”.9
6 In economic literature, a global public good is one that is characterized by non-rivalry, 
id est anyone can use a good without diminishing its availability to others, and nonex-
cludability, id est no one can be excluded from using the good. The term is used in in-
ternational law discourse to refer to values that are fundamental for the international 
community as a whole and that transcend the interests of individual States. See Inge 
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A Stern (eds), Global Public Goods. International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP 1999); and ‘Symposium: Global Public Goods 
and the Plurality of Legal Orders’ (2012) 23 Eur J Intl L 643.
7 UNGA Res 43/53 (6 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/530 Preamble, first, second 
and third recitals.
8 Preamble, first recital.
9 Adopted 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956, 249 UNTS, 240 Preamble, 
second recital.
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The same idea was echoed by the Declaration Concerning the Intentional De-
struction of Cultural Heritage, which establishes that
“[...] cultural heritage is an important component of the cultural identity of communi-
ties, groups and individuals, and of social cohesion, so that its intentional destruction 
may have adverse consequences on human dignity and human rights”.10
This chapter proceeds in five stages. It begins by looking at the ways in which 
climate change impacts on tangible Cultural Heritage, id est art objects, monu-
ments, archaeological sites, landscapes (section II). It then explores Cultural 
Heritage law (section III) and the international instruments that address the 
degradation of global climate conditions (section IV) in order to lay the founda-
tion for the examination of their interaction and some of the related problems 
(section V). The chapter concludes by offering a plea for a new attitude on the 
part of States, one that meets with the existing international rules and principles 
and that aims at meaningful sustainable models of economic growth for the sake 
of the protection of cultural properties of great value to all of humankind as well 
as future generations (section VI).
II The Impacts of Climate Change on Cultural Heritage
The deleterious effects of climate change will have consequences for the products 
of human creativity. In the case of built Cultural Heritage, the potential impacts 
of climate change range from (i) direct physical effects and (ii) effects on social 
and cultural structures and habitats.11 This means that the alteration of the cli-
matic equilibrium of the planet does not only severely affect monuments, sites 
and biodiversity, but has also an impact on people. Therefore, the assessment 
of the effects of climate change must account for the interactions within and 
between natural, cultural and societal systems.12
10 Preamble, fifth recital. The Declaration was adopted on 17 October 2003 by the Gen-
eral Conference of the UNESCO as a reaction to the demolition of the monumental 
statues of the Buddhas of Bamiyan committed by the Taliban in 2001.
11 UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’ (World Heritage 
Centre 2007) whc.unesco.org/en/activities/473 accessed 27 January 2014. This pub-
lication presents 26 case studies from selected natural and cultural WHC sites to il-
lustrate the observed and expected impacts of climate change. The World Heritage 
Centre was established in 1992 and is tasked with managing the day-to-day affairs of 
the WHC. See  whc.unesco.org/en/world-heritage-centre accessed 27 January 2014.
12 UNESCO, ‘Report on Predicting and Managing the Effects of Climate Change on World 
Heritage’ whc.unesco.org/en/climatechange accessed 27 January 2014, Paragraph 32.
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The adverse impacts of climate change on social and cultural structures can 
be illustrated by considering the buildings, sites and landscapes where people 
live, work, worship and socialize. Climate change alters the way people relate 
to these spaces. For instance, under the pressure of desertification, flooding or 
sea level rise, populations are forced to migrate, leading to the abandonment 
of property.13 This abandonment raises an important concern in contexts where 
traditional knowledge and skills are essential to ensure a proper maintenance of 
these properties. Biological changes (with species shifting ranges) can also have 
an impact on conservation, with the reduction of availability of native species to 
repair structures and buildings. Moreover, the migration of people leads to the 
break-up of communities and thus to the eventual loss of social structures, trad-
itional knowledge, cultural identity, rituals and the cultural memory of former 
inhabitants.14 For instance, the melting of ice caps and the arctic ground ice as 
a result of temperature increase in high northern latitudes has already had an 
impact on the traditional livelihoods and means of survivals of the local indi-
genous peoples.15
Direct physical damages are due to the fact that Cultural Heritage is closely 
related to the climate. In its Case Studies,16 the UNESCO World Heritage Centre 
has distinguished the archaeological heritage from the built heritage in order to 
identify the most important direct physical effects of climate change.
With respect to the archaeological heritage, the following changes in environ-
mental conditions have been considered: (i) modification in precipitation re-
gimes, regardless of whether the trend marks an increased frequency of droughts 
or floods or an increased year-to-year variability; (ii) increased soil temperature 
in response to increased atmospheric temperature, which may provoke subsoil 
instability, ground heave and subsidence as well as landslides; (iii) sea-level rise, 
13 Several islands in the Southern Pacific have already been abandoned after the rising 
ocean flooded parts of their shorelines and saltwater seeped into the ground water. 
As 70 per cent of the world population lives in coastal areas, the majority will be af-
fected directly by that development. Stefan Gruber, ‘The Impact of Climate Change 
on Cultural Heritage Sites: Environmental Law and Adaptation’ (2008) 8/117 Sidney 
Law SchoolLegal Studies Research Paper papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1285741 accessed 26 July 2013, 15–16. See also Hee-Eun Kim, ‘Changing Climate, 
Changing Culture: Adding the Climate Change Dimension to the Protection of Intan-
gible Cultural Heritage’ (2011) 18 Intl J Cultural Property 259.
14 UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’ (n 11) 65.
15 Mutter and Barnard (n 1) 275–276.
16 UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’ (n 11).
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which threatens coastal areas with the subsequent coastal erosion and perma-
nent submersion of low lying areas and the increase in the sea salt chlorides 
load of coastal soils; (iv) changes in sediment moisture, which are expected to 
affect data preserved in waterlogged, anaerobic or anoxic conditions; (v) changes 
in wetting and drying cycles, which will induce crystallization and dissolution 
of salts and thus affect buried archaeology, wall paintings, frescos, rock art and 
other decorated surfaces. Essentially, these changes of temperature or water con-
tent may jeopardize the conservation of archaeological evidences – even those 
not known today – and exacerbate decay mechanisms since they perturb the 
balance in the hydrological, chemical and biological processes of the soil where 
archaeological sites are located.17
Regarding historic buildings the study of the World Heritage Centre evi dences 
that they have a greater intimacy with the ground than modern ones. The built 
heritage has been designed with the local climate in mind. Historic buildings are 
more porous and draw water from the ground into their structure and lose it to 
the environment by surface evaporation. Their wall surfaces and floors are the 
point of exchange for these reactions. Therefore, increases in soil moisture might 
result in greater salt mobilisation and consequent damaging crystallisation on 
decorated surfaces through drying. Moreover, extreme and sudden variations 
or changes in the amplitude of the diurnal or seasonal variation of temperature 
and humidity can cause the splitting, cracking, flaking and dusting of materials 
and surfaces. Timber and other organic building materials may be subject to 
increased biological infestation such as the migration of pests to altitudes and 
latitudes that may not have been previously concerned with such threats. Flood-
ing is another important concern. Buildings may be damaged due to the erosive 
character of rapid flowing water or because they were not designed to withstand 
prolonged immersion. In addition, post-flood drying may encourage the growth 
of damaging micro-organisms such as moulds and fungi. Likewise, sea-level rise 
leads to coastal erosion and threatens coastal properties with total loss.18
Another serious threat is desertification. This has been defined as
[...] land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various 
factors, including climatic variations and human activities.19
17 Ibid 52–53.
18 Ibid 64–65.
19 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experienc-
ing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa; adopted 14 October 
1994, entered into force 26 December 1996, 1954 UNTS 3, Article 1 (a).
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Thus, desertification is not only caused by natural causes. Anthropogenic factors 
such as deforestation, pollution, inappropriate irrigation and poor land govern-
ance play a significant part. However, climate change also plays an important 
role. In the peripheral areas of deserts, sand dunes are normally stabilised by 
vegetation. Higher temperatures and less rainfall contribute to droughts in such 
areas, leading to the decline of vegetation and hence to the migration of sand 
dunes. Once the sand dunes become mobile, all vegetation in their vicinity is 
at high risk and an unstoppable chain reaction begins. Windstorms, which are 
increasing in number, extension and frequency due to climate change, further 
exacerbate the situation.20
One of the case studies presented in the report by the World Heritage Centre 
deals with the three mosques of Djingareyber, Sankoré and Sidi Yahia in Tim-
buktu, Mali. These sites, which were inscribed in the List of World Heritage in 
Danger (2012), set up under Article 11 of the UNESCO Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC),21 bear testi-
mony to the physical and social impacts of climate change (desertification). On 
the one hand, projected changes show that in the future the area of Timbuktu 
will face a decrease in average rainfall and an increase in atmospheric tempera-
ture, which will surely contribute to desert encroachment and sand blown dam-
age.22 Another climate factor that deserves attention is the increase in extreme 
precipitation events. Heavy rains in 1999, 2001 and 2003 damaged or caused the 
collapse of traditional earthen buildings and mud mosques. Moreover, the deser-
tification in the region of Timbuktu is an important source of stress to the three 
mosques because it might lead the migration of the local population, including 
the local craftsmen, which are involved in the restoration process of the mud 
structures of the mosques.23
However, there are other climate change-related direct physical impacts that 
have not been reported by the World Heritage Centre.
First, environmental degradation leads to conditions for the recrudescence 
of thefts, illicit excavations and exportations of cultural objects. In effect, just as 
in times of war and of political disorder, the opportunity for illicit trafficking in 
art increases with the impoverishment of the local population or its departure, 
20 Gruber (n 13) 12.
21 Adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
22 This threat justified the inscription of Timbuktu on the List of World Heritage in 
Danger between 1990 and 2005. The site was subsequently re-inscribed in this list in 
2012 due to the armed conflict that threatened mosques and tombs.
23 UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage’ (n 11) 74–75.
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for example, because of climate change-related events such as desertification and 
agricultural disruption. As part of the same problem, it appears that this sce-
nario also entails that climate change may affect the efforts currently deployed by 
national governments, UNESCO and other specialised institutions to enhance 
(Cultural Heritage) law enforcement in these areas. In addition, climate change 
induced events may impinge on the implementation of UNESCO’s mantras that 
stolen or illicitly exported cultural materials must be returned to the country of 
origin and that archaeological assets should be preserved in situ.
Second, it may be argued that the geophysical changes resulting from climate 
change could lead to future armed conflicts, which in turn might impact – as 
either unwanted or premeditated consequences – cultural sites and properties.24 
The argument about the connection between climate change and conflict boils 
down to an argument about resource scarcity and competition over the means 
to sustain livelihoods.25
Third, extreme weather events in major art trade hubs like New York and 
London jeopardize the preservation of movable works of art.26 These are not 
unlikely events. In 2012, New York was hit by hurricane Sandy and in 2011 by 
hurricane Irene, two of the most devastating hurricanes in recent history. These 
can be related to climate change because, in a warming world, tropical climate 
conditions expand toward the poles. Consequently, storm tracks that have been 
associated with the tropics are moving northward (and similar northward shifts 
will occur in the Pacific). Therefore, areas that previously experienced very few 
hurricanes and cyclones will start to experience them in greater numbers.27 
Christiane Fischer, President of AXA Art in the Americas observed that
“Sandy was the costliest event for the art insurance industry by far. We all will need 
to adjust our disaster planning strategies to protect important works […] from becoming 
victims of water damage”.28
During hurricane Sandy, Christie’s Fine Art Storage Services, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the auction house that stores and protects artworks for private and 
24 Thomas F Homer-Dixon, ‘Terror in the Weather Forecast’ New York Times (New York, 
24 April 2007).
25 Ban Ki Moon, ‘A Climate Culprit in Darfur’ Washington Post (Washington, 16 June 
2007).
26 On London, see the case study in UNESCO, ‘Case Studies on Climate Change and 
World Heritage’ (n 11) 66–69.
27 IPCC (n 2) 46, 53; Mutter and Barnard (n 1) 275–277.
28 AXA ART Group, ‘AXA ART Presents Damages from Hurricane Sandy at Its Lounge 
During 2013 AIPAD Photography Show New York’ (press release, 3 April 2013).
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institutional owners in Brooklyn, was hit by at least one storm surge. Christie’s 
storage facility is not the only one to have clients’ works damaged. The storm 
threatened manifold businesses, including Chelsea’s art galleries, where streets 
were flooded. It is impossible to know the exact loss as most sources requested 
anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information. It has been estimated, 
however, that total losses run in the hundreds of millions.29
III Cultural Heritage-Related International Instruments
International Cultural Heritage law has developed throughout time thanks to the 
standard-setting activity of UNESCO and other international organizations in 
direct response to the pressure placed upon sites and objects by different forces. 
The destruction and illicit trade of cultural assets during the two World Wars 
triggered the adoption of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict.30 The exposure of clandestine excavations and 
illegal trafficking in cultural objects prompted further international instruments: 
the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property31 and the Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.32 Population growth, industrial de-
velopment and urbanization lead to the adoption of the Recommendation con-
cerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private 
Works (1968), the WHC, the Recommendation concerning the Protection, at a 
National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), and the Recommen-
dation concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas 
(1976). As far as the WHC is concerned, it is routinely affirmed that the idea of 
safeguarding monuments, sites and groups of buildings of ‘outstanding universal 
value’ emerged as a result of the international campaign organized in the 1960s 
by UNESCO to rescue the Abu Simbel Temples in the Upper Nile Valley. These 
would have flooded following the construction of the Aswan High Dam by the 
Government of Egypt. Pursuant to a request for assistance from Egypt and Su-
dan, UNESCO accelerated archaeological research on the site and the temples 
29 Laura Gilbert, ‘An Exodus from Red Hook’ The Art Newspaper (London, 26 April 
2013).
30 See n 9.
31 Adopted 17 November 1970, entered in force 24 April 1972, 823 UNTS 231.
32 Adopted 24 June 1995, entered into force 1 July 1998, 34 ILM 1322. This treaty was 
adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 
upon request of UNESCO.
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were ultimately dismantled, moved to dry ground and re-assembled. Subse-
quently, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage33 
was adopted to counter the increasing commercial exploitation of under water 
Cultural Heritage, which is due to the availability of new technologies that enable 
discovery and access to previously inaccessible sites.
All in all, these treaties aim to prevent the impoverishment of art-rich coun-
tries’ patrimony and to guarantee the protection of Cultural Heritage for the sake 
of its transmission to future generations. However, they were adopted before cli-
mate change emerged as a harmful phenomenon. This is the reason why climate 
change is not mentioned in UNESCO agreements. At best, these legal instru-
ments contain references to some of the effects of climate change or to atmos-
pheric pollution. For instance, Article 11(4) WHC states that cultural property 
can be inscribed in the List of World Heritage in Danger if “threatened by serious 
and specific dangers, such as the threat of disappearance caused by accelerated 
deterioration”, abandonment, landslides, changes in water level, floods and tidal 
waves, calamities and cataclysms. Article 6 of the 1978 Recommendation for the 
Protection of Movable Cultural Property emphasizes that cultural property
[...] is liable to deterioration as a result of […] atmospheric pollution [...], which in 
the long run may have more serious effects than accidental damage or occasional 
vandalism.34
The same holds true for the treaties adopted under the aegis of the Council of 
Europe. The Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of 
Europe affirms that,
(w)ith a view to limiting the risks of the physical deterioration of the architectural heri-
tage, each Party undertakes: (1) to support scientific research for identifying and ana-
lysing the harmful effects of pollution […]; (2) to take into consideration the special 
problems of conservation of the architectural heritage in anti-pollution policies.35
The Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society 
affirms that the States Parties undertake to
33 Adopted 2 November 2001, entered into force 2 January 2009, 41 ILM 37.
34 UNESCO, Recommendation for the Protection of Movable Cultural Property, Rec-
ommendation adopted on the Report of Programme Commission IV at the thirty-
seventh plenary meeting (28 November 1978) Records of the General Conference 
20th Session Paris, 24 October to 28 November 1978 Volume 1 Resolutions.
35 Adopted 3 October 1985, entered into force 1 December 1987, CETS No 121, 
Article 8.
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[...] enrich the processes of economic, political, social and cultural development and 
land-use planning, resorting to cultural heritage impact assessments […].36
At its 29th session (Durban, 2005), the WHC Committee37 examined the issue of 
climate change for the first time. This issue was brought to the attention of the 
Committee by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals from 
several countries. Between 2004 and 2006, these non-State actors had filed five 
petitions requesting the inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger for 
the following WHC sites: Sagarmatha National Park in Nepal; Huascaran Na-
tional Park in Peru; Great Barrier Reef in Australia; Belize’s Barrier Reef Reserve 
System; and the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park.38 Two other peti-
tions were filed in 2007 in regards to the Blue Mountains Area in Australia39 and 
La Amistad Park in Panama and Costa Rica.40 Lastly, in 2009, two NGOs filed a 
36 Adopted 27 October 2005, entered into force 1 June 2011, CETS No 199, Article 8.
37 In the machinery of the WHC, the Committee consists of representatives from 21 
of the States Parties to the Convention, which are elected for terms up to six years 
by the General Conference. It is tasked with: (i) inscribing in the WHC List the sites 
of ‘outstanding universal value’ designated by the States Parties; (ii) monitoring the 
state of conservation of WHC properties; (iii) establishing the terms for use of the 
WHC Fund; (iv) allocating financial assistance upon requests from States Parties; and 
(v) establishing a List of World Heritage in Danger. See Articles 8–14 WHC.
38 The WHC does not expressly authorize petitions of this nature by NGOs or indi-
viduals. The petitioner on the Huascaran National Park case relied on a UNESCO 
document (UNESCO, ‘World Heritage Information Kit’ (World Heritage Centre 
2008) whc.unesco.org/documents/publi_infokit_en.pdf accessed 27 January 2014). It 
indicates that “private individuals, non-governmental organizations, or other groups 
may also draw the Committee’s attention to existing threats. If the alert is justified and 
the problem serious enough, the Committee may consider including the site on the 
List of World Heritage in Danger” (18). The other petitions simply cited the power of 
the WHC Committee to add sites to the List of World Heritage in Danger as a justi-
fication. For an analysis of these petitions see Erica J Thorson, ‘The World Heritage 
Convention and Climate Change: The Case for a Climate-Change Mitigation Strategy 
beyond the Kyoto Protocol’ in William C G Burns and Hari M Osofsky (eds), Adjudi-
cating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches (CUP 2009) 255.
39 See Climate Justice, ‘International Tribunals’ www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/intl 
accessed 27 January 2014.
40 See International Environmental Law Project of Lewis and Clark Law School, ‘Peti-
tion to the World Heritage Committee requesting inclusion of Talamanca Range-La 
Amistad Reseres/La Amistad National Park on the List of World Heritage in Danger’ 
law.lclark.  edu/live/files/195 accessed 27 January 2014.
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petition focusing on the threat posed by black carbon to an array of WHC sites.41 
These petitions argued that, pursuant to their obligations under the WHC, States 
Parties should make drastic cuts in their GHG emissions, regardless of their 
commitments under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.42
With Decision 29 COM 7B.a of 2005, the WHC Committee took note of the 
petitions and of the ‘genuine concern’ of the petitioners and acknowledged
“that the impacts of climate change are affecting many and are likely to affect many more 
World Heritage properties […] in the years to come”.43
It then encouraged States Parties to incorporate responses to these threats in man-
agement plans developed for WHC sites. Furthermore, it requested the World 
Heritage Centre, in collaboration with the WHC’s Advisory Bodies,44 interested 
States Parties and the petitioners, to convene a working group of experts to
“review the nature and scale of the risks posed to World Heritage properties arising 
specifically from climate change; […] jointly develop a strategy to assist States Parties to 
implement appropriate management responses [...]”45
and to
“prepare a joint report on ‘Predicting and managing the effects of Climate Change on 
World Heritage’ to be examined by the Committee at its 30th session (Vilnius, 2006)”.46
As a result, the Committee did not inscribe the sites in question in the List of 
World Heritage in Danger as requested by the petitioners.47
The expert meeting took place in March 2006 at the UNESCO headquarters 
in Paris and resulted in the preparation of a Report on Predicting and Managing 
the Effects of Climate Change on World Heritage (‘the Report’)48 and a Strategy 
41 See Earthjustice and ACJP, ‘Petition to the World Heritage Committee’ whc.unesco.
org/uploads/activities/documents/activity-393-4.pdf accessed 27 January 2014.
42 Adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 148.
43 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 29COM 7B.a (9 September 2005) 
WHC-05/29.COM/22, Paragraphs 3–5.
44 These are the International Council for Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and International Centre for the 
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).
45 UNESCO (n 43) Paragraph 7.
46 Ibid Paragraph 9.
47 For an assessment of the Committee’s decision see William C G Burns, ‘Belt and Sus-
penders? The World Heritage Convention’s Role in Confronting Climate Change’ 
(2009) Rev Eur Community and Intl Environmental L 148.
48 See n 12.
 The Cultural Dimension of Climate Change 173
to Assist State Parties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses (‘the 
Strategy’).49 The Report (i) provided a detailed assessment of the potential – di-
rect, social and cultural – impacts of climate change on World Heritage cultural 
sites; (ii) required the adoption of management strategies for site-based mitiga-
tion and adaptation responses; and (iii) considered the development of synergies 
and partnerships with other international treaties, such as the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands,50 the UNESCO’s Pro-
gramme on Man and the Biosphere and the Convention on Biological Diversity.51 
The Strategy focused on three types of actions to safeguard WHC properties: 
(i) preventive actions, including monitoring, reporting and mitigation of climate 
change impacts; (ii) corrective actions, with a focus on global, regional and local 
adaptation strategies; and (iii) the sharing of knowledge, including best prac-
tices, education and capacity building.
The WHC Committee endorsed these two documents at its 30th session (Vil-
nius, 2006) and called on all the States Parties to implement the Strategy so as 
to protect the outstanding universal values, integrity and authenticity of WHC 
properties from the adverse impacts of climate change.52 The Committee fur-
ther requested the World Heritage Centre to develop a policy document on the 
impacts of climate change on WHC properties. The Committee stated that this 
document should focus on: (i) synergies between conventions; (ii) identification 
of future research needs in this area; (iii) legal questions on the role of the WHC 
with regard to appropriate responses to climate change; (iv) linkages to other UN 
and international bodies dealing with the issues of climate change; (v)  alternative 
mechanisms, other than the List of World Heritage in Danger, to address cli-
matic change and other international concerns.53 The Policy Document on the 
Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage Properties54 was presented and 
discussed by the WHC Committee at its 31st session (Christchurch, 2007) and 
49 UNESCO, ‘Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate Management 
Responses’ (26 June 2006) WHC-06/30.COM/7.1.
50 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habi-
tat; adopted 2 February 1971, entered into force 21 December 1975, 996 UNTS 245.
51 Adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS 79.
52 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 30 COM 7.1 (23 August 2006) 
WHC06/30.COM/19, Paragraphs 6–8.
53 Ibid Paragraph 13.
54 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, ‘Policy Document on the Impacts of Climate 
Change on World Heritage Properties’ (Paris 2008) whc.unesco.org/uploads/ 
activities/documents/activity-393-2.pdf accessed 27 January 2014.
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subsequently approved by the 16th General Assembly of the States Parties in 
2007, which also encouraged UNESCO and the WHC Advisory Bodies to dis-
seminate and promote the application of the Policy Document, the Report and 
the Strategy, including to the general public.
At its 32nd session (Quebec City, 2008) the WHC Committee decided to adopt 
“criteria for assessing properties which are most threatened by climate change for 
inclusion on the List of World Heritage in Danger”.55 This led to the amendment 
of the Operational Guidelines.56 Now, Paragraph 179(b)(vi) of the Operational 
Guidelines establishes that a WHC site can be inscribed on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger when the Committee finds that the property is faced with a 
potential threat which could have deleterious effects on its inherent characteris-
tics, such as “threatening impacts of climatic, geological or other environmental 
factors”.57 New Paragraph 181 reads:
“(T)he threats and/or their detrimental impacts on the integrity of the property must be 
those which are amenable to correction by human action. In the case of cultural proper-
ties, both natural factors and man-made factors may be threatening, while in the case of 
natural properties, most threats will be man-made and only very rarely a natural factor 
(such as an epidemic disease) will threaten the integrity of the property. In some cases, 
the threats and/or their detrimental impacts on the integrity of the property may be 
corrected by administrative or legislative action, such as the cancelling of a major public 
works project or the improvement of legal status”.
The amendment of the Operational Guidelines is important in that it permits 
to emphasise that the legal, factual and political context in which the provisions 
of an international treaty are applied may have changed as compared to the cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time of its adoption. In the case of the WHC, which 
has been in existence for more than forty years, the correct implementation of 
its norms has not required the revision of its text.58 Rather, the WHC Committee 
has taken into account the evolving context of natural and Cultural Heritage and 
new developments in international law through the continuing revision of the 
Operational Guidelines.59 An example is provided by the addition of the category 
55 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 32 COM 7A.32 (31 March 2009) 
WHC08/32.COM/24Rev para 5.
56 UNESCO, ‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heri-
tage Convention’ (June 2013) WHC. 13/01 whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines accessed 
27 January 2014.
57 Paragraph 180(b)(v) lists the same potential danger for natural properties.
58 Article 37 WHC regulates the issue of the revision.
59 Francesco Francioni, ‘Thirty Years On: Is the World Heritage Convention Ready for 
the 21st Century?’ (2003) Italian Y Intl L 13, 28.
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cultural landscape to the heritage defined in Articles 1 and 2 WHC. Another 
 example is represented by the addition of a new criterion for listing natural sites 
to take into consideration the value of biodiversity following the adoption of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.60 Accordingly, the Operational Guidelines 
may represent, in accordance with Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT),61 a “subsequent agreement between the parties re-
garding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” (let-
ter a) or “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” (letter b).62
In light of the foregoing survey, it appears that the WHC Committee’s response 
to the impacts of climate change on WHC properties is quite disappointing. In 
effect, although it acknowledged that numerous sites are threatened by climate 
change,63 it opted for a soft approach motivated by the alleged primary role of the 
IPCC and of the UNFCCC in addressing the problem of climate change at the 
international and national level.64 Accordingly, beyond the monitoring of sites 
pursuant to Article 29 WHC, the Committee now has only two options to react 
to a threat to or possible destruction of WHC properties: the inscription on the 
List of World Heritage Sites in Danger or the deletion of the site in question when 
it loses its outstanding universal value.65 The listing may not only attract interna-
60 Amendment of the Operational Guidelines approved by the WHC Committee at its 
16th session (Santa Fe, 1992) (14 December 1992) WHC-92/CONF.002/12.
61 Adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331.
62 Gionata P Buzzini and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Article 11: List of World Heritage Sites in 
Danger and Deletion of a Property from the World Heritage List’, in Francesco Fran-
cioni (edited with the assistance of Federico Lenzerini), The 1972 World Heritage 
Convention. A Commentary (OUP 2008) 175, 189.
63 See Decision 29 COM 7B.a (n 43) Paragraph 5; and the survey in the Report (n 12) 
Paragraphs 39–46, which indicates that of “the 110 responses received from 83 States 
Parties, 72 per cent acknowledged that climate change had an impact on their natural 
and Cultural Heritage”, and that a “total of 125 World Heritage sites were mentioned 
specifically as threatened by Climate Change”.
64 The Strategy (n 49) states that the “UNFCCC is the UN instrument through which 
mitigation strategies at the global and States Parties level is being addressed” (Para-
graph 18).
65 As of July 2013, the WHC Committee has delisted two sites only: the Dresden Elbe 
Valley in 2009 (Decision 33COM 7A.26) and the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in 2007 
(Decision 31COM 7B.11). On the List of World Heritage Sites in Danger see Buzzini 
and Condorelli (n 62); on the Fund, see Federico Lenzerini, ‘Articles 15–16: World 
Heritage Fund’ in Francioni and Lenzerini (n 62) 269.
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tional assistance, but it also allows the Committee to assign financial resources 
from the Fund established under Article 15 WHC.66 Moreover, the listing and 
the threat of deletion represent powerful tools to discourage States Parties from 
jeopardising the outstanding universal value of their properties.67
However, although these options are very strong, in-danger listing and dele-
tion do not seem adequate to pursue the objectives set forth in Cultural Heritage 
treaties, id est the conservation and protection of the world’s heritage for the sake 
of its transmission to future generations. Stated differently, it appears that these 
measures cannot effectively prevent the deterioration or disappearance of sites 
of outstanding universal value.
Apart from the fact that the limited size of the Fund does not allow major 
or multiple investments regarding properties endangered by climate change, it 
is worth considering that the deterrent effect of the listing would diminish if it 
were more common. In other words, an increase in in-danger listings related to 
climate change threats by the WHC Committee would likely weaken the cred-
ibility of this measure.68
IV Climate Change-Related International Regime
The centrepiece of global efforts to combat climate change is the UNFCCC. It 
was signed in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment in Rio de Janeiro – together with the Convention to Combat Deser-
tification and the Convention on Biological Diversity – as global warming had 
become a priority on the international political agenda. The UNFCCC defines 
climate change as 
[…] a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that 
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural 
climate variability observed over comparable time periods.69
66 Paragraph 189 of the Operational Guidelines (n 56) provides that the “Committee 
shall allocate a specific, significant portion of the World Heritage Fund to financing 
of possible assistance to World Heritage properties inscribed on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger”.
67 Gruber (n 13) 9.
68 Gruber (n 13) 9. As of July 2013, 44 properties are inscribed on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger, whereas 1.007 are inscribed on the World Heritage List.
69 Article 1.
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Therefore, the Convention distinguishes between anthropogenic climate change 
and the variability of climatic conditions attributable to natural causes. The ulti-
mate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve
(S)tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system […] within a 
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner.70
The Convention also sets out some guiding principles. In particular, it refers to 
the precautionary principle – according to which the lack of scientific certainty 
should not be used as an excuse to postpone action when there is a threat of seri-
ous or irreversible damage – and to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility – which is based on the facts that developed and developing States 
contributed differently to global environmental problems and that some States 
have less ability to cope with environmental problems.71
According to Article 4(1) of the UNFCCC, States Parties are required to: 
(i) develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference 
of the Parties national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases; (ii) formulate, implement, publish 
and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes for 
mitigating climate change; (iii) promote and cooperate in the development and 
diffusion of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; (iv) develop strategies for adapt-
ing to the impacts of climate change; (v) promote the sustainable management of 
resources; (vi) enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs (such as forests); and (vii) take 
climate change into account in their relevant social, economic, and environmen-
tal policies and cooperating in scientific, technical, and educational matters, as 
well as public awareness. Moreover, the UNFCCC stipulates that industrialized 
countries should support climate change activities in developing countries by 
providing financial assistance and sharing technologies. The Convention’s ob-
jective is to help developing countries to limit GHG emissions in ways that do 
not hinder their economic development. The Conference of the Parties uses the 
70 Article 2.
71 Article 3 UNFCCC states that “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities […] the de-
veloped country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof ”.
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information provided through the national reports to assess and review the ef-
fective implementation of the UNFCCC and to evaluate the aggregated effect of 
the steps taken by States Parties.
The UNFCCC has achieved almost universal participation.72 However, it is a 
binding treaty with no binding obligations. One reason is that the UNFCCC was 
concluded in a moment where there existed uncertainties on the phenomena of 
global warming and climate change. Another reason is that various States – most 
notably the United States – refused to accept legally binding reduction targets 
for GHG emissions. Consequently, the UNFCCC merely calls on the (industrial-
ized) States Parties to ‘aim’ to return their GHG emissions back to 1990 levels 
without setting precise targets.73 In sum, developed States agreed to voluntary 
caps on emission of man-made GHG.74
However, by 1995, the GHG emissions of most developed States were already 
well above 1990 levels. The realization that more substantive measures were ne-
cessary to confront global warming and the other dangerous effects of climate 
change led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC at the Third 
Conference of the Parties in 1997. Essentially, the Protocol was introduced to 
expand the scope of the UNFCCC in order to achieve an ambitious reduction – 
rather than stabilization – of GHG emissions.75
The Kyoto Protocol sets up a regulatory regime providing concrete and spe-
cific binding obligations: it called 37 industrialized States and the European Un-
ion to “reduc(e) their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”.76 In addition, the Protocol 
required States Parties to begin negotiating commitments for subsequent periods 
by 2005.77 In line with the UNFCCC and in accordance with the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities, developing countries were not required to 
72 As of July 2013, it has been ratified by 194 States and 1 regional economic integration 
organization, the European Union.
73 Article 4(2)(b).
74 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
A Commentary’ (1993) Yale J Intl L 451.
75 See UNFCCC, ‘Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto 
 Protocol’ unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php accessed 
27 Ja nuary 2014.
76 Article 3(1).
77 Article 3(9). The second commitment period (2013–2020) was decided on 8 De-
cember 2012, with the adoption of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. 
See UNFCCC, ‘Doha Amendment’ unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/
items/7362.php accessed 27 January 2014.
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make any commitment because it was considered that the largest responsibility 
for the levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere laid with industrialized coun-
tries. Moreover, similarly to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol contains rules pro-
viding for concessions to wavering States, which substantially dilute the Parties’ 
commitments. States’ actual emissions have to be monitored. Therefore, States 
are required to submit reports about annual emission inventories.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, States must meet their reduction targets for GHG 
emissions primarily through national measures. In addition to these means, the 
Protocol introduced three market-based mechanisms: (1) Joint Fulfilment of 
Commitments and Implementation (Joint Implementation); (2) the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM); (3) Emissions Trading.78
The mechanism of Joint Implementation79 allows any Party included in An-
nex I (States with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the 
Kyoto Protocol) to transfer to, or acquire from, any other Annex I Party Emis-
sion Reduction Units (ERUs) resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthro 
pogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of 
GHG in any sector of the economy. Therefore, Joint Implementation projects 
provide a reduction in emissions by sources or an enhancement of removals by 
sinks that is additional to what would otherwise have occurred. One of the pur-
poses of Joint Implementation projects is to involve private-sector money in the 
transfer of technology and know-how.
The CDM80 allows any Party included in Annex I (States with an emission 
reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol) to implement an 
emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn sale-
able Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits that can be counted towards 
meeting Kyoto targets. The projects must qualify through a rigorous and public 
registration process. Approval is given by the Designated National Authorities.
Emissions trading81 is a mechanism whereby any Party included in Annex I 
(States with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol) may trade their emission allowances with other States Parties. These emis-
sions allowances correspond to emission units permitted but not used by States. 
78 See UNFCCC, ‘The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol’ unfccc.int/kyoto_ protocol/
mechanisms/items/1673.php accessed 27 January 2014. For an analysis of these mech-
anisms see Rafael Leal-Arcas, Climate Change and International Trade (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2013) 227 ff.
79 Article 6 Kyoto Protocol.
80 Article 12 Kyoto Protocol.
81 Article 17 Kyoto Protocol.
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Thus, the emissions trading mechanism created a new commodity. However, since 
carbon dioxide is the principal GHG, people speak of carbon trading rather than 
emission reductions. Carbon is now traded like any other commodity. Apart from 
actual emissions units, other units can be traded under the Kyoto Protocol’s emis-
sions trading scheme: ‘removal units’ on the basis of land use, land-use change and 
forestry activities such as reforestation; ‘emission reduction units’ generated by a 
joint implementation project; certified emission reductions generated from a clean 
development mechanism project activity. Transfers and acquisitions of these units 
are tracked and recorded through the registry systems under the Kyoto Protocol.
These market-based mechanisms are meant to: (i) enable industrialized States 
Parties to meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way; (ii) to stimulate 
technology transfer and ‘green’ investments; (iii) encourage the private sector 
and developing countries to contribute to emission reduction efforts.
All in all, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol require State action. In this 
respect it is necessary to distinguish between adaptation and mitigation. Adapta-
tion refers to “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response 
to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. It refers to 
changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential damages 
or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change”.82 Therefore, it 
focuses on reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
Solutions to adapt to the effects of climate change take many shapes and forms 
depending on the context and the specific impacts of climate change. For instance, 
it can range from building flood defences, setting up early warning systems for 
cyclones and switching to crops that fare better under drought conditions to rede-
signing communication systems, business operations and government policies.83 
On the other hand, mitigation corresponds to any “anthropogenic intervention 
to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”.84 Therefore, it 
refers to actions that lead to reducing the emissions of GHGs.85
82 IPCC, ‘Third Assessment Report, Synthesis Report, Working Group II: Impacts, 
Adap tation, and Vulnerability (Chapter 18.2)’ (2001) www.grida.no/publications/
other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/644.htm accessed 27 July 2013.
83 See UNFCCC, ‘Focus: Adaptation’ unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/items/6999.php 
accessed 27 January 2014.
84 IPCC, ‘Third Assessment Report, Synthesis Report, Working Group III: Mitigation 
(Appendix II: Glossary)’ (2001) www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/ 
climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/466.htm accessed 27 July 2013.
85 See UNFCCC, ‘Focus: Mitigation’ unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7169.php accessed 
27 January 2014.
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V  What Relationship between Cultural Heritage  
and Climate Change?
Having explored the legal regimes for the protection of Cultural Heritage and the 
global climate, it is now necessary to examine the interface between these areas 
of international law. The main goal of this analysis is to discuss whether these 
legal systems should become mutually supportive at both the legal and policy 
levels.
However, the analysis that follows will focus only on the WHC. This is for 
three main reasons: the issue of climate change has been examined and internal-
ized by the WHC Committee; the direct, social and cultural effects on several 
WHC sites have been vastly documented; it is critical to the survival of many 
items of Cultural Heritage that the WHC works closely with the climate change 
regime. At this juncture, it must also be emphasized that this convention ap-
plies to heritage as defined in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of States 
Parties, whether or not this heritage has been inscribed on the WHC List under 
Article 11.86
1. The Story So Far
The foregoing examination reveals that climate change law neither addresses 
the impacts of climate change on Cultural Heritage nor contains references to 
UNESCO treaties. For instance, there is no Kyoto Protocol’s CDM projects di-
rectly involving Cultural Heritage.87 One could find various explications to this 
lacuna. First, it can be argued that in 1992, when the UNFCCC was concluded, 
the scientific community had not yet realized what consequences could arise 
from the changing climate. Second, it can be submitted that the protection of 
Cultural Heritage is not reflected in climate change instruments because it has 
been too difficult for environmental negotiators to include this issue into the 
already thorny climate change negotiations. Third, it can be argued that in the 
face of catastrophic predictions regarding climate change, the less appalling con-
sequences regarding individual sites have been overlooked.
By way of contrast, although the WHC does not mention climate change 
specifically, the WHC Committee has underlined the key role of the IPCC, the 
86 Guido Carducci, ‘Articles 4–7: National and International Protection of the Cultural 
and Natural Heritage’ in Francioni and Lenzerini (n 62) 103, 113.
87 See UNFCCC, ‘Project Search’ cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html accessed 
27 January 2014.
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UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in various documents. The Report affirms that 
“mitigation at the global and States Parties level is the mandate of the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol”88 and that the WHC Committee “could collaborate with 
the UNFCCC secretariat on Climate Change issues by presenting information 
at the Conference of the Parties (COP) and subsidiary bodies meetings […]”.89 
Moreover, the Strategy states that the “UNFCCC is the UN instrument through 
which mitigation strategies at the global and States Parties level is being ad-
dressed” and that the “World Heritage community could participate in climate 
change mitigation” by providing “information to IPCC and UNFCCC on the 
impacts of climate change” on WHC sites and by assisting them in tailoring miti-
gation strategies and in encouraging site-based reduction of GHG emissions.90 
The Policy Document calls for increased cooperation between WHC bodies and 
other international conventions and organizations working on climate change. 
For instance, it states that the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies 
“will seek to take advantage of synergies to better coordinate and enhance ef-
fective implementation” of the WHC “by capitalizing upon each organization’s 
strengths, and aiming to avoid overlap and duplication with, and respect the 
individual mandates of, other international organizations and mechanisms”; 
and that the “World Heritage Centre will strengthen its relationship with the 
UNFCCC and IPCC Secretariats, which are the key international organizations 
working on climate change”.91 Moreover, the Policy Document establishes that 
climate change should be considered in the application of the WHC and the Op-
erational Guidelines, id est in the preparation of nominations, in the drafting and 
implementation of the management plans by States Parties, in the monitoring by 
the WHC Committee and in the reporting by States Parties.92 Finally, the Opera-
tional Guidelines call for “appropriate co-ordination and information-sharing 
between the World Heritage Convention and other Conventions, programmes 
and international organizations related to the conservation of Cultural and nat-
ural heritage”, including the UNFCCC.93
In sum, it appears that Cultural Heritage law and climate change regulation 
are not mutually supportive. To use a metaphor, it is as if, within the UN family, 
88 UNESCO, ‘Report’ (n 12) Paragraph 6; see also Paragraphs 7, 77, 121, 124–125.
89 Ibid Paragraph 61.
90 UNESCO, ‘Strategy’ (n 49) Paragraphs 17–19.
91 UNESCO, ‘Policy Document’ (n 54) 4.
92 Ibid 6–8.
93 UNESCO, ‘Operational Guidelines’ (n 56) Paragraphs 42, 44.
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one of the sisters is so absorbed in her own pursuits to the point of ignoring one 
of her sisters and their commonalities.
2. Synergies between Treaty Regimes
Various questions arise as a result of the existing state of affairs: does it make 
sense to argue for the establishment of reciprocal linkages between Cultural 
Heri tage and climate change law? Would a more coordinated international  legal 
response permit to enhance the protection of these two fundamental global 
 public goods? What are the most reasonable solutions to build synergies between 
these two areas of international law?
The main reason in favour of the establishment of synergies between Cultural 
Heritage and climate change law is that this could bring about various advan-
tages. This is due to the fact that State obligations under these regimes appear to 
be complementary:94 while the main goals of climate change regulation are about 
environmental protection, sustainable development and the preservation of eco-
systems for present and future generations, the main objective of the Cultural 
Heritage regime is the preservation of all tangible and intangible manifestations 
of culture having artistic, historical and symbolic values, and their transmission 
to future generations.95 Today, cultural assets can be seen as part of the environ-
ment where they have been created and as an essential component of the identity 
and history of the people who created them or for whom they were created. This 
role of Cultural Heritage as part of public space opens the way to a holistic ap-
proach to heritage, id est an approach that brings together Cultural and Natural 
Heritage.96
The Policy Document cites some key advantages. First, it emphasises that 
WHC properties could be used “as a means to raise awareness about the impacts 
of climate change upon World Heritage to act as a catalyst in the international 
94 Humphreys (n 5) 11.
95 On this commonality see Article 1 of the 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, which famously states that “[…] cultural diversity is as necessary for hu-
mankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of hu-
manity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future 
generations”. Resolution adopted on the report of Commission IV at the 20th plenary 
meeting (2 November 2001) Records of the General Conference 31st Session Paris, 
15 October to 3 November 2001 Volume 1 Resolutions.
96 Francesco Francioni, ‘Public and Private in the International Protection of Global 
Cultural Goods’ (2012) 23 Eur J Intl L 719, 721.
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debate and obtain support for policies to mitigate climate change”.97 In other 
words, the iconic character of WHC sites can be seen as an asset for raising 
public concern and building up support to take preventive and precautionary 
measures in the context of climate change. The idea is that the loss of WHC 
sites is likely to be more tangible and immediate to people than meteorology 
and physical science. Second, there is the comparative advantage of WHC sites, 
id est the fact that they “can serve as laboratories where monitoring, mitigation 
and adaptation processes can be applied, tested and improved”. The World Heri-
tage Centre can thus promote, in cooperation with the States Parties, “the use 
of WHC properties in the activities of other conventions, international bodies 
and programmes working on climate change” because “(a)ctions taken at these 
iconic properties […] can influence the adoption of good management practices 
elsewhere”.98
To mobilise the policy value and the legal force of Cultural Heritage in the 
development of synergies with the climate change regime, the injection of Cul-
tural Heritage concerns into climate change negotiations is crucial. One way to 
do so is through the adoption of a more proactive approach on the part of the 
WHC Committee. This could exercise pressure on the States and international 
organizations claiming leadership in matter of climate change demanding that 
the WHC be explicitly taken into consideration in the definition of mitigation 
strategies. Such an approach would be in line with the findings of the increased 
cooperation between WHC bodies and the international organizations working 
on climate change contained in the Policy Document99 and with Article 13(7) 
WHC, which provides that the WHC Committee “shall cooperate with interna-
tional and national governmental and non-governmental organizations having 
objectives similar to those of this Convention”.
3. A Critical Appraisal
Although the establishment of synergies and linkages between the two areas of 
law under examination seems both desirable and necessary, this proactive hy-
pothesis needs be considered in light of the following issues: (a) the functioning 
of the climate change regime; and (b) the nature and extent of States’ obligations 
under the WHC.
97 UNESCO, ‘Policy Document’ (n 54) 9.
98 Ibid 4.
99 See n 91.
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a) The Functioning of the Climate Change Regime
It is a fact that both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (and the post-Kyoto 
regime) aim at combating anthropogenic global warming through cost-effective 
policies and measures. In this respect, Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC establishes 
that States Parties
(S)hould take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest pos-
sible cost.
This approach has been heavily criticized. In particular, it has been maintained 
that the reductions agreed upon with the Kyoto Protocol (and the post-Kyoto 
regime) are inadequate and too modest to stabilize concentration of GHG emis-
sions and to reverse current global warming and climate change trends. It has 
also been held that the Kyoto Protocol “can be considered as only a first and rela-
tively small step towards stabilizing the climate”.100 The main problem is that the 
Protocol required only a small percentage of GHG emissions reduction – 5 per 
cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 – and only from industrialized 
States. This is an extremely modest requirement that, even if it were carefully 
fulfilled, could not curb the problem.101 Indeed, to avoid temperature increases 
beyond 2°C above preindustrial temperatures, States should commit to greater 
reductions in GHG emissions than those called for by the Kyoto Protocol.102
The market-based mechanisms introduced by the Kyoto Protocol – Joint 
Implementation, CDM, Emissions Trading – have also attracted several criti-
cisms. On the one hand, it has been argued that the solution to climate change 
should not lie in the dogma of market freedom and price mechanism. Many 
critics maintain that this approach is absurd because it encourages profit from 
pollution and subjects the development of green technologies to the approval of 
the market. These market-based mechanisms tend to reduce the natural world 
to a purely economic resource.103 On the other hand, the mechanisms intro-
100 Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (OUP 
2007) 91.
101 Leal-Arcas (n 78) 245.
102 Thorson (n 38) 265.
103 Adelman Sam, ‘Rethinking Human Rights: The Impact of Climate Change on the 
Dominant Discourse’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed) (n 1) 159, 164.
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duced by the Kyoto Protocol obviate the fact that human life emerged from, 
and is dependent upon, the Earth’s natural resource base and that human be-
ings have a unique capacity to alter the environment.104 In addition, by relying 
on market-based mechanisms, States and international organizations neglect 
the bitter lesson of the contemporary financial crisis and banking scandals that 
the market can no longer be trusted to self-regulate. In connection with this, it 
should be mentioned that chemical, wind, gas and hydro companies routinely 
abuse these systems by claiming emission reduction credits for projects that 
should not qualify.105
Accordingly, it appears that the abovementioned WHC Committee’s defer-
ence to the UNFCCC system is misplaced.
From a political perspective, while the UNFCCC is optimally positioned to 
address the effects of climate change at the national and international  levels, it 
has not fulfilled its promise to date. For this reason, the UNFCCC – and by 
extension the Kyoto Protocol – has been characterized as a quintessentially 
failed regime106 because it results from consensus-driven and welfare-based solu-
tions.107 As a result, the climate change regime falls short of setting the necessary 
reductions in GHG emissions. Therefore, there is a real threat that much of the 
world’s Cultural and Natural Heritage will be lost if the WHC Committee waits 
for the UNFCCC to ‘solve’ the climate change problem.
From a legal perspective, deference to the UNFCCC by the WHC Commit-
tee seems grounded on the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, id est the 
principle that more detailed and specific norms ought to prevail against more 
general rules. In other words, the WHC Committee may have held the position 
that, as the UNFCCC was established to mitigate anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions, States should use this regime also to address the problem of the impacts 
of climate change on Cultural Heritage.108 However, the lex specialis principle is 
only relevant when legal norms clash. But in the case of the relationship be-
tween the UNFCCC and the WHC, it does not seem applicable because there is 
no language in the former treaty that evinces the intent to displace potentially 
104 Dinah Shelton, ‘Equitable Utilization of the Atmosphere: A Rights-Based Approach 
to Climate Change?’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed) (n 1) 91, 115.
105 John Vidal, ‘Billions Wasted on UN Climate Programme’ Guardian (London, 
26 May 2008).
106 Burns (n 47) 160.
107 Humphreys (n 5).
108 Burns (n 47) 158.
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parallel mandates under other regimes to address climate change.109 It can be 
presumed that the parties would have included such language if this was their 
intent. Moreover, it has been rightly pointed out that the lex specialis is the WHC 
because it contains the more detailed and specific norms in matters of protection 
of cultural assets in contrast to the more generalized mandate of the UNFCCC to 
protect the climate system.110
b) The Nature and Extent of States’ Obligations under the WHC
The WHC defines the obligations of States Parties mainly in Articles 4, 5 and 6. 
Article 4 states:
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identifica-
tion, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of 
(cultural heritage sites) situated on its territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do 
all it can to this end, to the utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any 
international assistance and co-operation […] which it may be able to obtain.
Thus States Parties accept the commitment to take all necessary actions to pre-
serve any item of Cultural or Natural Heritage situated on their territory because 
their “deterioration or disappearance […] constitutes a harmful impoverishment 
of the heritage of all the nations of the world”.111 Nevertheless, the WHC leaves 
it mostly to the States Parties to decide how to meet their obligations. Article 5 
reads:
To ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation 
and presentation of the cultural and natural heritage situated on its territory, each State 
Party […] shall endeavor, in so far as possible, and as appropriate for each country: 
(a) to adopt a general policy which aims to give the cultural and natural heritage a func-
tion in the life of the community and to integrate the protection of that heritage into 
comprehensive planning programmes; (b) to set up within its territories, where such 
services do not exist, one or more services for the protection, conservation and pres-
entation of the cultural and natural heritage with an appropriate staff and possessing 
the means to discharge their functions; (c) to develop scientific and technical studies 
109 The principle lex posterior derogat legi priori, which is codified in Article 30 VCLT 
and which provides that where two treaties are concluded relating to the same sub-
ject matter the later treaty prevails, is inapplicable as between the WHC and the 
UNFCCC because they do not relate to the same subject matter. Catherine Redg-
well, ‘The World Heritage Convention and other Conventions Relating to the Pro-
tection of the Natural Heritage’ in Francioni and Lenzerini (n 62) 377, 395.
110 Burns (n 47) 159–160.
111 WHC, preamble, second recital.
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and research and to work out such operating methods as will make the State capable 
of counteracting the dangers that threaten its cultural or natural heritage; (d) to take 
the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures neces-
sary for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of 
this heritage; and (e) to foster the establishment or development of national or regional 
centres for training in the protection, conservation and presentation of the cultural and 
natural heritage and to encourage scientific research in this field.
Articles 4 and 5 are broad, potentially leaving much room for State Party dis-
cretion as to the exact nature of the respective responsibilities. The language 
used – “to the utmost of its own resources”, “where appropriate”, “endeavor”, “in 
so far as possible” – indicates that these articles do not impose legally binding 
obligations.112
Article 6 is less discretionary. It provides that “it is the duty of the interna-
tional community as a whole to co-operate” for the protection of WHC sites113 
and that the “States Parties undertake […] to give their help in the identification, 
protection, conservation and presentation of the Cultural and Natural Heritage 
[…] if the States on whose territory it is situated so request”.114 Finally, it estab-
lishes that each “State Party […] undertakes not to take any deliberate measures 
which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage […] 
situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Convention”.115 The scope 
of Article 6(3) is both broad and narrow: it is narrow because only deliberate 
measures are covered; it is broad because it concerns any measure which may 
directly or indirectly damage Cultural Heritage.
All in all, Articles 4, 5 and 6 comprise the responsibility to cooperate to pro-
tect Cultural Heritage sites and to ensure that actions taken within a national 
territory do not cause damage or deterioration of items of Cultural Heritage situ-
ated in any other national territory.116 Moreover, these provisions can be seen as 
the basis for States to address the causes and the potential and identified effects 
of climate change on WHC sites. Therefore, they certainly comprise the obliga-
tion to adopt site-specific mitigation and adaptation measures.117 Furthermore, it 




116 Thorson (n 38) 259.
117 See UNESCO, ‘Report’ Paragraphs 7, 77, 124–125; UNESCO, ‘Strategy’ Paragraphs 
17–19; UNESCO, ‘Policy Document’ 4, 9. See also Thorson (n 38) 269.
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can be argued that these norms oblige WHC States Parties to support the goals 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.118
In the light of current climate change trends, however, the crucial question is 
whether Articles 4, 5 and 6 also entail an obligation for the States Parties to the 
WHC to make GHG emission reductions that go beyond the reductions called 
for by the Kyoto Protocol (and the post-Kyoto regime). Various reasons can be 
found in support of a positive answer to this question.
The first is that WHC obligations are independent of the obligations under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.119 Second, the WHC and the UNFCCC 
are not mutually exclusive. As said above, there is no language in the text of 
the UNFCCC that evinces the intent of the States Parties to exclude other legal 
regimes from addressing climate change when this is deemed necessary to effec-
tuate the objectives of those regimes.120 The third reason relates to the principle 
of no harm (or principle of prevention). This entails the duty of a State not to 
allow or tolerate any activity within its jurisdiction that may cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond its national jurisdiction, unless 
the transboundary environmental impacts of this activity prove to be insignifi-
cant.121 This principle, which belongs to customary law, was first enunciated in 
the Trail Smelter case122 and was later incorporated in the 1972 Stockholm Dec-
laration on the Human Environment,123 the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development124 and in the preamble of the UNFCCC. This principle 
was also taken up by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion 
on Nuclear Weapons125 and in the judgments Gabčikovo-Nagymaros
126
 and Corfu 
Channel.127 Fourth, it can be argued that Articles 4, 5 and 6 entail an obligation to 
make GHG emission reductions beyond the limits established under the Kyoto 
Protocol (and the post-Kyoto regime) because, as demonstrated above, these re-
118 Gruber (n 13) 6.
119 Thorson (n 38) 267.
120 Burns (n 47) 159–160.
121 Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker, ‘The Evolution of the Global Environ-
mental System: Trends and Prospects’ (2013) 8/2013 Transworld Working Paper 
www.transworld-fp7.eu/?p=985 accessed 26 July 2013, 7.




125 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Rep 226. 
126 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep 1.
127 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania) (Merits) (1949) ICJ Rep 4.
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ductions are inadequate. Additionally, the adoption of general GHG emissions 
reduction is necessary because site-specific mitigation and adaptation measures 
are inherently insufficient. Although the outstanding and fragile character of 
WHC properties justifies the adoption of site-level climate change strategies, 
any climate change intervention occurring within the boundaries of a WHC site 
cannot cope with the slow but devastating consequences of climate change on 
that site because GHG emissions normally occur outside WHC sites. Even if a 
State would impose a total ban on GHG emissions within the boundaries of a 
WHC site, this would continue to be threatened. Thus, site specific mitigation 
cannot realistically ameliorate the climate change threats to a WHC site in any 
meaningful way.128 Moreover, there is a ‘timescale mismatch’ between mitigation 
measures and results. Even if every State were to implement drastic measures 
to reduce GHG emissions, it will be many decades before there are palpable ef-
fects because of the inertia of the climatic system.129 In this respect, the strategy 
acknowledges that “(t)he benefit of mitigation at World Heritage sites is […] 
likely to be negligible on a quantitative basis”.130 In addition, it can be argued that 
WHC States Parties are under an obligation to make general GHG emission re-
ductions because of the principle pacta sunt servanda. According to this, “(e)very 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith”.131 Accordingly, States Parties are bound to implement the WHC 
through the adoption of measures effectively capable of realizing the purpose of 
this Convention.
However, the affirmation that the WHC contains a legally binding obliga-
tion for the States Parties to adopt GHG emission limits that are more compel-
ling than those called for by the Kyoto Protocol is not uncontroversial. In effect, 
the adoption of this proactive interpretation unveils at least two problematic 
aspects.132
The first relates to the identification of the means to define the GHG emis-
sions limits for States Parties to the WHC. Since the amendment of the text of 
the WHC is unlikely, one can consider two options: the adoption of an additional 
128 Thorson (n 38) 270.
129 Burns (n 47) 156–157.
130 UNESCO, ‘Strategy’ (n 49) Paragraph 124.
131 Article 26 VCLT.
132 See Ottavio Quirico, ‘Key Issues in the Relationship between the World Heritage 
Convention and Climate Change Regulation’, in Silvia Borelli and Federico Lenzer-
ini (eds), Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural Diversity. New Developments 
in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 391, 406.
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protocol or a further amendment of the Operational Guidelines. Apart from 
GHG emission limits, these new legal instruments should also provide measures 
of implementation, including sanctions in case of violations of mitigation meas-
ures. The second pertains to the clausula rebus sic stantibus codified in Article 62 
VCLT. This provision makes it possible for a State to cite a “fundamental change 
of circumstances” as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending 
the operation of a treaty. Termination or withdrawal are possible only if (a) the 
circumstances that have changed were essential to the consenting of the parties 
to their legal obligations;133 (b) the effect of the change is to radically transform 
the extent of the obligation in question;134 (c) the obligation is unrelated to a 
boundary matter;135 (d) the fundamental change is not caused by the default-
ing State’s previous breach.136 Article 62 VCLT is relevant for the purposes of 
the present study because climate change was not perceived as a global threat 
when the WHC was adopted. In effect, the Convention does not cover the phe-
nomenon of climate change. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that if the 
WHC were interpreted to impose an obligation to implement general GHG cuts, 
the States that currently oppose GHG emissions reduction targets would likely 
invoke Article 62 VCLT to terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation 
of the WHC on the grounds that the absence of requirements of GHG emission 
reduction in the WHC constitutes an essential basis of consent to be bound by 
it. In other words, Article 62 would authorize the States Parties to the WHC to 
terminate, withdraw from or suspend the operation of this treaty because its im-
plementation would differ from the original commitment. Needless to say, if the 
main GHG emitting States would decide to abandon the WHC in order to flout 
GHG, the mission of the WHC would be inevitably undermined.137
VI Conclusion
Climate change is a global problem that transcends territorial boundaries. Its 
impacts are now being felt and others cannot be halted due to the extent of his-
torical and current emissions and the time lag between emissions and their ef-
fects on the climate. Thus far, the response of the international community has 
been disheartening, with UN negotiations on the reduction of GHG emissions 
133 Article 62(1)(a) VCLT.
134 Article 62(1)(b) VCLT.
135 Article 62(2)(a) VCLT.
136 Article 62(2)(b) VCLT.
137 Burns (n 47) 161.
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proceeding at glacial pace due to the stand-off between major economic pow-
ers.138 Likewise, UNESCO bodies have failed to provide decisive responses. 
Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated that there is no constructive inter-
action between Cultural Heritage and climate change law. The international 
treaties that address the degradation of global climate conditions do not take 
account of the problem of the impacts of climate change on Cultural Heritage.
The main argument advanced here is that the evolution of the current state of 
affairs towards recognition of Cultural Heritage concerns by climate change law 
is both desirable and necessary. This complementarity would make it possible to 
emphasise that climate change is about losing the legacy – sites, monuments and 
social structures – handed over to us by our forbearers as a result of the dam-
age that peoples are doing to nature. More importantly, as demonstrated by the 
studies endorsed by the WHC Committee, the building of a mutually supportive 
relationship between these areas of law would make it possible to raise public 
concern, build up support for preventive and precautionary measures and de-
velop best practices and pilot projects in vulnerability assessments, monitoring, 
mitigation and adaptation processes.
However, although it would be germane that the legal instruments dealing 
with climate change were modified – so as to recognise that this phenomenon 
impacts Cultural Heritage – efforts should be first and foremost directed at 
addressing the shortcomings of the existing climate change regime. The above 
analysis indicates that otherwise any revision in the sense advocated above 
would be useless.
Needless to say, a meaningful reform of climate change law can be achieved 
only if States – especially industrialized and developing countries – accept to 
revise their agenda of unsustainable development. In effect, thus far national 
governments have proven to be unwilling to grasp the scale and urgency of the 
problem.139 States have been more concerned with pursuing economic, political 
138 Pilita Clark, ‘Climate: Progress at Glacial Pace in UN Talks on Emissions’ Financial 
Times (22 January 2013).
139 Of course, important differences persist among States. Certain States are deter-
mined to comply with climate change targets for the sake of the protection of global 
climate for present and future generations. The EU and its Member States have 
unilaterally decided to go beyond their emission reduction targets included in the 
Kyoto Protocol. With Decision No. 406/2009/EC of 23 April 2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, the EU has set a target of cutting GHG emissions by 
20 % in 2020 from 1990 levels. Other States do not accept binding commitments, 
as these would severely harm the national economy and their freedom to pursue 
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or military interests to prioritize the respect and the protection of global public 
goods. It is the continuing prevalence of State-centred perspectives that has hin-
dered the development of legal obligations codifying the commitment of every 
State to engage in the promotion and protection of the global environment.140
In sum, today climate change can be seen as a potentially unique oppor-
tuni ty to develop more rational and egalitarian international governance struc-
tures and normative reforms not at variance with the principle of ‘sustainable 
development’. As well known, the Brundtland Commission defined it as the 
“(d)evelopment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.141 This principle empha-
sises that environmental protection is in everyone’s interest and calls for the 
development of a global regulatory regime aiming at: (i) limiting or recasting 
the principle of State sovereignty; States should take account of the negative 
duty not to harm internationally recognized global public goods and should 
thus stop regarding polluting the atmosphere as a sovereign prerogative; State 
sovereignty should become a vehicle (not a barrier) for ensuring the protection 
and conservation of global public goods; humanity faces a threat that cannot be 
addressed if States do not accept to subordinate perceived national interests to 
supranational interests;142 (ii) setting coherent and enforceable adaptation poli-
cies and mitigation targets; (iii) financing the development of new technologies 
that substitute fuels and preserve forests; (iv) redesigning international markets 
and trade; and (v) providing information about the impacts of climate change 
to the public at large.
development policies. The United States have been very reluctant to make any bind-
ing commitments at the multilateral level without any agreement on efforts to be 
made by newly industrialized and highly polluting states such as China and other 
developing countries (Francioni and Bakker (n 121) 11–15). In the US, the public 
debate has been heavily conditioned by the efforts of the oil and gas industry to de-
bunk evidence of the causal link between burning of fossil fuels and climate change 
(Oriana Zill de Granados and AC Thompson, ‘The Manipulation of Science’ PBS 
(24 April 2007)).
140 Francesco Francioni, ‘Realism, Utopia and the Future of International Law’, in An-
tonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law (OUP 2012) 
442, 454– 456.
141 World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future’ 
(1987) Doc. A/42/427/Annex.
142 Adelman (n 103) 167.
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Because climate change affects – and will continue to affect – the ecological 
systems that sustain life, not only the economic development of States, the op-
portunity to build international consensus around new international governance 
structures and normative reforms must be grasped now. Various recent alarming 
reports demonstrate that procrastination is not an option.143 Sherwood Rowland, 
Nobel Prize laureate for his research on the effects of chlorofluorocarbon gases 
on the ozone layer, asked “(w)hat is the use of having developed a science well 
enough to make predictions if all we are willing to do is stand around and wait 
for them to come true”?144
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World Cultural Heritage Sites and Climate 
Change: Management Issues
Since 20051 climate change has been on the World Heritage Committee’s agenda 
as one of the greatest dangers to World Heritage sites. The committee responded 
to this emerging threat at its 29th session in 2006 by launching an initiative to 
assess the impacts of climate change on World Heritage.2 Increased global tem-
perature has been identified as just one of the consequences of the impacts of 
human activities on the climate equilibrium of the planet, with modifications of 
precipitation patterns, droughts, storminess, ocean temperature and acidifica-
tion, sea level rise, etc. Aside from physical threats on natural and cultural sites 
of outstanding universal value, climate change will impact intangible heritage. 
Strategies and appropriate management responses are requested, especially for 
Cultural Heritage where the level of awareness and research is not as high as it is 
for Natural Heritage.
Also, European and German cultural sites are affected by climate change 
even though it is no not always clear, without ambiguity. For instance, the recent 
floods sweeping across Central and Eastern Europe, in June 2013, are indirectly 
tracked back to climate change and directly to other man made interventions 
such as canalization of rivers and damage of riparian zones. Often it is a combi-
nation of causes. Water related hazards account for 90 per cent of all disasters, 
and their frequency and intensity are rising. The floods affecting Eastern and 
Central European sites illustrate that cultural, and especially urban, heritage is 
particularly at risk and needs to be better protected against such events, espe-
cially considering its crucial role for the economy of local communities and their 
overall well-being. More effective coordination policies for heritage conserva-
tion and flood risk prevention at the national and local levels require the full 
∗ Federal Foreign Office Germany (Auswärtiges Amt), department of multilateral cul-
tural and media policy; member of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee.
1 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 29 COM 7B.a (9 September 2005) 
WHC-05/29.COM/22.
2 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decision 30 COM 7.1 (23 August 2006) 
WHC06/30.COM/19.
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integration of heritage concerns into risk strategies and programs, before any 
hazards occur.
Management plans for World Heritage sites are key-tools in the effective stew-
ardship of World Heritage sites under threat from climate change. As a regularly 
updated working document, such a plan should describe actions and include 
measures in response to climate change, id est education and traditional skills, 
monitoring and maintenance, research to support national/regional decision-
making planning for emergency preparedness, re-evaluation of management 
priorities and training on the various problems. Moreover, risk and vulnerability 
maps of the site, which overlay flood data and heritage site locations, so that an 
overview of the risks can be obtained and detailed adaption strategies developed, 
are important.
By now, nearly every management plan for a German World Heritage site 
identifies threats and describes measures for preventive protection. Flood de-
fence and action plans have been developed for most of the German sites in-
scribed on the World Heritage List and on the tentative list. They describe the 
area, indicate the fold areas, quantify possible damage and suggest general and 
local measures.
Floodplains based on 100to 500-year-experiences and empirical data are im-
portant for risk preparedness. Traditional knowledge and long-time-experience 
illustrate that unforeseeable natural disasters are not a new natural phenome-
non, they occur from time to time. For generations, one of the most effective 
measures to protect a building against floods was the careful examination of the 
building’s foundation and to take care for sufficient flood zones. The floodplain 
(Figure 1) for the Cultural Heritage site Carolingian Westwork and Civitas Corvey 
documents that the Benedictine monkhood were fully aware of such a hazard; in 
822 Corvey abbey was founded exactly at the point in a curve of the River Weser 
which, for over 1200 years, has never been affected by floods. A 100-year water 
level fluctuation affects only select parts of the open spaces within the monastery 
grounds, surrounded by walls, in the area of the physical structure of Corvey.
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Figure 1:  Map of Floodplains for the Cultural Heritage site Carolingian Westwork and 
Civitas Corvey (Town of Höxter)
In order to avoid negative impacts of flooding and to minimize damages, alarm 
and operation plans, content attendance and resource availability as well as suita-
ble preventive measures like raising the level of dikes and mobile flood-walls are 
necessary. In the World Heritage city Old Town of Regensburg and Stadtamhof 
for example, an interdisciplinary competition was held in 2003 for technical and 
design solutions for flood protection in the municipal area. The result focused 
primarily on stationary and mobile solutions as well as different combinations 
of these. In and around the area of the less effected Old Town river-bank, man-
made mobile metal elements (Figure 2) are planned. In other areas, both mobile 
barrier sections, as well as stretches with combinations of stationary plinth walls 
and mobile barrier systems, are planned. In realizing the flooding protection 
system, special attention had to be paid to ensure that these stationary elements 
would not degrade the visual qualities.
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Figure 2: Mobile Flood-Walls in the Old Town of Regensburg and Stadtamhof
Flood protection systems have to be compatible with the integrity of World Heri-
tage sites. The buffer zone of the nominated site Speicherstadt and Kontorhaus 
district with Chilehaus (Hamburg) is a good example of the reconciling of flood 
and heritage protection requirements. Existing flood defenses along the Cus-
toms Canal are designed and integrated as viewpoints into the canal structure 
(Figure 3).
Figure 3:  Existing flood defences along the Customs Canal and their utilisation as viewing 
points
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Cases like these demonstrate that climate change is a global threat which needs 
answers and management responses on the state, city, or even neighborhood  level. 
Beside preventive protection measures for every site, a general policy is necessary 
to address and minimize the impact of climate change. In Germany, this issue has 
been taken very seriously; especially the promotion to expand renewable energy 
has been increased by the national and federal governments in the last years. 
Appropriate laws and regulations ensure a guaranteed feed-in remuneration 
for electricity produced by solar panels, photovoltaic systems, biogas plants and 
wind mills as well as the connection to and distribution through the power grid. 
Building insulation is subsidized by the state. The political goal is to reduce the 
emissions caused by fossil fuels in order to slow down the global warming and 
to cover 80 per cent of the demand by energy produced from renewable energies 
in 2050. The measures already taken show their effects: Investments made in 
renewable energy generation plants pay off in the short and medium term due to 
state support and fiscal privileges. The awareness building has been successful; 
state subsidy programmes have contributed significantly to convince the public. 
First important steps for the energy turnaround and on the way from the fossil 
fuel and nuclear age to the solar and efficient energy age are done.
There is probably no country in Europe in which the using of renewable en-
ergies is that visible as in Germany. In some regions and historic cities wind 
farms, photovoltaic and biogas plants as well as insulated buildings are dominant 
elements. It sometimes looks as if the “Land der Dichter und Denker” has been 
turned into a “Land der Dichter and Dämmer”. This ironical remark points to 
the other side of the coin; renewable energy generation plants could have seri-
ous impacts on World Heritage sites especially in regard to their integrity and 
visual qualities. In the reflection reports on the trends of conservation – annually 
presented to the World Heritage Committee3 – wind farms have long since been 
recognized as possible threats for the integrity of a site due to the need to be on 
exposed sites to catch the wind. Their impact can be highly detrimental in visual 
terms to the setting of World Heritage properties, particularly in flat open land-
scapes and mountain ridges where they can disturb long views, panoramas and 
silhouettes. Solar panels and photovoltaic systems could change completely the 
roof landscapes of historic cities and traditional villages as well as agricultural 
landscapes. Building insulation meant to destroy the surface of historic façades, 
in the end the character of a complete traditional ensemble could get lost.
3 See UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Decisions, always Number 7c on the list of 
documents.
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Heritage assets and conservation requirements concur often with measures 
and projects for saving energy and producing renewable energy. A balancing of 
different public and private interests, as to slow down the global warming and to 
reduce energy costs, is necessary. The way ahead is to look for alternative solu-
tions. Heritage Impact Assessment based on a clear articulation of the attributes 
of Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) and sound indisputable topographical 
data is essential for defining the potential visual impacts of windmills and other 
renewable energy generation plants in properties of outstanding universal value 
and their buffer zones.
In general, not enough attention is given to the fact that use and reuse of 
monuments is to be seen as ecologically sound and economically advantageous 
because of the potential energy sources in buildings, the reduction of land con-
sumption for construction, and the know-how transfer of traditional skills. 
Subsidy programmes are very narrow, focused on renewable energy generation; 
built heritage is not as appreciated as non-renewable resources. In a nutshell, it 
may be concluded that to a large extent management issues with regard to World 
Cultural Heritage and climate change remain unresolved or even still untackled.
Roland Bernecker∗
Concluding Remarks
The impact of climate change on our Cultural Heritage is a fact. 72 per cent of 
the State Parties to the World Heritage Convention1 report damages that can 
be linked to the effects of climate change, 125 sites in 59 countries are affected. 
Extreme events related to climate change will increase in frequency and in in-
tensity. In addition, we have to consider slow events like changes in corrosive 
processes, the effects of which are less obvious. The threat is not just one to the 
buildings and the material side of things: losses and damages we incur concern 
socio-economic patterns as well. The loss of memory and of historic wisdom in 
dealing with our cultural and natural resources may lead to the disruption of 
peaceful coexistence.
The rich and diverse presentations of the conference “Climate Change as 
a Threat to Peace: Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity” have 
shown that culture is a crucial, yet dramatically neglected dimension of sustain-
ability. More research will be necessary, especially in order to assess local impacts 
of climate change, to analyse risks and to better capture the relevance of socio-
economic factors. At the conference, a concrete proposal was made to estab-
lish a World Monitoring Report on the state of World Heritage Sites, similar to 
UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report on Education. This would help not only to 
collect information, which is already available on a large scale, but also to process 
this information adequately. At present, this does not happen for lack of funds. 
Such a report could also help to use the prestigious World Heritage Sites to better 
communicate the destructive effects of climate change.
At the same time, we have to reconsider the concepts of prevention, adapta-
tion and monitoring with regard to the impact of climate change on culture and 
peace. We have to broaden our view and rework the concepts we use in describ-
ing and analysing Cultural Heritage. What does preservation and safeguarding 
of Cultural Heritage, what does change, what does management mean? Climate 
change itself has to be put in the more comprehensive frame of what might be 
∗ Secretary-General of the German Commission for UNESCO (DUK).
1 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 
adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151.
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better captured in the expression global change. We are not only facing more ex-
treme weather conditions. The dimension of a changing climate is to be seen in 
relation to significant demographic developments and the important effects of a 
highly dynamic global urbanisation. An interdisciplinary and holistic approach 
is necessary when we reassess the conceptual frame of our analysis and recon-
sider the function of heritage in the context of global changes.
A major issue in this regard is the close link between natural and cultural 
resources. Both categories of heritage are integrated in the World Heritage Con-
vention of 1972, but not until 1992 was the new concept of cultural landscapes 
as sites representing both dimensions officially introduced. We are still at the 
beginning of learning to understand interdependencies.
Moreover, throughout the course of the conference an important issue repeat-
edly emerged: Cultural Heritage and cultural diversity are an important factor 
in developing more sustainable societies. In this context, the notion of resilience 
appeared as crucial. It means the capacity to resist to, absorb and recover from 
effects of hazards. In view of increasing threats, resilience is becoming more im-
portant. We must shift from a paradigm of simple growth and efficiency to  better 
deal with risks and uncertainty. Cultural diversity is a recognised principle in 
dealing with uncertainty and it further increases resilience. The fragility of mono-
cultural patterns is well known. Again, viable solutions have to be  developed in 
the specific context at the local level. Urban resilience, the  development of smart 
cities with intelligent use of ICTs, is an inspiring concept in the perspective of 
enhancing the resilience of our societies.
We are suffering today from a technology bias in the search for solutions for 
the problems we are facing. We tend to increase the complexity and specificity of 
our technical tools in order to solve problems. Cultural resources are neglected, 
as is the need to redefine some of our basic problems in a cultural way. Cul-
tural heritage in its different dimensions is reflecting human experience in the 
permanent effort to build resilient communities. To care for heritage means to 
value our long-term collective experience. The World Heritage Convention is 
not dealing only with sites, but also with values.
One layer of the day’s discussions addressed the legal issues linked to the pres-
ervation of Cultural Heritage. With 190 State Parties, UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Convention is universally ratified. In Article 4, the convention clearly defines 
the obligation of State Parties which I consider worthwhile reproducing here in 
extenso:
Each State Party to this Convention recognises that the duty of ensuring the identifi-
cation, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations 
of the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its 
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territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to the utmost 
of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any international assistance and co-
operation, in particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it may be able 
to obtain.
The question is how the obligation laid down in this provision could be enforced 
with regard to the destructive effects of climate change. Do we really, besides the 
ethical pressure, dispose of some kind of legal leverage to bring governments 
to action? The World Heritage Convention itself does not address the issue of 
climate change directly. The only practical way to add this dimension would 
be a revision of the Operational Guidelines where the threats posed by climate 
change and necessary action could be included. The same is valid for other cul-
tural conventions as for example the Intangible Heritage Convention2 which is 
totally unequipped with regard to climate change.
Other international treaties should be analysed for points of convergence and 
supportiveness in providing a legal hold for advancing concrete requests. The 
current negotiation of newly defined Sustainable Development Goals could be 
an entry point to better integrate the issue in the international agenda. Seen that 
the impact of climate change on Cultural Heritage does constitute, in a broader 
perspective, a possible threat to peace, the proposal was made to bring this issue 
to the Security Council of the UN. The Security Council would be in a position 
to declare its own competence in this matter and to take immediate action.
The more basic question was voiced of if and how the challenges posed by 
climate change present an opportunity to limit State sovereignty in the view of 
better securing global public goods.
When we consider the destructive impact of anthropogenic climate change 
on World Heritage Sites, we run into a highly symbolic paradox: Cultural sites 
of outstanding universal value, globally recognised as the greatest achievements 
of human creativity and as the most treasured expressions of cultural identi-
ties, are threatened by the effects of human inventiveness in developing un-
sustainable lifestyles. While we inscribe outstanding natural sites in UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List, thus formally accrediting their critical value as biological 
and aesthetic resources for humanity, these sites are threatened by a feverish ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of our planet. Anthropogenic climate change 
seems to be a result of the same cultural disposition, which allowed human-
ity to construct Cultural Heritage of outstanding universal value. Today, our 
2 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage; adopted 17 
 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006, 2368 UNTS 3.
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inventiveness and our hunger for improvement not only compromise our fu-
ture, but consume our past.
We have to better explain why – when addressing the challenges of climate 
change and global peace – Cultural Heritage is a fundamental issue. The concern 
of heritage conservation is most evidently losing ground. In my view, we have 
to be more specific when we talk about Cultural Heritage, focusing more on the 
values we need to preserve. We have to be more concrete and more compelling 
when we ask for maintaining awareness of the human dimension, awareness of 
who we were in the past, who we are today, and what the world will look like in 
the future.
In reflecting upon the loss of bonds with our heritage, we have to become 
more serious. The World Heritage Convention is about values. These values are 
the essence of how we live, what is vital for us. My impression is that in the re-
lentless race for an ever-increasing effectiveness, we are becoming inattentive to 
our past, negligent of the interdependencies with our natural environment and 
that we too zealously stress the human substance of our societies. This will make 
us more vulnerable.
It is interesting to note that vulnerability is a central feature in understanding 
the World Heritage Convention. In the 1960s, humanity was offered the oppor-
tunity to learn to consider its presence on earth as a somewhat surprising, at least 
fragile, contingency. On July 20th 1969, an estimated 600 million people followed 
the landing on the moon of Apollo 11 on TV. For the first time in history, a 
human being stood on firm ground outside the geosphere and had an inverted 
look on it. To us humans living here, the earth has become the epistemologi-
cal angle of all cosmic events. Standing on the moon with Neil Armstrong, we 
had to perceive the blue planet as an object, shining with beauty and life, but 
surrounded by an infinite black space which seemed unrelated to human des-
tiny, indifferent to our efforts and hopes. In the year 1968, Richard Buckminster 
 Fuller, an American architect and futurist, published the legendary book, Op-
erating Manual for Spaceship Earth, in which he sets forth the metaphor of the 
earth as a mechanical vehicle that requires constant maintenance and that will 
cease to function if we do not keep it in good order. “We are all astronauts”, says 
Fuller, and there is no emergency exit from our spaceship.
In line with Buckminster Fuller’s metaphor, the international community 
started in the same years to worry in more concrete terms about the mainte-
nance of this vehicle. On June 5 to 16, 1972, the first United Nations Summit 
on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm. It was the summit that 
led to the establishment of the United Nations Environmental Programme. The 
perception that we had to take care of planet earth had become an issue of high 
 Concluding Remarks 209
intergovernmental relevance. It is for this Stockholm summit that finally nat-
ural sites were included in the World Heritage Convention, adopted some five 
months later in Paris.
In addition to this emerging change of perspective on our terrestrial condi-
tions, the possibility of a comprehensive nuclear destruction had become a real-
istic scenario. Some weeks ago I visited the former German government bunker 
in Ahrweiler near Bonn, constructed between 1960 and 1972, in order to al-
low a continuation of central elements of the political administration for at least 
30 days after a nuclear attack. The bunker was fully functional until 1997 and is 
now a heritage site. Not only the approximate cost of 1.5 billion € for this im-
pressive construction indicates how seriously the highest levels of the political 
establishment considered the probability of a nuclear war, it is also the detailed 
thoroughness of its implementation, its technological ambition and the bureau-
cratic soberness of its functionality that still today create a strongly embarrassing 
feeling of how close humanity seemed to have come to the moment the bunker 
was build for.
The inventory of human achievements we collect in the prestigious World 
Heritage List was adopted the same year the construction of the bunker was fin-
ished. One might see the World Heritage Convention as the collective response 
to these developments that confronted us as cruelly as never before with the 
fundamental vulnerability of the human condition. The basic idea, the starting 
point of the World Heritage Convention, is the concept of “one humanity”, of the 
“unity of human values” as it is put in the Venice Charter of 1964. The concept 
of a common heritage of humanity is indeed the most sublime reply to the un-
defeatable vulnerability and fragility of human life on earth. Climate change is 
adding a new dimension to the vulnerability of the ecosystem we depend upon.
The World Heritage Convention reframes the competitive set of national cul-
tural pride into the global perspective of shared universal values, which help 
us to find common responses to growing global challenges. Not to loose these 
values is a necessary contribution to peace.

